El Salvador

• Introduction and background
• Part 1: Legal frameworks
• Part 2: Policies and procedures
• Part 3: Comparative indicators
• Summary and recommendations
• References and data sources

Introduction

Abstract

In 2019, reforms were implemented to the Law on Access to Public Information (LAIP)^* that weakened its guarantees, as well as the oversight role of its governing body, the Institute of Access to Public Information (IAIP). This significantly impacted the accountability mechanisms of public institutions, including the National Civil Police, the Attorney General’s Office, and the Ministry of National Defense.

This has generated serious difficulties in obtaining information related to public security, including data on civilian and security agent deaths. Prior to 2022, it was possible to obtain information related to indicators of police actions and abuses, and that information revealed the continued disproportionate use of lethal force. The lethality rate of the use of force is ranging from 2.34 in 2018 to 2.57 in 2019, 1.67 in 2020, and 1.42 in 2021. The data showed that the proportion of homicides perpetrated by state agents in relation to the total number of homicides was above 5%: 6.4% in 2018, 8.1% in 2019, 6.56% in 2020, and 5.0% in 2021. However, the lethality ratio of civilians to security agents showed that the lethality of civilians was 5.8 times the lethality index of security agents in 2018 and 7.18 in 2019.¹

In these years, although access to this information was available, the level of disaggregation of the data did not allow for knowledge of the sex, gender, age, or other demographic information about the victims. In 2022, each institution linked to public security declared this type of information to be classified for unreasonable periods and justifications, disregarding human rights standards and the LAIP itself. This was done through the approval of a state of exception in March 2022, an extraordinary measure which has since been extended for 18 months as a response to homicidal violence, but which in practice suspended rights and limited the accountability of institutions.² This places El Salvador in a challenging situation in terms of transparency, accountability, and democracy.

Background

The National Civil Police (PNC) is the institution responsible for public security in El Salvador. Its origins stem from the reforms that emerged after the signing of the Peace Accords in 1992, which put an end to a civil war that lasted for over twelve years.³ The accords established a process of demilitarization of public security, leading to the dissolution of the former military security forces and the creation of a new democratic security force, subject to civilian authorities, with adequate disciplinary and functional control mechanisms, a new training system, and the explicit mandate to respect fundamental rights and freedoms.

The reforms also allowed for a reduction and modification of the Armed Forces (FAES), including limitations on their involvement in political life. They also assigned specific functions to the Armed Forces, and their interference in public security would be reserved for national emergencies, risks, or threats.⁴ What was meant to be an extraordinary measure subsequently allowed for the discretionary use of the Armed Forces by all post-war governments, and a military presence has been maintained on multiple occasions, beyond the constitutional limits established in the peace accords. According to the latest available data, it is estimated that as of 2022, there were a total of 20,237 military personnel supporting public security tasks, a figure that is comparable to the scale of the police.⁵

The PNC, on the other hand, has nationwide coverage in the 14 departments that make up the country, with a total of 35 delegations, 71 sub-delegations, 254 police posts, and 14 rural police headquarters.⁶ Approximately 21,941 police officers are managed by a general directorate, with technical secretariats for institutional planning, international relations, and cooperation, among others. Likewise, various departments such as document management and archives, information technology, human rights, access to public information, and gender, among others, are part of the organizational structure of the institution. The data on military and police personnel amount to a total of 42,178 officers for a territory of 21,041 km².

Part 1: Legal Frameworks

Global treaties

1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)		State party
ICCPR Optional Protocol 1		State party
1984 Convention Against Torture (CAT)		State party
CAT committee competent to receive individual complaints?		No
CAT Optional Protocol 1		Not party

Regional treaties

1969 Inter-American Convention on Human Rights		State party
1985 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture		State party

National legal provisions

Relevant constitutional provisions or general laws

The Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador,⁷ in effect since 1983, establishes in Article 2 that every person has the right to life, physical and moral integrity, liberty, security, work, property and possession, and to be protected in the preservation and defense of these rights.

Regarding the administration of National Defense and public security, Article 159 states that both are assigned to different ministries, and that public security will be the responsibility of the National Civil Police, which will be a professional body, independent of the armed forces and unrelated to any partisan activity. Furthermore, the constitution establishes in Article 86 that public power emanates from the people, therefore, government officials are delegates of the people and have no more powers than those expressly granted to them by law.

State of Exception

Certain fundamental rights have been limited, and this provision is based on Articles 29, 30, and 31 of the Constitution.

• Article 29 – “In cases of war, invasion of territory, rebellion, sedition, catastrophe, epidemic, or other general calamities, or serious disturbances of public order, the guarantees established in Articles 5, 6 paragraph 1, 7 Paragraph 1, and 24 of this Constitution may be suspended, except when it comes to meetings or associations with religious, cultural, economic, or sporting purposes. Such suspension may affect the whole or part of the territory of the Republic, and will be effected by means of a decree by the Legislative Body or the Executive Body, as the case may be. The guarantees contained in Articles 12 Paragraph 2 and 13 Paragraph 2 of this Constitution may also be suspended, when so agreed by the Legislative Body, with the favorable vote of three-quarters of the elected Deputies; administrative detention not to exceed fifteen days.”
• Article 30 – “The term of suspension of constitutional guarantees shall not exceed 30 days. After this period, the suspension may be extended for an equal period and by means of a new decree, if the circumstances that motivated it continue. If such decree is not issued, the suspended guarantees shall be established as a matter of right.”
• Article 31 – “When the circumstances that led to the suspension of constitutional guarantees cease to exist, the Legislative Assembly or the Council of Ministers, as the case may be, must restore such guarantees.”

The suspended rights refer to Article 7, regarding the right to assembly and association; Article 12, Paragraph 2, regarding the right to be informed of the reasons for detention, the right to remain silent, and the right to legal defense; Article 13, Paragraph 2, regarding the maximum duration of administrative detention of 72 hours before being presented to a court; and Article 24, regarding the inviolability of communications. As of August 17, 2022, the suspension of the right to assembly and association was lifted, but the rest of the rights remain suspended. Additionally, at least 15 reforms to the penal code, criminal procedural code, and specialized laws have been made.

Penal Code on organised crime

The Penal Code (Decree 349) created Article 345-C, “Illegal production and reproduction of messages, signals, names, or propaganda related to gangs,” in line with the reform of Article 1 of the Law on the Proscription of Gangs, Criminal Gangs, Groups, Associations, and Organizations. Both reforms establish the prohibition of sympathetic behaviors that involve the creation or transmission of signs, signals, or messages related to gangs, as well as references to territorial control or the reproduction of messages or statements by gangs through any audiovisual or computer means, with a penalty of 10 to 15 years of imprisonment for these behaviors. This provision has been considered a restriction on freedom of the press and information, as well as an exercise of anticipatory censorship that prevents the coverage of certain sources and content, and is seen as disproportionate as it imposes a long sentence for such behavior.

Reforms to the Penal Code have also focused on significantly increasing penalties for participating in Illicit Associations (Article 345, Decree 337), imposing a range of 20 to 30 years in prison for members or associates of these organizations, and 40 to 45 years for leaders or creators. It also included an aggravating factor of one-third of the maximum penalties when involving an authority figure or public official. The Law Regulating Activities Related to Drugs (Decree 338) and the Special Law Against the Crime of Extortion (Decree 343) also impose penalties of 20 to 30 years in prison for the commission of any of the crimes contemplated in these laws by members of gangs or terrorist organizations.

The Criminal Procedural Code (CPP) reforms

Provisional Detention (Article 8): The two-year time limit for provisional detention has been eliminated, and an indefinite period has been established for cases of homicide, aggravated homicide, extortion, aggravated extortion, solicitation and conspiracy to commit these crimes, as well as crimes related to illicit associations, terrorist organizations, and those contemplated in the Law Regulating Activities Related to Drugs; and in general, any other criminal group referred to in Article 1 of the Law on the Proscription of Gangs, Criminal Gangs, Groups, Associations, and Organizations (see above).

Faceless Judges: Incorporation of Article 73-A, which conceals the identity of judicial officials and secretaries, at both in-person and virtual hearings, and in case documentation, taking necessary measures to prevent traceability.

Law Against Organized Crime (LECO), Decree 527 of 6 October 2022

Trial of Minors in Adult Courts (Article 3, Paragraph 3): When adults and minors are jointly accused in a case, the trial will be conducted by two judges, one with jurisdiction over adults and another for minors; who, in such cases, will jointly oversee the process from its initiation to its conclusion, each issuing their respective orders based on the provisions of this law and other applicable laws and international instruments, while respecting the legal guarantees established in these regulations, especially regarding the determination of measures, penalties, and correctional facilities for minors.

Juvenile Penal Law (LPJ), Decree 342 of 30 March 2022

Article 8 incorporates the use of imprisonment as a sanction for offenses such as “illicit associations, terrorist activities, and those contemplated in the Law Regulating Activities Related to Drugs, committed by members of terrorist groups, gangs, or any other criminal group referred to in Article 1 of the Law on the Proscription of Gangs, Criminal Gangs, Groups, Associations, and Organizations,” with penalties of up to 20 years in prison for adolescents aged 16 or older and 10 years in prison for those over 12 years old.

Relevant specific national legislation

The Penal Code,⁸ Article 27, establishes that a person is not criminally responsible “when acting or failing to act in compliance with a legal duty or in the legitimate exercise of a right or lawful activity,” and Article 129, Subsections 8, 9, and 10, establishes that aggravated homicide occurs in the following cases:

8. When committed by a civilian or military authority, taking advantage of their position;
9. When preceded by forced disappearance of persons;
10. When committed against a public official, public authority, law enforcement agent, or prison personnel, whether or not they are performing their duties or on account of them.

The Criminal Procedure Code⁹ establishes regulations for the detention of the accused. Article 275 states that police officers shall arrest the accused in cases authorized by this Code, strictly adhering to the following basic principles of action:

1. Not to use force, except when strictly necessary and in proportion to the execution of the arrest.
2. Not to use firearms, except when there is resistance that endangers the life or physical integrity of individuals, or to prevent the commission of another crime, within the limitations referred to in the previous paragraph.
3. Not to inflict, instigate, or tolerate any act of torture or ill-treatment or other forms of punishment.

The Organic Law of the National Civil Police of El Salvador,¹⁰ in Article 15, states that members of the National Civil Police shall carry regulated firearms in certain specified circumstances and activities. The use of firearms is governed by the following rules:

1. In the performance of their duties, members of the National Civil Police shall use non-violent means whenever possible before resorting to the use of force and firearms. They may use force and firearms only when other means are ineffective or do not guarantee the achievement of the intended legitimate result.
2. Members of the National Civil Police shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defense or defense of others in the face of imminent danger of death or serious injury, with the purpose of preventing the commission of a particularly serious crime that poses a serious threat to life, and only if less extreme measures are insufficient and the use of firearms is strictly unavoidable.
3. When the use of firearms is unavoidable, members of the National Civil Police shall: a) exercise restraint and act in proportion to the seriousness of the crimes and the legitimate objective pursued; b) minimize harm and injuries, respect and protect human life; c) provide prompt medical assistance and services to injured or affected individuals; d) promptly notify the relatives or close friends of the injured or affected persons.
4. When using force or firearms, members of the National Civil Police shall immediately report any injuries or deaths to their superiors.
5. In fulfilling their duty to safeguard the exercise of people’s rights, members of the National Civil Police shall guarantee the rights of assembly and demonstration. When, by legal orders, they are obliged to disperse a gathering or demonstration, they shall use the least dangerous means and only to the extent necessary. Members of the National Civil Police shall refrain from using firearms in such cases, except in the case of violent gatherings where other means have been exhausted, and only when the circumstances specified in subsection 2 of this article are met.
6. Exceptional circumstances such as internal political instability or any other public emergency shall not be invoked to justify the violation of these rules.
7. Special weapons shall be kept in the arsenal of the National Civil Police for use by trained personnel; the cases and conditions in which they may be used shall be established by regulations.

The Police Disciplinary Law,¹¹ in Article 8, states that the following behaviors constitute serious offenses:

1. Failure to report facts that should be brought to the attention of a superior due to the officer’s position or duties, or doing so with delay, affecting the implementation of those duties.
2. Failure to comply with professional obligations related to police duties or inherent to the position.
3. Using weapons on or off duty in violation of the regulations governing their use, as well as negligence, recklessness, or excessive use or handling of weapons, force, or any other means, even when there is no harm to the integrity of individuals or property.

Relevant national regulations

The National Civil Police and the Ministry of Justice and Public Security published the Conceptual Framework for the Use of Force and the Use of Lethal Weapons in the National Civil Police of El Salvador in 2017, which establishes the legal basis, conceptual framework, model of resistance and control, use of lethal weapons, etc.¹²

Additionally, the National Civil Police has an Instruction Manual for Weapons, Explosives, and Similar Articles, published in 2015, which describes the use of firearms.¹³

Article 40: In the performance of their duties, members of the National Civil Police shall use non-violent means to the extent possible before resorting to the use of force and firearms. They may use force and firearms only when other means are ineffective or do not guarantee the achievement of the intended legitimate result.

b. Members of the National Civil Police shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defense or defense of others in the face of imminent danger of death or serious injury, with the purpose of preventing the commission of a particularly serious crime that poses a serious threat to life, and only if less extreme measures are insufficient and the use of firearms is strictly unavoidable;

c. When the use of firearms is unavoidable, members of the National Civil Police shall:

1. Exercise restraint and act in proportion to the seriousness of the crime and the legitimate objective pursued;
2. Minimize harm and injuries, respect and protect human life;
3. Provide prompt medical assistance and services to injured or affected individuals;
4. Notify the relatives or close friends of the injured or affected persons as soon as possible;
5. When using force or firearms, members of the National Civil Police shall immediately report any injuries or deaths to their superiors;
6. In fulfilling their duty to safeguard the exercise of people’s rights, members of the National Civil Police shall guarantee the rights of assembly and demonstration. When, by legal orders, they are obliged to disperse a gathering or demonstration, they shall use the least dangerous means and only to the extent necessary. Members of the National Civil Police shall refrain from using firearms in such cases, except in the case of violent gatherings where other means have been exhausted, and only when the circumstances specified in subsection b of this regulation are met.
7. Exceptional circumstances such as internal political instability or any other public emergency shall not be invoked to justify the violation of these rules.

Legal interpretation and application

UN or other international body decisions or advisory opinions

In 2018, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions analyzed cases of “armed confrontations” and found that the modus operandi indicated that alleged gang members were killed in cold blood, and that the perpetrators or third parties had subsequently manipulated the crime scene, for example, by placing weapons and drugs next to the bodies. With some exceptions, most cases indicated the commission of extrajudicial executions. This conduct was facilitated by the lack of adequate investigations and judicial responses.¹⁴

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), in its follow-up report to its 2019 on-site visit, stated that “due to the irreversible consequences that could arise from the use of force, its use must be conceived as a last resort, limited qualitatively and quantitatively, with the aim of preventing a more serious event than the one that provokes the state’s reaction. Both the Commission and the Court have agreed that in order for the use of force to be justified, the principles of legality, absolute necessity, and proportionality must be satisfied.” This report emphasized the need for an appropriate legal framework that deters any threat to the right to life and, in particular, regulates by law the use of force and lethal force by law enforcement personnel. This regulation must establish that, without any exception, the use of force, including lethal force, will be carried out under the principles of absolute necessity, rationality, moderation, and progressive use, always considering: (1) the rights to be protected; (2) the legitimate objective pursued; and (3) the risk that law enforcement personnel must face.¹⁵

Among other recommendations established by the Commission was the suggestion that the country should ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and establish the Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture, as conditions that could generate preventive actions related to the issue of extrajudicial executions in force in the country.

As stated by the IACHR, in all cases where civilians are injured or killed by police or military forces, the State must urgently conduct diligent and impartial investigations in order to establish the facts and determine the corresponding criminal responsibilities.

The IACHR emphasizes that the duty to respect and guarantee Article 1.1 of the American Convention imposes the obligation to document cases in which the police have used force and lethal force in the exercise of their functions, as well as to conduct necessary internal and external investigations, including judicial investigations, to ensure that actions were carried out within the framework of legality. All these actions are the minimum necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of extrajudicial executions by state agents.¹⁶

Regional court judgments

El Salvador does not have any judgments from regional courts such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights or the United Nations treaty monitoring committees regarding cases of the use of lethal force.

National court judgments

El Salvador does not have any specific national court judgments on the use of lethal force, as the offense is not codified. However, criminal investigations have been conducted against police officers and soldiers.

According to data from the Attorney General’s Office, from 2015 to 2020, a total of 5,052 public security agents were processed, and their cases have been brought to court. Of these, 4,279 were police officers and 773 were soldiers. The most prevalent crimes were: Simple homicide (1,087), illegal possession or carrying of firearms (495), injuries (388), aggravated homicide (271), and threats (230). Out of the total, only 12.51% faced the process with pretrial detention.

From 2015 to 2020, 1,365 public security agents were prosecuted for violent deaths, and the number of convictions was 25.¹⁷

Oversight bodies

In El Salvador, the actions of the police are supervised and regulated internally and externally through the following two mechanisms

Police Disciplinary Law, Legislative Decree 518, 2007

This law establishes the disciplinary regime applicable to the personnel of the National Civil Police (PNC). It defines the types and classifications of sanctions, procedures, and authorities and bodies with investigative and sanctioning powers.

• Article 17 establishes national disciplinary tribunals that handle cases involving senior and executive-level personnel. Regional tribunals are also established to resolve cases originating within their territorial jurisdictions and involving basic, administrative, technical, and service-level police personnel.
• Article 26 establishes appellate tribunals that have jurisdiction to hear appeals of decisions by the disciplinary tribunals.
• Article 32 establishes the General Inspectorate, which is responsible for verifying compliance with the disciplinary regime. It initiates the respective procedures, acts as a controller, submits reports to the Director-General, and can appeal, if necessary, the final decision of the disciplinary tribunal.

Organic Law of the General Inspectorate of Public Security, Legislative Decree 815, 2014

Published in the Official Gazette No. 202, Volume No. 405 on October 30, 2014, it states the following:

• Article 1: The General Inspectorate of Public Security is a supervisory and oversight body for Public Security Institutions. It operates under the authority of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, in accordance with the law.
• Article 3: The General Inspectorate’s competence includes the control and oversight of the actions of the operational and management services of the National Civil Police (PNC) and the National Academy of Public Security (ANSP), with special emphasis on respect for human rights.
• Article 5: The General Inspectorate has the following powers:
  1. Ensuring strict compliance with the law by members of the Police Corporation and the ANSP, in accordance with the governing regulations.
  2. Monitoring and controlling the functioning of all agencies, departments, units, and operational and management services of the PNC and the ANSP.
  3. Supervising compliance with human rights in the actions of PNC members and the ANSP.
  4. Ensuring adherence to the Police Code of Conduct and Ethics required for the exercise of functions by the PNC.
  5. Supervising the conduct of public servants of the ANSP and students in accordance with ethical principles governing public service and approved curricula by the ANSP Academic Council, as stipulated in its Organic Law.
  6. Evaluating and supervising police plans, programs, instruments, and procedures to ensure compliance with national and international laws.
  7. Verifying the proper management of personnel and institutional resources in the PNC and the ANSP;
  8. Supervising compliance with the disciplinary regimes of the ANSP and the PNC, in accordance with the regulations governing both institutions.
  9. Receiving, investigating, and processing complaints from citizens regarding the actions of PNC members and the ANSP.
  10. Initiating disciplinary proceedings for serious and very serious offenses committed by members of the Police Institution and the ANSP.
  11. Exercising functional direction over internal disciplinary investigations of the PNC and the ANSP.
  12. Requesting reports from the heads of the PNC and the ANSP regarding investigations related to this law.
  13. Referring cases that constitute crimes or offenses committed by personnel of the Police Institution and the ANSP to the competent authorities.

Part 2: Policies and Procedures

Data collection and publication by official agencies

1. Are the number of deaths following any police use of force
	Collected?	Limited, Poor
	Accessible through existing publicly available information?	Limited, Poor
	Is this a legal requirement?	Partial, Medium
	If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released?	Limited, Poor
2. If published, to what extent can the number of deaths be readily determined from official statistics?		Partial, Medium
3. Is it possible to identify specific individuals killed in official records?		Limited, Poor
4. Is demographic and other information for the deceased
	Collected?	Limited, Poor
	Accessible through existing publicly available information?	Limited, Poor
	Is this a legal requirement?	Partial, Medium
	Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available?	Good, Robust
	If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released?	Limited, Poor
5. Is demographic and other information on officers in use of force incidents
	Collected?	Unknown
	Accessible through existing publicly available information?	Limited, Poor
	Is this a legal requirement?	Partial, Medium
	Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available?	Good, Robust
	If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released?	Limited, Poor
6. Is information on the circumstances
	Collected?	Limited, Poor
	Publicly available?	Limited, Poor
	Is this a legal requirement?	Partial, Medium
	Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available?	Good, Robust
	If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released?	Limited, Poor
7. Is information about the type(s) of force used
	Collected?	Limited, Poor
	Accessible through existing publicly available information?	Limited, Poor
	Is this a legal requirement?	Partial, Medium
	Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available?	Good, Robust
	If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released?	Limited, Poor

Data quality of official sources

8. How reliable are the sources used to produce official statistics about deaths?		Partial, Medium
9. Are there mechanisms for internal quality assurance / verification conducted		Good, Robust
10. Is the methodology for data collection publicised?		Limited, Poor
11. How reliable are the overall figures produced?		Partial, Medium

Data analysis and lessons learnt

12. Do state or police agencies analyse data on the use of lethal force, to prevent future deaths?		Partial, Medium
13. Is there evidence that state/ police agencies act on the results of their analysis, including applying lessons learnt?		Partial, Medium
14. Are external bodies are able to reuse data for their own analyses?		Partial, Medium
15. Do external, non-governmental agencies collect and publish their own statistics on deaths following police use of force?		Partial, Medium

Investigations by official agencies

16. Is there a legal requirement for deaths to be independently investigated?		Partial, Medium
19. Are close relatives of the victims involved in the investigations?		Partial, Medium
20. Investigation reports into deaths
	Are publicly available?	Limited, Poor
	Give reasons for the conclusions they have reached?	Limited, Poor
	Is this a legal requirement?	Limited, Poor
	Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available?	Good, Robust
	If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released?	Limited, Poor
21. Is there information available on legal proceedings against agents / officials, pursuant to deaths?		Limited, Poor
22. Is there information available on legal proceedings against state agencies, pursuant to deaths?		Limited, Poor
23. Is there information available on disciplinary proceedings against agents/ officials, pursuant to deaths?		Limited, Poor
24. Number of prosecutions against agents / officials involved in the last ten years?		In the last FIVE years (2015–2020), 1365 public security agents were prosecuted for causing violent deaths.
25. Number of convictions against agents / officials involved in the last ten years?		25 convictions in 2015–2020.
28. Number of cases in which states have been found to have breached human rights law on the use of lethal force?		No international human rights cases have been brought & found against El Salvador.

Detailed elaboration

Data collection and publication by official agencies

The deaths resulting from the use of lethal force by the police have been monitored by the Passionist Social Service since 2018. There are records shared by the Access to Public Information Units of the National Civil Police and the Attorney General’s Office, covering the period from 2018 to April 2022. It is unknown if there were any records after this period as the information is no longer shared.

From 2018 to April 2022, public requests for information about police use of force was done through the Attorney General’s Office, which provided records on the number of deaths resulting from confrontations with security agents¹⁸ disaggregated by date, department, municipality, profession or occupation of the victims and perpetrators, and gang affiliation if applicable. Similarly, the information could be requested from the National Civil Police, which provided the number of deaths in illegitimate attacks,¹⁹ disaggregated by date, time, department, municipality, number of injured and deceased, indicating whether they were police officers, military personnel, or gang members, and if applicable, their gang affiliation. Furthermore, there are no records regarding the disaggregation of ethnic origin, age, and gender of the deceased individuals. It is worth mentioning that information regarding illegitimate attacks²⁰ where firearms were used as the type of weapon was available.

However, starting in April 2022, it is unknown whether the police and the Attorney General’s Office are registering this information. The Attorney General’s Office has declared the information as non-existent, and the Police declared it to be confidential on May 4, 2022, for a period of 7 years according to Agreement No. PNC/DG/COP.1.1-A-001-05-2022. In light of this, the only official source of information is the daily number of homicides provided through the official Twitter account of the National Civil Police. However, in such tweets the level of disaggregation is reduced from past practice. In some cases, the tweets indicate the gang affiliation, whether they were police officers or soldiers, the date, municipality, and department of the incident. Additionally, the gender and age of the deceased individuals are not provided. Furthermore, there are three limitations: the information is in total numbers, there is no supporting resolution, and the type of weapon used is generally unknown.

Nevertheless, access to information is a legal requirement. According to the Law of Access to Public Information (LAIP), Article 2 states that every person has the right to request and receive timely and truthful information generated, managed, or held by public institutions and other obligated entities, without the need to provide any interest or motivation. Furthermore, it is established that information can be made public either officially²¹ or through a request. Additionally, according to Article 4, public information must be complete, reliable, and truthful, in accordance with the principle of integrity governing the law. Therefore, in order to provide comprehensive information, levels of disaggregation should be considered.

However, the information has been declared classified under the same law, according to Article 19, subparagraphs (b), (d), (f), (g), and (h), which are detailed as follows:

1. b) Information that harms or puts at risk national defense and public security.
2. d) Information that clearly endangers the life, security, or health of any person.
3. f) Information that causes serious harm to the prevention, investigation, or prosecution of illicit acts, the administration of justice, or the verification of compliance with laws.
4. g) Information that compromises state strategies and functions in ongoing judicial or administrative procedures.
5. h) Information that may provide an undue advantage to a person to the detriment of a third party.

The Access to Public Information Units of the National Civil Police and the Attorney General’s Office previously shared records for each unidentified victim²² in an Excel document, and the data needed to be cleaned. In some cases, information was generated through pivot tables. Therefore, there was moderate difficulty in extracting statistics. The turning point came in April 2022, as from this date, it has been necessary to monitor the official Twitter account of the National Civil Police.

Data quality of official sources

The Agreement for Cooperation and Institutional Strengthening required reconciling homicide and femicide figures, between the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJSP), the Attorney General’s Office (FGR), and the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ). This agreement stated that there should be a Tripartite Operational Board, which, according to clause four, had the authority to “validate protocols, methodologies, instruments, and data variables to be reconciled”.²³ Furthermore, data quality was also ensured by the Law of Access to Public Information (LAIP), which stated that its implementation should be based on the principle of integrity, meaning it should be complete, reliable, and truthful (Article 4d)

It is known that the FGR had the Directorate of Management, Analysis, and Access to Information, which consisted of the units: Information Analysis Unit, Fiscal Information Management Unit, and Information Access Unit. Additionally, they had the Information and Automated Management System for the Prosecution (SIGAP) to ensure availability, timeliness, confidentiality, security, and effectiveness in obtaining information. This information system allowed for automated generation of information and reduced margins of error.

Similarly, the PNC had a Central Unit for Analysis and Information Processing (UCATI), where procedures such as system development, analysis of the criminal situation, management and updating of support databases, consultation of criminal information in the mechanized and physical systems, among others, were carried out.

The information managed by these units was shared by the Units of Access to Public Information (UAIP). Therefore, the reliability of the figures was supported by a final resolution on the delivery of information. However, starting in 2022, in response to the withholding of public information regarding the number of deaths, a strategy was developed to monitor the daily number of homicides through the official Twitter account of the PNC, where the number of deaths “after attacking agents, PNC members, and/or FAES” is reported. As a result, the reliability through a final resolution from the UAIP of the institutions has been lost, and there is no document indicating the methodology and protocols used for the data.

Finally, the data collection methodology of the PNC and FGR is unknown. However, it is known that the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office (PDDH) collects data as follows. According to the Manual for the Investigation of Extrajudicial Executions and Torture of the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office²⁴, the data collection process begins with the receipt of a complaint or the initiation of an investigation ex officio (through news, notices, reports, or verification). The data to be collected include the full name of the complainant, the age of the complainant, the address and telephone number of the complainant’s home, the issue being reported, the name of the victim, when the incident occurred (exact or approximate time, day, month, and year), how the incident occurred (in as much detail as possible), who was present at the scene, who witnessed the incident, who was involved in the incident, whether any public authority was involved, and a description of the perpetrators’ attire.

If the investigation begins with a complaint, a preliminary examination is conducted. Then, in either case, registration is carried out, followed by qualification. Based on this, an initial resolution is issued with or without precautionary measures, either closing the case or continuing with the investigation. If the investigation continues, the collection of documents, information, or evidence proceeds, including expert reports, verification reports, inspections, interviews, among others. A Final Resolution is then issued, along with its corresponding notification. Finally, follow-up may or may not be given to the case.

Data analysis and lessons learned

Regarding data analysis and its utilization by state institutions, there used to be a coordinated effort between state institutions and civil society organizations. However, this relationship has progressively deteriorated since President Nayib Bukele took office in 2019.

From 2014 to 2018, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman conducted the “Special Report by the Human Rights Ombudsman, Ms. Raquel Caballero de Guevara, on extrajudicial executions attributed to the National Civil Police in El Salvador, 2014–2018”. This report characterized cases of violations of the right to life and patterns of extrajudicial actions, providing general and specific recommendations to various state institutions, including the Attorney General, the President of the Republic, the Technical Executive Unit of the Justice Sector, the Victim Support Directorate, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the Legislative Assembly’s Justice and Human Rights Committees, the Supreme Court of Justice, among others.

In 2021, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman published a report on the situation of the right to health for persons deprived of liberty, with technical support from the Passionist Social Service. This report analyzed the current conditions of detainees and made recommendations to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the General Directorate of Penal Centers.

Furthermore, in 2021, with the support of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, a Manual for the Investigation of Extrajudicial Executions and Torture was developed to strengthen the technical and investigative capacities of the operational staff of the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman in cases of grave human rights violations, with an emphasis on the right to life and personal integrity.

The Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office was one of the main institutions working collaboratively, it was part of the Round Table on Internal Forced Displacement, which was made up of civil society organizations working on different projects related to forced displacement, gender-based violence, and social violence to improve responses to these issues.

The approval of the state of exception in March 2022 marked a turning point in the joint work carried out by the Human Rights Ombudsman and civil society organizations. The ties created by this joint work were cut, as the Ombudsman’s official position was to support the actions taken by the presidency. One year and five months after the approval of the state of exception, the Ombudsman has not made any statement regarding multiple human rights violations which have been continuously reported and accompanied by civil society organizations.

Regarding the use of official data from public institutions, the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office issued an annual report documenting its work, in which it analyzed the activities of different state institutions, especially those involved with Public Security, listing the principal institutions subject to reports, the principal rights violated, etc., thereby generating recommendations for each one of the institutions.

During the presidency of Salvador Sánchez Cerén (2014–2019), a Round Table on Police Actions and Human Rights was formed, specifically in the year 2016, where state institutions and civil society worked together. Among those participating were the Secretariat of Professional Responsibility and the Human Rights Unit of the National Civil Police, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the Office of Attention to Victims, and the Human Rights Ombudsman which also received technical assistance and financial support from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

This collaborative working group issued a proposal to measure indicators of Lethal Use of Force on the part of the National Civil Police. However, the measurement could not be carried out as the institutions did not share the necessary information.

Investigations by official agencies

For investigations into cases of lethal use of force by public security agents, there is a Manual for the Investigation of Extrajudicial Executions and Torture, which establishes an investigative procedure to be carried out by the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman. This manual was developed with the support of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Investigations can be initiated either ex officio or through complaints filed with the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman.

The investigation process is divided into four stages:

1. Opening, registration, and classification
2. Hypothesis, collection of elements, evidence, and proof
3. Analysis and resolution
4. Case follow-up

Each stage is developed specifically, gradually, and with established timelines.

The National Civil Police (PNC) also has internal and external control mechanisms to ensure compliance with its functions and prevent excesses and abuses of police power. Internal controls are handled by the Professional Responsibility Secretariat, which oversees and controls the performance of the institution’s services. The following units depend on the procedures of this department: Control Unit, Disciplinary Investigation Unit, and Internal Affairs Unit.

The General Inspectorate of Public Security is a supervisory and oversight body for the operational and management services of the PNC and the National Public Security Academy. This institution is responsible for receiving, investigating, and processing citizen complaints, as well as referring cases classified as crimes or offenses to the authorities.

Investigations into members of the National Civil Police are carried out by the Attorney General’s Office, the General Inspectorate of Public Security, and the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman.

However, according to the Special Report on Extrajudicial Executions attributed to the National Civil Police in El Salvador 2014–2018, it is clear that very few cases reach the sentencing stage, and in most cases, the prosecutors requested definitive dismissal based on exemptions from criminal responsibility related to the fulfillment of duty and legitimate defense.

The investigative approach taken in these cases is based on the assumption of armed confrontations with gangs, taking into account the statements of the perpetrator and their colleagues, which often leads to the dismissal of charges against the majority of implicated security agents.

Investigations of Security Agents Implicated in Cases Involving the Lethal Use of Force

Regarding the independence and impartiality of investigations of implicated security agents, the “Special Report of the Human Rights Ombudsman Raquel Caballero de Guevara, on Extrajudicial Executions attributed to the National Civil Police in El Salvador 2014–2018, Characterization of cases in violation of the right to life and patterns of extralegal actions,” identifies certain characteristics during the investigations of these cases. These include classifying extrajudicial executions as simple homicides instead of aggravated homicides, even when they meet the circumstances established in the Criminal Procedure Code to qualify as aggravated homicides, due to involving civilian or military authorities, malice, premeditation, or abuse of rank and deliberate cruelty. Those cases which have resulted in a prison sentence have been those that have been exposed to public scrutiny.

There are also benefits given to the accused to lessen the impact of the legal process, such as being processed while remaining free or having the case information kept confidential. Additionally, there have been cases where the accused had defenders assigned by the police in addition to the public defenders assigned by the Attorney General, raising concerns about independence.

The role of the police in investigating crimes allegedly committed by police officers is questionable. The management of crime scenes should be extremely careful, exhaustive, and rigorous, throughout the collection, recollection, and custody of evidence, however, many cases²⁵ have shown contamination of crime scenes by police officers and indications of tampering with evidence, indicating procedural fraud. The custody of the crime scenes is often entrusted to police officers who may be colleagues of the accused or assigned to the same police unit, which indicates a bias in handling the scenes and the overall processes.

External controls, such as the General Inspectorate of Public Security, are limited to conducting administrative investigations while a criminal investigation is ongoing, according to a ruling by the Constitutional Chamber.

The Attorney General’s Office has been criticized for hindering the investigation process by failing to interview family members or eyewitnesses, to arrest suspects during the investigation, or to seize their weapons. There have been instances of complete lack of protection for family members and witnesses, as well as a lack of participation or consideration. The prosecuting attorneys take on the role of actively defending the suspects, justifying their executions through the framework of legitimate defense and the fulfillment of duties.

The Institute of Legal Medicine, which is involved in the investigation process, has been known to delay the processing of crime scenes and the collection of bodies. Inconsistent reports and omissions of relevant information for the investigation have also been observed.

Overall, the investigation of extrajudicial executions involving security agents lacks independence and is characterized by negligence at various levels. Patterns of behavior, modus operandi, and high levels of impunity have normalized and legitimized extralegal executions within the police force, often justified under the premise of legitimate defense and the fulfillment of duties.

Information on cases of lethal use of force is not publicly shared, making it difficult to access updates. The data provided by the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman is general, with limited information on final resolutions of responsibility against members of the PNC and FAES. However, various documents indicate that the majority of cases do not result in a conviction due to several obstacles. Investigations are usually initiated through complaints, and there are indications of procedural fraud, lack of protection for victims, threats, and pressure to withdraw complaints. In those cases which result in proceedings, the defendants receive special benefits. Usually the death is justified through legitimate defense and the fulfillment of duties.

Legal proceedings, prosecutions and convictions

Regarding the information obtained through public information requests regarding cases of security agents involved in the use of lethal force, for the period from 2018 to 2021, it was possible to obtain statistical information for each record detailing the crimes (simple homicide, aggravated homicide, simple femicide, and aggravated femicide) in which a police officer or member of military personnel was the defendant, according to the judicial stage of the process (closed file, provisional file, under investigation, in court proceedings, conviction, acquittal, definitive dismissal, and provisional dismissal).

This information addressed the number of police officers accused in cases that were archived, dismissed, or resulted in a conviction, as well as the number of police officers accused of homicide and attempted homicide who were convicted. Since 2022, all the mentioned information has been classified as confidential.

The accessible information comes from the General Inspectorate of Public Security (IGSP), which shares information about police officers accused of human rights violations, specifying cases in which the right to life has been violated.

Likewise, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (PDDH) shares the same information based on the complaints it receives, recognizing state institutions as perpetrators, including the FAES and PNC.

Non-official sources

As part of the strategies of civil society organizations in the face of the lack of official data, the Servicio Social Pasionista has implemented a system to monitor the official accounts of public officials in order to gather information on homicides, illegitimate assaults, arrests, incarcerated population, and seizures, among other variables related to public security.

This monitoring allows disaggregated information on homicides, including the date of the incident, the profession or occupation of the deceased, the department and municipality where the incident occurred, and, in some cases, a possible cause. It also indicates if the perpetrator was apprehended in some cases.

Another variable that provides insight is the number of illegitimate assaults, disaggregated by the date of the incident, the number of injured police/soldiers, the number of deceased police/soldiers, the number of injured alleged gang members, the number of deceased alleged gang members, the presence of FAES/PNC groups during the illegitimate assault, and the department and municipality where the incident occurred.

Additionally, the monitoring records the number of arrests during the State of Exception, through which estimations are made regarding the overcrowding rate and the rate of incarcerated population per 100,000 inhabitants aged 18 or older.

This monitoring allows us to track various variables and compare them with the information provided by public institutions and government officials.

Civil society organizations have also produced various reports based on data provided by the Access to Public Information Units. For example, the Passionist Social Service (SSPAS) published reports on human rights violations in 2018, which highlighted the number and percentage of victims in armed confrontations involving the PNC and the FAES and alleged criminal groups from 2014 to 2018.²⁶ The report also included the ratio of civilian deaths to police or military deaths in armed confrontations. Similarly, this index of lethality from 2017 to 2020 was highlighted in the 2019-2020 report.²⁷

The José Simeón Cañas Central American University (UCA), through the University Human Rights Observatory, has annually published statistics on deaths caused by the use of force.²⁸ These statistics were mostly obtained through the Access to Public Information Units.

The Platform for Citizen Security (PSC) conducted an exercise to measure indicators of citizen security, calculating the levels of use of force and firearms by the National Civil Police and the Armed Forces of El Salvador from 2018 to 2020.²⁹ The same measurement was done for the year 2021.³⁰

The University Human Rights Observatory presented the 2022 report, highlighting the difficulty in obtaining statistics on deaths caused by the use of force by the police.

Furthermore, the SSPAS has faced difficulties in compiling statistics for reporting since 2020. For example, a report on “Deaths in prisons during the state of emergency in El Salvador, alleged extrajudicial executions” was submitted to the United Nations, but the information was obtained through monitoring press releases as data on deaths of persons in custody was declared confidential.

Since 2022, there is no longer access to public information regarding deaths caused by the use of force as it has been declared confidential. However, civil society organizations have developed strategies to obtain statistics, including monitoring, collecting, and recording daily publications from official Twitter accounts of public security institutions, as well as tracking press releases, among other methods.

Part 3: Comparative indicators

I-1a. CK: Number of civilians killed by law enforcement agents on duty, by gunshot	195
I-1b. CKt: Number of civilians killed by law enforcement agents, regardless of means and whether or not on duty	Data unavailable
I-1c. CW: Number of civilians wounded by law enforcement agents on duty, by gunshot	76
I-1d. CWt: Number of civilians wounded by law enforcement agents, whether or not on duty and regardless of means	Data unavailable
I-2. CK per 100000 inhabitants	3.1
I-3. CK per 1000 law enforcement agents	6.9
I-4. CK per 1000 arrests	5.0
I-5. CK per 1000 weapons seized	57.1
I-6. AK: Number of law enforcement officers unlawfully killed on duty by firearm	5
I-6b. AKt: Number of law enforcement officers unlawfully killed, whether or not on duty and regardless of means	Data unavailable
I-7. AK per 1000 agents	0.18
A1. Percentage of homicides due to state intervention	8.10
A2. Ratio between CK and AK	39
A3. Civilian lethality index: Ratio between CK and CW	2.6
A4. Lethality ratio: Ratio between Civilian lethality index and law enforcement agents lethality index	7.2
A5. Average number of civilians killed by intentional gunshot, per incident	0.7

Number of civilians killed and injured

According to official data, starting from 2016, there has been a significant reduction in civilian deaths caused by firearm shootings by on-duty public security agents (I-1). This number excludes injured civilians, deaths caused by other types of weapons, and off-duty agents. By 2019, the number of civilian deaths reduced to 195.

Regarding measurement (I-3), it is observed that during the 2018-2019 period, the number of police officers had a minimal reduction in their ranks, while the military reduced its participation in 2019. This rate has been decreasing since 2017 with a slight increase in 2019. Despite the decrease in the number of on-duty security agents in that year, the data closed with a value 0.5 higher compared to 2018.

As for indicator (I-5), the number of civilians killed by on-duty security agents per 1,000 confiscated weapons (rate) shows a reduction from the period of 2017 to 2018, decreasing from 154.2 to 57.8. There was no significant variation reported between 2018 and 2019. The rate indicates considerably high values regarding the use of firearms in civilian deaths by security agents.

 

Number of law enforcement officers killed and injured

In relation to deaths of on-duty security agents caused by firearm shootings (I-6), the absolute number is relatively lower compared to the civilian deaths analyzed in the previous indicators.

Indicators of use and abuse

With indicator A-2, the ratio between civilians killed by on-duty security agents using firearms and security agents killed by intentional firearm shootings while on duty, the relationship between civilian deaths and security agents’ deaths by firearms suggests the excessive use of lethal force by public security agents during the study period. For 2018, the data shows a drastic decrease in this ratio; however, it still remains at values considered as an abuse of lethal force by public security agents, surpassing the expected value (10) for this indicator and increasing to 39.00 in 2019.

Regarding indicator A-3, the lethality index based on official data between 2018 and 2019 fluctuates between 1 and 2 civilians killed for every civilian injured by security agents using firearms. This indicates that the use of lethal force is not used exceptionally within the established normative frameworks for security agents.

The number of incidents resulting in injuries or deaths caused by firearms has decreased between 2018 and 2019. This indicator shows that for every event where firearm injuries occurred, there were 0.77 civilian deaths caused by firearms in 2018, and 0.74 in 2019, reflecting a decrease in the number of deaths in each event.

Summary and recommendations

Monitoring and evaluating citizen security variables through the Units of Access to Public Information (UAIP) has become increasingly difficult due to many variables being declared confidential, and disaggregations being declared confidential as well, resulting in limited access to information from official sources. Specifically, it is no longer possible to obtain information from the General Directorate of Penitentiary Centers, the Attorney General’s Office, and the Institute of Legal Medicine, and only limited information can be obtained from the National Civil Police. Additionally, the Ministry of National Defense has started declaring several requests as “confidential” in 2023.

This limitation is concerning in the context of a state of exception, as it is not possible to statistically determine the number of incarcerated individuals, the overcrowding rate in detention centers, deaths of incarcerated individuals, the number of crimes, whether abuses of force by public security agents are being recorded and sanctioned, the number of military and police personnel involved in public security tasks, among other citizen security variables that allow for monitoring and evaluating the security context and the state of exception.

It is also important to note that many of the information classifications are justified on security grounds; however, the requested information is purely statistical and does not require the release of sensitive information such as names or unique identification documents.

It is necessary for institutions to review these classifications; otherwise, citizen oversight based on official sources will become increasingly unviable.

Recommendations

1. Review and revise the confidentiality classifications of information related to citizen security variables to ensure transparency and accountability.
2. Enhance cooperation and data sharing between relevant institutions, such as the General Directorate of Penitentiary Centers, the Attorney General’s Office, the Institute of Legal Medicine, and the National Civil Police, to ensure comprehensive and accurate monitoring and evaluation of citizen security.
3. Strengthen the capacity of Units of Access to Public Information (UAIP) to effectively monitor and evaluate citizen security variables, including providing necessary resources and training.
4. Promote the use of anonymized data and aggregate statistics to address security concerns while still providing access to important information for monitoring and evaluation purposes.
5. Encourage public institutions to prioritize transparency and accountability in their operations, ensuring that information related to citizen security is readily accessible to the public.

By implementing these measures, it is possible to overcome the limitations in monitoring and evaluating citizen security variables and ensure a more transparent and accountable approach to public security.

References, data sources and downloads

* Glossary:

• CSJ: Supreme Court of Justice
• FAES: Armed Forces of El Salvador
• FGR: Attorney General’s Office
• IAIP – Institute of Access to Public Information
• IGSP: General Inspectorate of Public Security
• LAIP: Law of Access to Public Information
• MJSP: Ministry of Justice and Public Security
• OUDH: University Observatory of Human Rights
• PDDH: Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman
• PNC: National Civil Police
• SRP: Professional Responsibility Secretariat
• SSPAS: Passionist Social Service
• UAIP: Unit of Access to Public Information
• UCA: José Simeón Cañas Central American University

1 Servicio Social Pasionista, Monitor of Use of Lethal Force in Latin American and the Caribbean: El Salvador 2022. Available online at: http://monitorfuerzaletal.com/docs/MonitorFuerzaLetal_2022_ElSalvador.pdf (Accessed 30 August 2023)

2 Available online at https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/node/12934

3 Chapultepec Peace Accords 1992. Available online at: https://biblioteca.asamblea.gob.sv/1234_acuerdos-de-chapultepec?q=

4 Constitution of the Republic, Article 29. Available online at: https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/sites/default/files/documents/decretos/171117_072857074_archivo_documento_legislativo.pdf

5 Ministry of National Defense, Resolution 077/19OCT022, information available up to September 2022.

6 Andrade, L., & Guevara, C. (2020). La Policía Nacional Civil en El Salvador: evaluando la profesionalización del cuerpo policial civil. Investigaciones UCA, 250-251.

7 Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador. Available online at: https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/sites/default/files/documents/decretos/171117_072857074_archivo_documento_legislativo.pdf

8 Penal Code ofEl Salvador. Available online at: https://www.oas.org/dil/esp/codigo_penal_el_salvador.pdf

9 Criminal Procedure Code. Available online at: http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/mesicic3_slv_procesal.pdf

10 Organic Law of the National Civil Police of El Salvador. Available online at: https://www.transparencia.gob.sv/institutions/igsp/documents/201877/download

11 Police Disciplinary Law. Available online at: https://www.pnc.gob.sv/download/ley-disciplinaria-policial/

12 Conceptual Framework for the Use of Force and the Use of Lethal Weapons in the National Civil Police. Available online at: https://sandbox.adslivecorp.com/landing/pncsv/images/manual-amigable.pdf

13 Instruction Manual for Weapons, Explosives, and Similar Articles. Available online at: https://transparencia.pnc.gob.sv/download/instructivo-de-armamento-explosivo-y-art-similares-pnc-2017

14 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Situation of Human Rights in El Salvador. 2021. Available online at: http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/informes/pdfs/2021_ElSalvador-ES.pdf. (Accessed 30 August 2023)

15 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Situation of Human Rights in El Salvador. 2021. Available online at: http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/informes/pdfs/2021_ElSalvador-ES.pdf. (Accessed 30 August 2023)

16 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Situation of Human Rights in El Salvador. 2021. Available online at: http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/informes/pdfs/2021_ElSalvador-ES.pdf. (Accessed 30 August 2023)

17 University Observatory on Human Rights. “Report on Extrajudicial Executions in El Salvador 2015-2020.” Pages 64-65. Available online at: https://arpas.org.sv/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/OUDH.-Informe-sobre-Ejecuciones-Extrajudiciales-en-El-Salvador.-Informe-completo.pdf

18 Term used by the Attorney General’s Office to refer to these deaths

19 Term used by the National Civil Police to refer to these deaths

20 The concept of ” illegitimate attacks” is the term used by the National Civil Police to refer to incidents where there is a confrontation or exchange of gunfire between law enforcement agents and armed civilians or criminal groups.

21 Official Information is public information that the agencies are obligated to reléase to the public according to this law without the need for a direct request

22 Regardless, an estimated 75% of cases do not detail this information

23 Ministry of Justice and Public Security (2019). Institutional Agreement. Available online at: https://www.seguridad.gob.sv/dia/acuerdo-interistitucional/. (Accessed 30 August 2023).

24 El Manual para la investigación de ejecuciones extrajudiciales y tortura no se encuentra en la biblioteca en línea de la PDDH. Pero de acuerdo con notas de prensa y blogs es un instrumento que socializan con el personal de la institución. Disponible en: https://www.rindhca.org/actualidad/indh/el-salvador/pddh-implementa-herramienta-para-la-investigacion-de-ejecuciones-extrajudiciales-y-torturas

25 This report analyzes 48 incidents of extrajudicial executions and 8 attempted extrajudicial executions investigated ex officio by the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office (PDDH).”Special Report by the Human Rights Ombudsman, Ms. Raquel Caballero de Guevara, on extrajudicial executions attributed to the National Civil Police in El Salvador, 2014-2018.” Available: https://elfaro.net/attachment/1076/Informe%2520especial%2520sobre%2520ejecuciones%2520extralegales.%2520PDDH.pdf?g_download=1

26 SSPAS, 2018, op. cit., p23.

27 SSPAS, 2018, op. cit., p31.

28 University Human Rights Observatory. Available online at: https://oudh.uca.edu.sv. (Accessed 30 August 2023).

29 Platform for Citizen Security (2020). Report on Citizen Security: Measurement of Indicators 2018-2020. Page 53. Available online at: https://sspas.org.sv/sspas/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Informe-sobre-seguridad-ciudadana-2018-2020.pdf

30 Platform for Citizen Security (2021). Report on Citizen Security: Measurement of Indicators 2021. https://sspas.org.sv/sspas/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/PSC-Informe-sobre-seguridad-ciudadana-2021.pdf