Filtered LFM countries comparison table

Australia does not have a Bill of Rights. Rights and protections of human rights are in the Australian Constitution, Commonwealth legislation, and the statutes of states and territories.

Brazil’s 1988 Constitution enshrines the right to life and to physical integrity. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Furthermore, will be held in custody unless there is a warrant for arrest issued by a judge with the requisite jurisdiction or unless the person was arrested in the process of committing a crime.

The Brazilian Constitution establishes that the Military Police are responsible for the preservation of public order and for policing.

Political Constitution of the Republic, Article 101, Paragraph 2

“The Public Order and Security Forces are composed only of Carabineros and Investigaciones. They constitute the public force and exist to give effectiveness to the law, guarantee public order and internal public security.”

Law 17.798, on arms control. Article 3, Paragraph 3

Exempts the Carabineros de Chile and Investigaciones de Chile, among other State institutions, from the prohibition of firearms possession.
COROLLARY: Carabineros and the Investigative Police, as ‘Public Order and Security Forces’, are the Chilean law enforcement agencies. In this role, they have the power to use force and, in its exercise, they are authorized to use lethal weapons (firearms).

Code of Military Justice (applies to Carabineros de Chile), Articles 208 and 410

The use of arms in self-defense or in the immediate defense of a stranger to whom, by reason of their position, they must provide protection or assistance; when there is no other rational means to achieve it.

Penal Code (applies in a supplementary manner), Article 10, Parts 4 and 6

The person who acts in defense of his person or rights, or of the person and rights of a stranger, is exempt from criminal responsibility, provided that there is an unlawful aggression, the rational necessity of the means used to prevent or repel it and the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

COROLLARY: Police officers —in a generic sense— are exempt from criminal liability when, in self-defense or in defense of a third party, they use their weapons, provided it is an unlawful aggression, there is no other rational means to prevent or repel it, and it is not attributable to their provocation.

Article 12 of the National Constitution 1991 “Nadie será sometido a desaparición forzada, a torturas ni a tratos o penas crueles, inhumanos o degradantes”.

Law 599 2000, “Por la cual se expide el Código penal”

Law 1407 2010, “Por la cual se expide el Código Penal Militar”.

Law 1698 2013 “Por la cual se crea el Sistema de Defensa Técnica y Especializada de los miembros de la Fuerza Pública, y se dictan otras disposiciones”.

Decree 124/2014 regulatory of Law 1698/2013 “En donde se establece la integración de los tratados internacionales ratificados por Colombia, la legislación nacional y la jurisprudencia en materia de derechos humanos y derecho internacional humanitario al planeamiento, ejecución y seguimiento de las operaciones, operativos y procedimientos de la Fuerza Pública”.

Decree 003 2021 “Por el cual se expide el Protocolo de acciones preventivas, concomitantes y posteriores, denominado Estatuto de reacción, uso y verificación de la fuerza legítima del Estado y protección del derecho a la protesta pacífica ciudadana.

Resolution 1091, March 31 2023: “Por el cual se expide el Manual para la Atención a la Reunión y Manifestación Pública y Pacífica y Control de Disturbios de la Policía Nacional de Colombia”.

The Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador,⁷ in effect since 1983, establishes in Article 2 that every person has the right to life, physical and moral integrity, liberty, security, work, property and possession, and to be protected in the preservation and defense of these rights.

Regarding the administration of National Defense and public security, Article 159 states that both are assigned to different ministries, and that public security will be the responsibility of the National Civil Police, which will be a professional body, independent of the armed forces and unrelated to any partisan activity. Furthermore, the constitution establishes in Article 86 that public power emanates from the people, therefore, government officials are delegates of the people and have no more powers than those expressly granted to them by law.

State of Exception

Certain fundamental rights have been limited, and this provision is based on Articles 29, 30, and 31 of the Constitution.

• Article 29 – “In cases of war, invasion of territory, rebellion, sedition, catastrophe, epidemic, or other general calamities, or serious disturbances of public order, the guarantees established in Articles 5, 6 paragraph 1, 7 Paragraph 1, and 24 of this Constitution may be suspended, except when it comes to meetings or associations with religious, cultural, economic, or sporting purposes. Such suspension may affect the whole or part of the territory of the Republic, and will be effected by means of a decree by the Legislative Body or the Executive Body, as the case may be. The guarantees contained in Articles 12 Paragraph 2 and 13 Paragraph 2 of this Constitution may also be suspended, when so agreed by the Legislative Body, with the favorable vote of three-quarters of the elected Deputies; administrative detention not to exceed fifteen days.”
• Article 30 – “The term of suspension of constitutional guarantees shall not exceed 30 days. After this period, the suspension may be extended for an equal period and by means of a new decree, if the circumstances that motivated it continue. If such decree is not issued, the suspended guarantees shall be established as a matter of right.”
• Article 31 – “When the circumstances that led to the suspension of constitutional guarantees cease to exist, the Legislative Assembly or the Council of Ministers, as the case may be, must restore such guarantees.”

The suspended rights refer to Article 7, regarding the right to assembly and association; Article 12, Paragraph 2, regarding the right to be informed of the reasons for detention, the right to remain silent, and the right to legal defense; Article 13, Paragraph 2, regarding the maximum duration of administrative detention of 72 hours before being presented to a court; and Article 24, regarding the inviolability of communications. As of August 17, 2022, the suspension of the right to assembly and association was lifted, but the rest of the rights remain suspended. Additionally, at least 15 reforms to the penal code, criminal procedural code, and specialized laws have been made.

Penal Code on organised crime

The Penal Code (Decree 349) created Article 345-C, “Illegal production and reproduction of messages, signals, names, or propaganda related to gangs,” in line with the reform of Article 1 of the Law on the Proscription of Gangs, Criminal Gangs, Groups, Associations, and Organizations. Both reforms establish the prohibition of sympathetic behaviors that involve the creation or transmission of signs, signals, or messages related to gangs, as well as references to territorial control or the reproduction of messages or statements by gangs through any audiovisual or computer means, with a penalty of 10 to 15 years of imprisonment for these behaviors. This provision has been considered a restriction on freedom of the press and information, as well as an exercise of anticipatory censorship that prevents the coverage of certain sources and content, and is seen as disproportionate as it imposes a long sentence for such behavior.

Reforms to the Penal Code have also focused on significantly increasing penalties for participating in Illicit Associations (Article 345, Decree 337), imposing a range of 20 to 30 years in prison for members or associates of these organizations, and 40 to 45 years for leaders or creators. It also included an aggravating factor of one-third of the maximum penalties when involving an authority figure or public official. The Law Regulating Activities Related to Drugs (Decree 338) and the Special Law Against the Crime of Extortion (Decree 343) also impose penalties of 20 to 30 years in prison for the commission of any of the crimes contemplated in these laws by members of gangs or terrorist organizations.

The Criminal Procedural Code (CPP) reforms

Provisional Detention (Article 8): The two-year time limit for provisional detention has been eliminated, and an indefinite period has been established for cases of homicide, aggravated homicide, extortion, aggravated extortion, solicitation and conspiracy to commit these crimes, as well as crimes related to illicit associations, terrorist organizations, and those contemplated in the Law Regulating Activities Related to Drugs; and in general, any other criminal group referred to in Article 1 of the Law on the Proscription of Gangs, Criminal Gangs, Groups, Associations, and Organizations (see above).

Faceless Judges: Incorporation of Article 73-A, which conceals the identity of judicial officials and secretaries, at both in-person and virtual hearings, and in case documentation, taking necessary measures to prevent traceability.

Law Against Organized Crime (LECO), Decree 527 of 6 October 2022

Trial of Minors in Adult Courts (Article 3, Paragraph 3): When adults and minors are jointly accused in a case, the trial will be conducted by two judges, one with jurisdiction over adults and another for minors; who, in such cases, will jointly oversee the process from its initiation to its conclusion, each issuing their respective orders based on the provisions of this law and other applicable laws and international instruments, while respecting the legal guarantees established in these regulations, especially regarding the determination of measures, penalties, and correctional facilities for minors.

Juvenile Penal Law (LPJ), Decree 342 of 30 March 2022

Article 8 incorporates the use of imprisonment as a sanction for offenses such as “illicit associations, terrorist activities, and those contemplated in the Law Regulating Activities Related to Drugs, committed by members of terrorist groups, gangs, or any other criminal group referred to in Article 1 of the Law on the Proscription of Gangs, Criminal Gangs, Groups, Associations, and Organizations,” with penalties of up to 20 years in prison for adolescents aged 16 or older and 10 years in prison for those over 12 years old.

Information from this section is taken largely from PolicingLaw.info (accessed 21 August 2023), with some additions and some updating.

The UK does not have a written constitution. The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, including Article 2 on the Right to Life, and related case law into UK law.

Rules on police use of force are spread across statute and the common law. The statutory provisions include, but are not limited to, the 1967 Criminal Law Act, which states that: &ldquoA person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large”. The requirement for force to be reasonable in the circumstances is also the position at common law with respect to self-defence or the defence of others, including by police officers and other law enforcement officials.

Within this general framework, the notion of what is ‘reasonable’ force is determined on the basis of necessity and proportionality. How these concepts are to be assessed is clarified by Section 76 of the 2008 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act:

The question whether the degree of force used by D [the person charged with the offence] was reasonable in the circumstances is to be decided by reference to the circumstances as D believed them to be…

If D claims to have held a particular belief as regards the existence of any circumstances:

the reasonableness or otherwise of that belief is relevant to the question whether D genuinely held it; but if it is determined that D did genuinely hold it [i.e. a belief that force was reasonable], D is entitled to rely on it … whether or not—

(i) it was mistaken, or

(ii) (if it was mistaken) the mistake was a reasonable one to have made.

It has been argued that there is thus both a subjective and an objective element to this defence under criminal law. The question of whether the degree of force used by a person was reasonable in the circumstances is to be decided by reference to the circumstances that that person genuinely and honestly believed to exist. This is so even if their belief is mistaken. Whether the degree of force used in the circumstances as the person believed them to be was actually reasonable on the basis of that belief will, however, be assessed objectively by the courts. In other words, a jury will be required to determine whether a use of force was reasonable from the accused’s perspective. It is though possible for a jury to determine that the accused’s belief about the circumstances was so unreasonable that the accused could not honestly and genuinely have held it.

R (on the application of Officer W80) v Director General of the Independent Office for Police Conduct and others addressed differences between the criminal and civil law tests, and associated ambiguities in the context of a possible misconduct hearing (i.e., a disciplinary proceeding) for an officer —known as Officer W80— in relation to a police shooting of Mr Jermaine Baker in December 2015. Mr Baker was shot during a foiled attempt to enable a prisoner to escape in the context of a sentencing hearing. In 2023, the Supreme Court found that: ‘the test to be applied in disciplinary proceedings in relation to the use of force by a police officer in self-defence is the civil law test… (which looks to whether an honest but mistaken belief is reasonable) as opposed to the criminal law test of self-defence (which looks to whether the belief is honestly held)’⁶.

France has a written constitution but this document does not contain provisions applicable to the use of force by LEOs.

The use of force is partly covered by the general provisions of Article 122 of the Penal Code, including:

• Article 122-4 which excludes criminal liability for acts authorised by law or ordered by a legitimate authority;
• Article 122-5 and 122-6 which exclude criminal liability for proportionate acts carried out for the legitimate defence of oneself or another against an unjustified attack, or to prevent a property offence;
• Article 122-7 which excludes criminal liability for proportionate acts carried out in response to an actual or imminent danger where it is necessary to act to protect a person or property.

For more details, see the summary at https://www.policinglaw.info/country/france which includes Law no. 2017-258 (28 Feb 2017) amending Article L435-1 of the Internal Security Code. This law also repealed Article 122-4-1 of the Penal Code (see next).

Jamaica has passed the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Constitutional Amendment) Act 2011 and in doing so, Chapter III of the Constitution was repealed and replaced by a new chapter that reflected input from public consultations and deliberations about comprehensive and effective protection of all fundamental rights of citizens. The right to life is one of the fundamental expectations expressed in Chapter III. This identification of the right to life in the constitution is a clear indication of its importance.

The Political Constitution of the United States of Mexico (enacted 1917, various alterations)² guarantees the following:

• Art 10 entitles citizens to possess weapons for protection (but police regulations can restrict their right to bear them in inhabited areas),
• Art 14 asserts the right to life,
• Art 21 allows only the judiciary to impose any penalties, and Art 22 restricts capital punishment to specific offences,
• Art 129 states no military authority may in time of peace perform any functions other than those related to military affairs.

Article 11 of the Constitution (Grondwet), mentions the inviolable rights of physical integrity of the body.

Constitutional provisions relevant to the state’s use of force may be found under Article II of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines containing the state’s guiding principles, such as “[t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare” (Section 5)². Relevant provisions may also be found in Article III or the Bill of Rights which includes, among others, Section 1 stating that “[no] person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws”³.

The general penal laws of the Philippines are found in the Revised Penal Code⁴. Relevant provisions with regard to the use of force may be found in Title Eight: Crimes Against Persons. More specifically, chapter one enumerates the corresponding penalties for crimes that constitute the destruction of life such as murder and homicide, while chapter two contains the provisions penalizing crimes related to inflicting physical injuries.

Section 16(2) of the Constitution (1991) allows for a number of exceptions to the general prohibition against intentional taking of life, where a person “dies as a result of the use of force to such extent as is reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of the case. That is to say – (a) for the defence of any person from unlawful violence or for the defence of property; or (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; or (c) for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny; or (d) in order to prevent the commission by that person of a criminal offence; or (e) if he dies as a result of a lawful act of war”.

Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (CRBV). Extraordinary Official Gazette (GOE) No. 5,453 of March 24, 2000. Amended and published in GOE No. 5,908 of February 19, 2009:

• In its Article 2 it consecrates ‘life’ and ‘the preeminence of human rights’ as superior values of the legal system and the actions of the State. According to the CRBV, “The right to life is inviolable. No law may establish the death penalty, nor any authority apply it.” The State is obliged to protect “the lives of people who are deprived of their liberty, performing military or civil service, or subject to its authority in any other way” (Article 43). It also expressly prohibits the forced disappearance of people (article 45), prohibits torture and any other form of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 46).
• In its Article 19, it establishes the principle of progressivity, enjoyment, and inalienable, indivisible, and interdependent exercise in the guarantee of human rights.
• In its Article 23, it orders that the treaties, pacts, and conventions related to human rights signed and ratified by Venezuela have constitutional hierarchy and prevail in the internal order. By consequence, the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials as well as the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials are both part of the comprehensive of the Venezuelan legal system.
• In its Article 55, citizen security is presented as a guarantee of civil rights that the State must give to every citizen to protect their personal integrity, their property, as well as the enjoyment of their rights and the fulfillment of their duties. The State security forces will respect the dignity and human rights of all people. The use of weapons by police and security agents is limited by the principles of necessity, convenience, opportunity, and proportionality in accordance with the law.
• In its Article 68, it enshrines the right to demonstrate peacefully and without weapons, and it prohibits the use of firearms and toxic substances to control them.
• In its Article 332, it establishes that public order is part of citizen security; consequently, the bodies responsible for its maintenance and restoration are of a civil, not military, nature.

Penal Code (Código Penal), GOE No. 5,768, of April 13, 2005: it contains general provisions on crimes and misdemeanors. Death caused by firearms is punishable under the crime of homicide in Article 405.

In cases of extrajudicial executions, the legal classification would be qualified malicious homicide (Article 406.1), aggravated by abuse of the weapons of authority or use of any other means that weakens the defense of the offended party (Article 77.8), in ideal competition with breach of Conventions or Treaties concluded by the Republic (155.3). The sentence would range between 17 years and six months to 20 years, approximately 18 years and nine months in prison.

However, when the use of lethal force is justified by the defense of the official’s own life or that of a third party, it will not be punishable in accordance with Article 65, Paragraphs 1 and 3.

Organic Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Orgánico Procesal Penal), GOE No. 6,664 of September 17, 2021:

Article 119 states that the criminal investigation police must detain the accused in compliance with the following principles of action:

1. Use force only when strictly necessary and in the proportion required by the execution of the arrest.
2. Do not use weapons, except when there is resistance that endangers the life or physical integrity of people, within the limitations referred to in the previous paragraph.
3. Not to inflict, instigate or tolerate any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

Law for the Disarmament and Control of Weapons and Ammunition (Ley para el Desarme y Control de Armas y Municiones), Official Gazette (GO) No. 40,190 of June 17, 2013: The Law aims to regulate and supervise the carrying, possession, use, registration, manufacturing, marketing, supply, storage, registration, import, export, transit, and transportation of all types of weapons, ammunition, accessories, parts, and components; classify and punish illegal acts arising from this matter.

The law defines the types of weapons and specifically defines ‘organic weapons’’ as firearms used by the Bolivarian National Armed Forces, police forces, bodies and institutions that exceptionally perform functions of the police service, as well as other organizations of the State authorized to acquire weapons, duly authorized and registered by the body of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces with jurisdiction over arms control (Article 5.1). The carrying and use of these organic weapons is the exclusive power of these organizations and other State entities authorized to acquire weapons (Article 40). The provision of these weapons will correspond to the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (Article 42).

The improper use of these organic weapons by officials who use their organic weapons for purposes other than legitimate defense or protection of public order will be punished in accordance with Article 115 (six to eight years in prison).

The use of force by police officers is regulated by legislation that confers powers to ‘constables’ and also legislation that regulates behaviour by ‘a person’.

Constables (defined as a member or a special member of the Australian Federal Police, or a member of a state or territory agency) are afforded the provision to use force against another person under the Australian Crimes Act 1914. Section 3ZC stipulates the general principles of necessity and reasonableness when using force to make an arrest or prevent the escape of an arrested person:

1. A person must not, in the course of arresting another person for an offence, use more force, or subject the other person to greater indignity, than is necessary and reasonable to make the arrest or to prevent the escape of the other person after the arrest.
2. Without limiting the operation of Subsection (1), a constable must not, in the course of arresting a person for an offence:
   1. do anything that is likely to cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, the person unless the constable believes on reasonable grounds that doing that thing is necessary to protect life or to prevent serious injury to another person (including the constable); or
   2. if the person is attempting to escape arrest by fleeing — do such a thing unless:
      1. the constable believes on reasonable grounds that doing that thing is necessary to protect life or to prevent serious injury to another person (including the constable); and
      2. the person has, if practicable, been called on to surrender and the constable believes on reasonable grounds that the person cannot be apprehended in any other manner.

Protective Service Officers (PSO) are similarly authorised to use force when arresting within specific legislation. For instance, PSOs employed by the Australian Federal Police are empowered under section 14B of the Australian Federal Police Act 1979:

1. A protective service officer must not, in arresting or attempting to arrest a person for an offence or in preventing a person who has been arrested for an offence from escaping, use more force, or subject the person to greater indignity, than is reasonable and necessary in order to make the arrest or prevent the escape of the person.
2. Without limiting the generality of Subsection (1), a protective service officer must not, in arresting or attempting to arrest a person for an offence or in preventing a person who has been arrested for an offence from escaping, do an act likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm to the person unless the officer believes on reasonable grounds that the doing of the act is necessary to protect life or prevent serious injury to the officer or any other person.

Officers of state and territorial police agencies (constables and protective service officers) also derive authority to use force in certain circumstances from provisions afforded to ‘a person’. For instance, Section 462A of the Victorian Crimes Act 1958 states:

462A Use of force to prevent the commission of an indictable offence

A person may use such force not disproportionate to the objective as he believes on reasonable grounds to be necessary to prevent the commission, continuance or completion of an indictable offence or to effect or assist in effecting the lawful arrest of a person committing or suspected of committing any offence.

Example

A police officer or protective services officer uses lethal force on a person to prevent that person from committing an indictable offence that involves causing really serious injury or death because the officer believes on reasonable grounds that it is necessary to use that force for that purpose. The police officer or protective services officer may do so before that offence is committed.

Similarly, police officers also derive authority to use force in self-defence. For instance, Section 322K of the Victorian Crimes Act 1958 states:

1. A person is not guilty of an offence if the person carries out the conduct constituting the offence in self-defence.
2. A person carries out conduct in self-defence if —
   1. the person believes that the conduct is necessary in self-defence; and
   2. the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as the person perceives them.
3. This section only applies in the case of murder if the person believes that the conduct is necessary to defend the person or another person from the infliction of death or really serious injury.

Other national LEO have powers to use force and carry firearms. For instance, Section 189A of the Australian Customs Act 1901 provides authorised Customers Officers to carry firearms and/or other “approved items of personal defence equipment”. The Act also provides the power for Customs officers (or police) to arrest without warrant (Section 210) if a person is committing or has committed an offence under the Act, and use reasonable force to effect the arrest (Section 210A).

Article 25 of the Brazilian Penal Code states that anybody is justified in using, within reason, the means necessary to repel an unfair imminent or ongoing aggression against themself or another person.

The 1941 Criminal Procedure Code establishes the principle of use of force in self-defence, only to be used in case of ‘resistance’ where law enforcement officials can “use whatever means necessary to defend themselves or to overcome resistance”, or to prevent the escape of a prisoner.

A 2014 federal statute calls for security agencies to prioritise the use of less-lethal weapons, provided that their use does not endanger the physical or mental integrity of police officers. Use of lethal force must comply with the principles of legality, necessity, and reasonableness and proportionality. It is not lawful to use firearms against an unarmed fleeing person, or against a vehicle that disrespects a police blockade on public roads, except when there is a risk of death or injury to law enforcement agents or third parties.

Law 21560 (April, 2023)

Amends the Codes of Military Justice, Criminal Procedure, Penal, and the organic laws of the Carabineros de Chile; Investigative Police and Gendarmerie of Chile, among other legal texts, in order to strengthen and protect the exercise of the police and gendarmerie functions of Chile.

General Order 2870 (September 8, 2021)

Updates part of those Carabineros protocols, on international human rights standards applicable to the police function; basic concepts about police action and the right of assembly; and intervention techniques in public meetings or social demonstrations for the maintenance and restoration of public order

General Order 2635 (March 1, 2019)

Applies international guidelines on the use of force to Carabineros operations in safeguarding public order, through protocols of a practical nature.

Circular 1832 (March 1, 2019)

Establishes general principles and imparts technical instructions regarding the use of force, with special emphasis on the use of lethal and potentially lethal weapons.

General Order 2615 (October 2, 2019)

Regulates the use of force by the PDI, also assimilating international guidelines and seeking to operationalize the general principles.

General Order 918 (January 8, 1988)

Enables the PDI to possess firearms, regulating their control, carrying and use in the context of the fulfilment of the PDI’s institutional duties.

Supreme Decree 1364 (November 13, 2018)

Establishes guidelines for the use of force in safeguarding public order and a biannual report with statistical information on use of force incidents.

Decree 2535 1993 “Por el cual se expiden normas sobre armas, municiones y explosivos”.

Resolution 02903 June 2017 “Por la cual se expide el Reglamento para el uso de la fuerza y el empleo de armas, municiones, elementos y dispositivos menos letales, por la Policía Nacional”.

Resolution 00448 2015 “Reglamento para el uso de la fuerza y empleo de elementos, dispositivos, municiones y armas no letales en la Policía Nacional”.

Law 1801 July 2016 “Código Nacional de Policía y convivencia”.

The Penal Code,⁸ Article 27, establishes that a person is not criminally responsible “when acting or failing to act in compliance with a legal duty or in the legitimate exercise of a right or lawful activity,” and Article 129, Subsections 8, 9, and 10, establishes that aggravated homicide occurs in the following cases:

8. When committed by a civilian or military authority, taking advantage of their position;
9. When preceded by forced disappearance of persons;
10. When committed against a public official, public authority, law enforcement agent, or prison personnel, whether or not they are performing their duties or on account of them.

The Criminal Procedure Code⁹ establishes regulations for the detention of the accused. Article 275 states that police officers shall arrest the accused in cases authorized by this Code, strictly adhering to the following basic principles of action:

1. Not to use force, except when strictly necessary and in proportion to the execution of the arrest.
2. Not to use firearms, except when there is resistance that endangers the life or physical integrity of individuals, or to prevent the commission of another crime, within the limitations referred to in the previous paragraph.
3. Not to inflict, instigate, or tolerate any act of torture or ill-treatment or other forms of punishment.

The Organic Law of the National Civil Police of El Salvador,¹⁰ in Article 15, states that members of the National Civil Police shall carry regulated firearms in certain specified circumstances and activities. The use of firearms is governed by the following rules:

1. In the performance of their duties, members of the National Civil Police shall use non-violent means whenever possible before resorting to the use of force and firearms. They may use force and firearms only when other means are ineffective or do not guarantee the achievement of the intended legitimate result.
2. Members of the National Civil Police shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defense or defense of others in the face of imminent danger of death or serious injury, with the purpose of preventing the commission of a particularly serious crime that poses a serious threat to life, and only if less extreme measures are insufficient and the use of firearms is strictly unavoidable.
3. When the use of firearms is unavoidable, members of the National Civil Police shall: a) exercise restraint and act in proportion to the seriousness of the crimes and the legitimate objective pursued; b) minimize harm and injuries, respect and protect human life; c) provide prompt medical assistance and services to injured or affected individuals; d) promptly notify the relatives or close friends of the injured or affected persons.
4. When using force or firearms, members of the National Civil Police shall immediately report any injuries or deaths to their superiors.
5. In fulfilling their duty to safeguard the exercise of people’s rights, members of the National Civil Police shall guarantee the rights of assembly and demonstration. When, by legal orders, they are obliged to disperse a gathering or demonstration, they shall use the least dangerous means and only to the extent necessary. Members of the National Civil Police shall refrain from using firearms in such cases, except in the case of violent gatherings where other means have been exhausted, and only when the circumstances specified in subsection 2 of this article are met.
6. Exceptional circumstances such as internal political instability or any other public emergency shall not be invoked to justify the violation of these rules.
7. Special weapons shall be kept in the arsenal of the National Civil Police for use by trained personnel; the cases and conditions in which they may be used shall be established by regulations.

The Police Disciplinary Law,¹¹ in Article 8, states that the following behaviors constitute serious offenses:

1. Failure to report facts that should be brought to the attention of a superior due to the officer’s position or duties, or doing so with delay, affecting the implementation of those duties.
2. Failure to comply with professional obligations related to police duties or inherent to the position.
3. Using weapons on or off duty in violation of the regulations governing their use, as well as negligence, recklessness, or excessive use or handling of weapons, force, or any other means, even when there is no harm to the integrity of individuals or property.

The use of force is covered by the Code of Ethics of the Police and the Gendarmerie in France. Article L434-1 of the Internal Security Code states that the Code of Ethics is established by a decree issued by the Conseil d’État. The Code of Ethics is included in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 4 of the regulatory part of the Internal Security Code. It is also available on the Interior Ministry website.

The use of force by the gendarmerie is authorised by Article L2338-3 of the Defence Code, which refers to Article 435-1 of the Internal Security Code.

The use of force by the police and gendarmerie is now specifically covered by Article 435-1 of the Internal Security Code, as amended by Law no. 2017-258 (28 Feb 2017), to bring the use of firearms by police officers into line with those for gendarmes. Previously, police officers were subject to the Penal Code and had to prove self-defence like any other citizen, whereas gendarmes could neutralize an individual who was trying to escape from them and risked harming third parties in the process. It is worth noting that the draft bill’s impact study also refers to the Guerdner v. France judgment handed down on April 17, 2014 (cited below) to justify the compliance of French legislation with Article 2 ECHR¹.

Following the 2017 law there has been an increase of police shootings involving firearms, in general² and against moving vehicles³, but also an increase of fatal police shootings against moving vehicles⁴. A number of critics have argued that the law introduced confusing notions and questionable interpretation of the use of firearms. As Catherine Tzutzuiano, legal expert, argues, the legislator has legally enshrined an act of ‘anticipatory defense’. Although the rules of engagement remain close to the framework of self-defence, they create considerable confusion⁵. “This has created a risk of increased use of weapons, and a legal risk for police officers, because they remain criminally liable”⁶.

As of March 1, 2017, both the Directorate-General of the National Police(Direction générale de la Police nationale or DGPN) and the Directorate-General of the National Gendarmerie (Direction générale de la Gendarmerie nationale or DGGN) have issued instructions concerning the application of the law. The DGGN recalls the importance of immediate danger in its rules governing the use of weapons⁷. However, for the DGPN “unlike self-defence, the condition of simultaneity is softened [ … ] It is not required that the individual immediately and directly threaten [the police officer] or others in order to use the weapon against him. But the police officer must, at the moment he uses his weapon, have real and objective reasons to believe that this individual is dangerous, i.e. likely to harm his life or physical integrity or those of others”⁸.

Flagrant Déni, a French militant media outlet on police impunity, has revealed that the police abrogated the 2017 instruction in 2021⁹. A new instruction on individual or service weapons was issued on May 26, 2021. The document is not public and the national police force did not wish to share it with Flagrant Déni. However, the media was able to consult it and considers that the DGPN maintains the confusion in the rules on firearm use.

The Constabulary Force Act does not indicate any regulation for the use of force. In the Independent Commission of Investigations Act 2010, Part III ‘Complaints’ and the provisions under it may be seen as regulating the use of force by police officers as a complaint can be made directly to the Commission alleging misconduct of an officer or officers. Following a complaint, an investigation may commence, and the Act gives the Commission the power to forward a copy of the complaint to the Director of Public Prosecution if it is deemed that the conduct complained about is an offence. Officers are aware that they could face disciplinary and legal action for every fatal shooting or wounding they are involved in.

The Organic Law of the Mexican Army and Air Force, 1986, regulates the military. Art 129 of the Constitution prevents it to carry out civilian duties, but it has been informally tasked with policing duties since 2006³.

The National Law on the Use of Force, 2019, regulates security institutions while undertaking public security functions:

• Art 32: Whenever members of the security institutions use force in the performance of their duties, they shall make a detailed report to their immediate superior, a copy of which shall be included in the file of the officer in command of the operation and, where appropriate, of each of the participants.The hierarchical superiors shall be responsible when they should have or have knowledge that the agents under their command have unlawfully used force, instruments or firearms in their charge and do not prevent it or do not report it to the corresponding authorities.
• Art 33: The detailed report shall contain:
  1. Name, assignment and identification data of the officer;
  2. Level of force used;
  3. Circumstances of manner, time, place of occurrence and reasons for the decision to use such level of force, and;
  4. If lethal weapons were used:
     1. Detail the reasons for the use of the firearm or explosive;
     2. Identify the number of shots fired or the amount of explosive detonation;
     3. Specify the type of injuries, the number and identity of the injured persons, and the material damage caused; and
     4. If applicable, specify the number and identity of persons killed.
• Art 35: Security institutions shall submit annual public reports on the development of activities involving the use of force. These reports shall contain:
  1. Data related to arrests;
  2. The results of the bodily assessment carried out on persons detained;
  3. The number of persons killed by the use of force, disaggregated by sex, and;
  4. If applicable, any recommendations issued by public human rights bodies in relation to these events, and the attention given to them.

Not all agencies comply with the law in terms of making information public. They also do not always respond to information requests in the same way. Some states or municipalities do not even respond to requests, although obliged by law to do so.

This law is applicable to all agencies and their personnel when conducting public security tasks. This is a problem when members of the armed force use lethal force as they may describe their activities as national security and not public security. However, the Supreme Court has stated that when the human rights of any civil person are harmed, civil —and not military— authorities should investigate the events and sanction the perpetrator. Still, recent cases of extrajudicial killings are investigated and prosecuted in military courts.

The National Guard Law, 2019, regulates the National Guard. Although constitutionally a civil body, it is in fact a military institution⁴, that carries out public security tasks in direct contravention of the constitution⁵.

The use of the firearm is regulated (as are all police uses of force) by Article 7.1 of the Police Law 2012 (Politiewet 2012). It stipulates that police officers are authorized to use force³, when the intended goal justifies this (paying attention to the dangers inherent in the use of force) and the goal cannot be achieved by other means. If possible, a warning should be given before any use of force. The exercise of authority to use force must be reasonable and measured in relation to the intended goal (principles of subsidiarity and proportionality).

In a recent change of the Dutch Criminal Code (2022) a new offence has been introduced ‘schending van de Ambtsinstructie’ (‘violation of the official instructions on use of force’, only in cases that resulted in death or led to injury). The idea is that with this new offence it is possible to better consider the unique position of police officers (as it is part of their job to use force in specific circumstances). The offence is meant for cases where the officer violated the Ambtsinstructie by acting carelessly or made a wrong assessment of the situation. When there is a deliberate violation of the Ambtsinstructie, e.g., by using excessive force, prosecution for offences already in the law (e.g., assault, manslaughter) would be more appropriate.

As of date, there is no specific national legislation regulating the use of force particularly in the context of a law enforcement operation. For instance, provisions in Republic Act 6975⁵ titled the “Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990” that established the Philippine National Police under a re-organized department only outlines in general the functions of the police force. Before RA 6975 took effect in 1991, the police force called the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police, was part of the Armed Force of the Philippines under the Department of National Defense. From 1991 until today, the PNP has been under the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), to emphasize its civilian nature and the fact that it is under civilian control. RA 6975 also created the National Police Commission under the DILG to examine and audit the standards of policing and compile “statistical data for the proper evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of all police units in the country”.

In 1998, some parts of RA 6975 were amended by virtue of RA 8551. Of note was the creation of an Internal Affairs Service within the PNP. Its primary tasks: “pro-actively conduct inspections and audits on PNP personnel and units; investigate complaints and gather evidence in support of an open investigation; conduct summary hearings on PNP members facing administrative charges; submit a periodic report on the assessment, analysis, and evaluation of the character and behavior of PNP personnel and units to the Chief PNP and the Commission; file appropriate criminal cases against PNP members before the court as evidence warrants and assist in the prosecution of the case; and provide assistance to the Office of the Ombudsman in cases involving the personnel of the PNP”.

RA 8551 specifically authorizes the IAS to “conduct, motu proprio, automatic investigation of the following cases: incidents where a police personnel discharges a firearm; incidents where death, serious physical injury, or any violation of human rights occurred in the conduct of a police operation; incidents where evidence was compromised, tampered with, obliterated, or lost while in the custody of police personnel; incidents where a suspect in the custody of the police was seriously injured; and incidents where the established rules of engagement have been violated”. Yet its annual report for 2022 offers no details on what it has accomplished on the aforementioned mandates, except to make a claim that it has a “100% case resolution”⁶.

S.4(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act (1965) allows sufficient force to effect an arrest “but not more”. The exceptions within s.4(3) of the same Act create “a right to cause the death of any person […] when a constable or private person is legally attempting to arrest [them] upon a charge or treason, felony or inflicting a dangerous wound and the arrest of such person cannot otherwise be accomplished”.

S.16 of the Correctional Service Act (2014) permits the use of potentially deadly force to stop unarmed prisoners from escaping.

Organic Law of the Police Service and the Bolivarian National Police Corps (Ley Orgánica del Servicio de Policía y del Cuerpo de Policía Nacional Bolivariana), GOE No. 5,940 of December 7, 2009: This law specifically regulates police action and the use of force in its Chapter II, Articles 68 to 72, in which it establishes the guiding principles of the use of force for all the country’s security forces that carry out police work.

Article 68 states that the use of force by police forces will be guided by the principle of affirmation of life as a supreme constitutional and legal value, the adoption of progressive scales for the use of force depending on the level of resistance and opposition of the citizen, the procedures for monitoring and supervising its use, and permanent police training and dissemination of instructions among the community. The use of deadly force will only be justified to defend the life of the police officer or a third party.

Article 69 orders that police forces will have means that allow police officials to use force differently, and they must be permanently trained in its use.

Article 70 considers the levels of use of force:

Police officers will use physical force in accordance with the following criteria:

1. The level of use of force to be applied is determined by the conduct of the person and not by the predisposition of the officer.
2. The differentiated use of force implies that, between psychological intimidation and potentially fatal force, the official will grade its use considering the progression from passive resistance to life-threatening aggression on the part of the person.
3. The police officer must maintain the lowest level of use of force possible to achieve the proposed objective.
4. At no time should there be unnecessary physical harm or moral abuse to the people targeted by police action, nor should force be used as a form of direct punishment.

The Australia New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency (ANZPAA) provides advisory services to all Australian and New Zealand police agencies. Their Use of Force Principles (2023)³ statement provides ‘strategic guidance’ to police agencies and promotes cross-jurisdictional consistency for operational safety. The guidance lists three key principles:

1. Authority: the authority for police to use force is derived from law
2. Proportionality: police should use no more force than is reasonably necessary and proportionate for the safe and effective execution of their duties
3. Accountability: agencies and their members are accountable and responsible for their use of force and must be able to justify their actions at law

The Interministerial Ordinance n. 4226, of 31 December 2010, signed by the Justice Department and Human Rights Department, provides specific regulations regarding the use of force by all the police forces in Brazil. Made up of 25 guidelines, the document states the use of force must be compliant with the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, moderation and convenience. It states police use of firearms is illegitimate except in cases of legitimate defense of their own or a third person’s life, and demands that they otherwise refrain from resorting to it. The ordinance also requires that a law enforcement officer carry at least two less-lethal weapons. It also defines the types of weapons and techniques that are authorised, depending on technical circumstances.

Law 18.961 (February 27, 1990) and Decree Law 2460 (January 9, 1979)

Organic Laws of the Carabineros de Chile and the Investigative Police of Chile, respectively. Both enable the personnel of each institution to use firearms, in compliance with the law in force and in the performance of their role.

Decree Law 3.356 (April 30, 1980 – last version December 5, 1989)

Enables retired personnel (General Officers, Superior Officers, Lieutenant Colonels, or equivalent, and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers of the Armed Forces and Carabineros) to carry arms, as long as they still have a valid Institutional Identify Card.

General Order 2125 (October 2, 2012) and General Order 2490 (May 11, 2017)

Establish technical manuals for Carabineros operations in safeguarding public order, with a human rights approach and a practical translation of general principles and international standards.

General Order 2478 (March 27, 2017) and General Order 2186 (May 20, 2008)

Establish the guiding principles of the ethics of each institution, respectively, and of the police function, in general.

National Police and the Army have incorporated guidelines and rules of the International Humanitarian Law in their own action and operational manuals, such as the “Manual de Derecho Operacional para las Fuerzas Militares 2015: en donde se regula la conducción de hostilidades y otras misiones militares en tiempos de guerra, transición, estabilización o paz, en cuanto al uso de la fuerza, es decir en donde se establecen los elementos de legalidad para adelantar las operaciones militares y policía”.

The National Civil Police and the Ministry of Justice and Public Security published the Conceptual Framework for the Use of Force and the Use of Lethal Weapons in the National Civil Police of El Salvador in 2017, which establishes the legal basis, conceptual framework, model of resistance and control, use of lethal weapons, etc.¹²

Additionally, the National Civil Police has an Instruction Manual for Weapons, Explosives, and Similar Articles, published in 2015, which describes the use of firearms.¹³

Article 40: In the performance of their duties, members of the National Civil Police shall use non-violent means to the extent possible before resorting to the use of force and firearms. They may use force and firearms only when other means are ineffective or do not guarantee the achievement of the intended legitimate result.

b. Members of the National Civil Police shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defense or defense of others in the face of imminent danger of death or serious injury, with the purpose of preventing the commission of a particularly serious crime that poses a serious threat to life, and only if less extreme measures are insufficient and the use of firearms is strictly unavoidable;

c. When the use of firearms is unavoidable, members of the National Civil Police shall:

1. Exercise restraint and act in proportion to the seriousness of the crime and the legitimate objective pursued;
2. Minimize harm and injuries, respect and protect human life;
3. Provide prompt medical assistance and services to injured or affected individuals;
4. Notify the relatives or close friends of the injured or affected persons as soon as possible;
5. When using force or firearms, members of the National Civil Police shall immediately report any injuries or deaths to their superiors;
6. In fulfilling their duty to safeguard the exercise of people’s rights, members of the National Civil Police shall guarantee the rights of assembly and demonstration. When, by legal orders, they are obliged to disperse a gathering or demonstration, they shall use the least dangerous means and only to the extent necessary. Members of the National Civil Police shall refrain from using firearms in such cases, except in the case of violent gatherings where other means have been exhausted, and only when the circumstances specified in subsection b of this regulation are met.
7. Exceptional circumstances such as internal political instability or any other public emergency shall not be invoked to justify the violation of these rules.

The College of Policing publishes Authorised Professional Practice (APP) guidance on a range of topics, including:

• Armed policing, which includes sections on general principles on the ‘use of force, firearms and less lethal weapons’, as well as specific sections including ‘discharge of firearms’, ‘Conducted energy devices (Taser)’ and ‘attenuating energy projectiles’. Available at https://www.college.police.uk/app/armed-policing (dated 2023).
• Detention and Custody, which includes sections on the principles of using force in custody and on control and restraint. https://www.college.police.uk/app/detention-and-custody/control-restraint-and-searches (dated 2023).

Hence, while some weapon types are covered in a broader APP (such as armed policing), not every type of force or less lethal weapon appears to have its own publicly available APP that can be readily accessed via the College of Policing’s website, although the College states that “new authorised professional practice (APP) on public and personal safety training is being published soon to provide further support”⁷.

APP sits alongside Schedule 2 to the Police (Conduct) Regulations of 2012 and 2020 which provides that police officers shall only use force to the extent that it is necessary, proportionate and reasonable in all the circumstances; wording also used in the College of Policing Code of Ethics⁸.

In 2020, the French Ministry of the Interior published the national policing plan for maintaining public order (schéma national du maintien de l’ordre or SNMO), a set of guidelines for all law enforcement agencies concerning the management of demonstrations. Following the repeated questioning of policing strategies during the Yellow Vest movement (a national protest movement in France that began in 2018), the Minister of the Interior formed a “working seminar” aimed at adapting and updating the management of public order in France, which ultimately led to the SNMO. The SNMO endorses practices that have been tested in the field in recent years, including assigning units trained to maintain order to static protection missions, while the non-specialized units are tasked with intervening in the body of the demonstration; and legitimizing the use of weapons developed to tackle urban violence, such as kinetic impact projectile (KIP) launchers¹⁰ (known in French as lanceurs de balle de defense or ‘defensive ball launchers’, which fire hard foam rubber balls).

About less lethal weapons in France

Less lethal weapons were introduced in France in the 1990s for specific police units, and have been generalized since 2004¹¹. Over the years, there have been a number of different models of stun grenades (grenades à effet de choc), thrown by hand or by propulsion, ‘sting ball’ grenades (grenades de désencerclement), which project small rubber balls designed to strike shins and calves, and KIP launchers. All these weapons are designated as war materiel by French legislation.

France is one of the few European countries —along with Spain, Poland and Portugal to a lesser extent,— to make extensive use of KIP launchers¹². According to figures communicated by the Ministry of the Interior in 2020, 2448 people were injured and 19,071 shots were fired with KIP launchers, 1,428 tear-gas grenades were fired, and 5,420 sting ball grenades were used during the Yellow Vest movement¹³.

Taser has been authorized for use by the police since 2007 and is being used more and more frequently by the police. The IGPN reports that in 2022, 2995 uses of tasers were recorded in the police force¹⁴. This is twice as many as 6 years ago (1,403 shots), and 5 times as many as in 2014 (522). The National Gendarmerie does not provide similar data.

The Maintien de l’ordre website brings together all the technical details on the less lethal armament of French law enforcement forces¹⁵. The Violences policières website lists, among others, the victims of less lethal weapons¹⁶. Both websites are in French only.

The Jamaica Constabulary Force has a Human Rights and Police Use of Force and Firearms Policy which incorporates the principles articulated in the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (Eighth United Nations Congress on Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders — Havana 27 August to 7 September 1990). In the policy, the instruction given requires members to apply non-violent means as far as possible before resorting to the use of force. In the policy, members are instructed to “minimize any interference with human rights, exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and the lawful objective to be achieved, minimize damage and injury and ensure that medical aid is secured for any person requiring it at the earliest opportunity” (p.3).

The JCF also has a Book of Rules for the guidance and direction of its members. This document requires JCF members to exercise care in the handling of firearms and where a firearm is used to injure or kill an individual the officer must be prepared to prove that it was the last available option.

The official national instruction on the use of force (Ambtsinstructie 1994⁴) is stipulated by Article 9 of the Police Law.

The Ambtsinstructie 1994 defines a ‘means to use force’ (‘geweldmiddel’) as any officially distributed weapon or piece of equipment that can be used for the purpose of using force. Article 4 stipulates that use of a weapon is allowed only if the officer is in the lawful exercise of his duty, if the weapon is given to the officer for that duty and if the officer is trained in the use of the weapon. Article 5 stipulates that when a commanding officer is present, an officer shall use force only if his commander tells him to do so, unless it is not reasonable to wait for a command. Articles 7–12 deal specifically with the use of firearms. Use of a firearm is allowed only against persons or vehicles in which persons are present:

• to arrest a person who can reasonably be supposed to be in possession of a firearm that is ready to be used and who intends to use it against persons.
• to arrest a person who attempts to evade a legitimate arrest and who is at the same time suspected of, or convicted for, a criminal offence that
  1. Has a maximum penalty of 4 years or more and
  2. Is a serious infringement of the physical integrity of an individual and
  3. Is a type of criminal offence that is or can be in its consequences a threat to society.
• in specific cases of serious civil or military disturbances on specific orders from authorities and under command of a senior officer

The Dutch section of Amnesty International is of the opinion that the criteria and thresholds for the use of force provided in the Ambtsinstructie are not compliant with the international standards of necessity and proportionality and the requirements about when firearms may be used⁵.

The Ambtsinstructie stipulates that no use shall be made of the firearm when the identity of the individual is known, and it is reasonable to assume that postponement of the arrest does not constitute an unacceptable risk to society.

An officer may only take a firearm out of the holster into his hand in cases where use of the firearm is allowed or, for the protection of himself or others, in cases where it can reasonably be assumed such a situation will arise. Whenever such a situation ceases to exist, the firearm must be put into the holster again.

Prior to any use of the firearm, the officer must give a clear verbal warning or a warning shot, unless circumstances do not allow this. Any warning shots should be fired in such a way that danger to persons or properties is avoided as much as possible.

Article 10 specifies that a firearm can only be drawn in circumstances where use of the firearm is permitted or for the safety of himself or others when it can reasonably be assumed that such a situation will arise. If such a situation no longer exists, the firearm should be put away.

Use of force in self-defence (defined as the necessary defence of one’s own or another person’s body or property against immediate attack) is explicitly not included in the Ambtsinstructie, based on the reasoning that for police officers, self-defence works the same way as for every other individual and that therefor there is no need for a separate regulation. In this way any case law regarding self-defence applies automatically to police as well. Other legal grounds to exclude culpability for use of force can be legal regulations and (lawful) official orders.

Articles 8 & 9 of the Ambtsinstructie provide specific regulations for the use of automatic or sharpshooter rifles by special units. In 1989, one death occurred because of the use of such a weapon, but no other instances have occurred since then⁶. In a specific regulation (RTGP), training requirements for all police officers are set out. In this national regulation it is stipulated that officers should be trained for a minimum of 32 hours a year and that they should qualify regularly (depending on the test, two times per year or once every two years) for three tests: a theoretical test on use of force, a practical test in self-defence and arrest skills and a practical shooting skills test.

The National Regulation on Police Weapons and Equipment (Bewapenings- en uitrustingsregeling 2012)⁷ stipulates what weapons and equipment may be carried by specific types of officers. Even before there was a national police force, these regulations applied to all police forces and both weapons and equipment were acquired at the national level with the involvement and authorisation of the ministries responsible for police officers (in the past the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Justice, since 2010 the Ministry of Security & Justice and after a name change in 2017, the Ministry of Justice & Security). No local policies on use of force can be formulated that deviate from national policies.

Extensive guidelines on the use of force by law enforcement officers are found in the Philippine National Police Manual containing the operational procedures the force must abide by. In the most recent version of the manual, dated September 2021, the Revised Philippine National Operational Procedures, Section 2–4 sets out the police policy on the use of force. The manual implements a ‘Use of Force Continuum’, defined as “a linear-progressive decision-making process which displays the array of police reasonable responses commensurate to the level of suspect/law offender’s resistance to effect compliance, arrest and other law enforcement actions”⁷. Three approaches are enumerated in the continuum corresponding to the perceived level of threat: 1) non-lethal approach; 2) less-lethal approach; and 3) lethal approach. The lethal approach is prescribed as the “last resort”⁸ that is only employed during life-threatening situations such as instances where the suspect is armed and shows unlawful aggression against police or other individuals. The use of firearms is justified in the lethal approach, but officers are ordered to avoid hitting vital parts of the body and provide immediate medical attention to the suspect. The manual also requires police officers to submit an incident report for every use of service firearm or weapon. The Use of Force Continuum is also written into the PNP Guidebook on Human Rights Based-Policing⁹.

There are also regulations relating to the use of force in Second Schedule of the 2001 Police (Discipline) Regulations, which make it a disciplinary offence to use “unnecessary violence to, or ill-using [sic] any person in custody” and discharging “any firearm without just cause”.

Standards and principles for the Progressive and Differentiated Use of the Police Force by officials of the police forces in their various territorial political spheres (NUPDFP, Normas y principios para el Uso Progresivo y Diferenciado de la Fuerza Policial por parte de los funcionarios y funcionarias de los cuerpos de policía en sus diversos ámbitos político territoriales), GO No. 39,390 of March 19, 2010. These standards develop the mandates of the Organic Law of the Police Service and the Bolivarian National Police Corps regarding the use of force for all security forces in the country that carry out police work. The police force is guided in all cases by the affirmation of life as a supreme value; for these purposes, it must be applied in a necessary, progressive, and differentiated manner (Article 1 of the NUPDFP):

…based exclusively on the level of resistance and opposition that the person manifests to prevent, hinder, or enervate a police intervention, reducing the use of physical force to the minimum required for effective containment, reducing the probability of producing injuries or damage, whether physical or moral, based on the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality.

These regulations establish seven differentiated and progressive levels of the use of police force, which act in correspondence with the level of resistance and opposition of the citizen. It begins at minimum levels with mere police presence until reaching the last level —extraordinary, exceptional— of potentially deadly force. This last assumption is only justified when the conditions of legitimate defense or state of necessity, as established in the Penal Code, are met.

Manual for Progressive and Differentiated Use of the Police Force (Manual de Uso Progresivo y Diferenciado de la Fuerza Policial) of 2010 aims to establish standards and procedures for action within the framework of respect for human rights related to the use of police force. It is regulated under the concept of the Police Service as established in the Law: prevailing respect for the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality, framed in professional ethics. In this sense, it is a tool for mandatory use without any type of distinction due to level of hierarchical organization, rank, or position in the exercise of the function, as well as in the training and police specialization that will be applied throughout the national, state, and municipal territorial political sphere (p.17).

Rules on the actions of the Police Forces in their various territorial political spheres to guarantee public order, social peace and citizen coexistence in public meetings and demonstrations (Normas sobre la actuación de los Cuerpos de Policía en sus diversos ámbitos políticos territoriales para garantizar el orden público, la paz social y la convivencia ciudadana en reuniones públicas y manifestaciones), GO No. 39,658 of April 18, 2011 aims to regulate the action of the police forces in their various territorial political spheres to guarantee public order, social peace, and citizen coexistence in public meetings and demonstrations within the development of the democratic and social State of Law and Justice and the protection of the human rights (Article 1). These standards include an action manual.

Rules of Action of the Bolivarian National Armed Force in functions of control of public order, social peace, and citizen coexistence in public meetings and demonstrations (Normas de Actuación de la Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana en funciones de control del orden público, la paz social y la convivencia ciudadana en reuniones públicas y manifestaciones), GO No. 40,589 of January 27, 2015, known as Resolution 8610, allows the Armed Forces the use of firearms to control public demonstrations. These norms collide with the Constitution and with the legal block described above.

Organic Penitentiary Code (Código Orgánico Penitenciario), GOE No. 6,647 of September 17, 2021, governs the use of force in penitentiary establishments. Article 90 regulates the carrying of weapons inside the prison by officials in charge of security and custody in these establishments. It states that firearms can be used in self-defense or in defense of third parties when preventing a serious crime that leads to a serious threat to life and when lesser means are insufficient to prevent an escape. The following article orders that —in the case of use of firearms— at least three warning shots must be fired, and then the shots must be aimed at the lower extremities in order to minimize injuries and protect the person’s life as much as possible. These norms collide with the Constitution and with the legal block described above.

Australia adheres to several human rights treaties⁴. Most notably it ratified the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1980⁵, and accepted the ICCPR Optional Protocol 1 in 1991 but has not ratified it⁶.

The UN Committee against Torture expressed deep concern “about the persistent use of excessive force, especially the use of lethal force, by law enforcement and military officials in the context of security operations to combat organized crime” in 2023, and called for “urgent measures to end the use of excessive force, especially the use of lethal force, by law enforcement and military officials”¹.

Also in 2023, the UN Human Rights Committee expressed concerns about excessively lethal policing, disproportionately affecting LGBT and nonwhite people.

Furthermore in 2023, a UN Special Rapporteur affirmed Brazil’s long history of violence against peaceful demonstrations and of criminalizing social movements.

Report on the mission to Chile by a team from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, December 13, 2019

Following the protests and social commotion in Chile during the series of disturbances known as the ‘social outburst’ (estallido social), this visit was scheduled to assess the human rights situation, in general, and to identify the main patterns of human rights violations committed as well as to analyze the institutional response to the protests, and make recommendations to the Chilean State, specifically. The Commission concluded that a large number of human rights violations were committed, largely due to the excessive and unnecessary use of force (in breach of international norms and standards), which resulted in unlawful killings, torture and ill-treatment, as well as giving rise to acts of sexual violence.

Report of the on-site visit to Chile to observe the human rights situation, by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, January 24, 2022

The purpose of the visit was to observe on-site the human rights situation in the context of social protest since the beginning of the ‘social outburst’ (2019–2020), following an early warning of the excessive use of force and various forms of institutional violence. In closing, it made recommendations that, among other things, the necessary measures be taken to put an immediate end to the disproportionate use of force by the Carabineros de Chile in the context of social protests and to initiate the processing of a comprehensive reform of this institution, along with the establishment of an external control body for police actions.

Report of the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Council on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association following his mission to Chile of October 24, 2016

He assessed the situation, in general, of the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association in the country and compliance with international standards on the use of force in these contexts. The Special Rapporteur identified, on the one hand, a series of good practices in the management of public meetings, but, on the other hand, identified some normative deficiencies, as well as certain (worrisome) operational problems; all of which led to recommendations for their prompt resolution.

Sixth periodic report on Chile by the Committee Against Torture, dated August 28, 2018

It identified positive aspects of the country’s respect for human rights but also expressed concern about a number of critical areas (about which it made recommendations) including: definition and criminalization of the crime of torture; national mechanism for the prevention of torture; police brutality and excessive use of force; allegations of police sexual violence against women and girls; investigation, prosecution and punishment of acts of torture and ill-treatment; deaths of minors and allegations of torture, ill-treatment and sexual abuse in residential protection centers of the National Service for Minors network; and torture and ill-treatment of persons with disabilities and the elderly.

Seventh periodic report on Chile by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, March 14, 2018

Among the forms of gender-based violence against women in Chile, it recognized excessive use of force and sexual violence by State agents against Mapuche women.

Fourth and fifth periodic report on Chile by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, October 30, 2015

It recognized with concern the multiplicity of cases of excessive use of force against students by security forces and the lack of standards, protocols and procedures specifying the maximum force that can be applied to adolescents who are deprived of liberty.

OHCHR has been present in Colombia since 1997 giving technical assistance as well as strengthening capacity in relation to the promotion and protection of human rights with both the State and civil society. It currently operates from the capital city, Bogotá, and nine sub-offices across the country.

Within the context of the judgments issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights against the Colombian State, recommendations have been made regarding the use of force and the responsibilities of the Colombian State in providing victims with mechanisms for the provision of justice and compensation.

In 2018, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions analyzed cases of “armed confrontations” and found that the modus operandi indicated that alleged gang members were killed in cold blood, and that the perpetrators or third parties had subsequently manipulated the crime scene, for example, by placing weapons and drugs next to the bodies. With some exceptions, most cases indicated the commission of extrajudicial executions. This conduct was facilitated by the lack of adequate investigations and judicial responses.¹⁴

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), in its follow-up report to its 2019 on-site visit, stated that “due to the irreversible consequences that could arise from the use of force, its use must be conceived as a last resort, limited qualitatively and quantitatively, with the aim of preventing a more serious event than the one that provokes the state’s reaction. Both the Commission and the Court have agreed that in order for the use of force to be justified, the principles of legality, absolute necessity, and proportionality must be satisfied.” This report emphasized the need for an appropriate legal framework that deters any threat to the right to life and, in particular, regulates by law the use of force and lethal force by law enforcement personnel. This regulation must establish that, without any exception, the use of force, including lethal force, will be carried out under the principles of absolute necessity, rationality, moderation, and progressive use, always considering: (1) the rights to be protected; (2) the legitimate objective pursued; and (3) the risk that law enforcement personnel must face.¹⁵

Among other recommendations established by the Commission was the suggestion that the country should ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and establish the Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture, as conditions that could generate preventive actions related to the issue of extrajudicial executions in force in the country.

As stated by the IACHR, in all cases where civilians are injured or killed by police or military forces, the State must urgently conduct diligent and impartial investigations in order to establish the facts and determine the corresponding criminal responsibilities.

The IACHR emphasizes that the duty to respect and guarantee Article 1.1 of the American Convention imposes the obligation to document cases in which the police have used force and lethal force in the exercise of their functions, as well as to conduct necessary internal and external investigations, including judicial investigations, to ensure that actions were carried out within the framework of legality. All these actions are the minimum necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of extrajudicial executions by state agents.¹⁶

In 2023, the United Nations Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent, on its visit to the UK, found: “serious concerns about the unwarranted use of force against people of African descent, including in police-involved killings of people of African descent and deaths in custody. The Working Group met with the families of Chris Kaba, Oladeji Omishore, and Sean Rigg, among others, and followed the cases of Sheku Bayoh and Kevin Clarke. and learned about persistent structural barriers to the access to justice over the course of many years, including untenable delays in investigations, dismissive and callous treatment of families, misinformation, and the necessity for significant financial outlay by victims’ families to compel meaningful investigation. Notably, although much time has passed between these specific deaths, the same frustrations, obstacles, and intransigence persists according to accounts”⁹.

In its 2021 report, the UN Subcommittee for the Prevention of Torture expressed its concern about “the numerous reports received that… persons from ethnic minorities are more likely to be subject to restraint and other restrictive practices and to experience disproportionate numbers of deaths in custody and/or in mental health care”¹⁰.

As noted by the website PolicingLaw.info¹¹, in its 2019 Concluding Observations on the United Kingdom, the Committee against Torture considered that the UK authorities: “should ensure that the use of electrical discharge weapons is strictly compliant with the principles of necessity, subsidiarity, proportionality, advance warning (where feasible) and precaution. The State party should provide clear presumptions against the use of tasers on vulnerable groups, such as children and young people, investigate the causes for their disproportionate use against members of minorities and prohibit their use in drive stun mode. The Committee was of the view that electric discharge weapons “should not form part of the equipment of custodial staff in prisons or any other place of deprivation of liberty, including mental health settings”.

With respect to the use of conducted electrical weapons (e.g. Taser©), in its 2013 Concluding Observations on the United Kingdom’s fifth periodic report on its implementation of the CAT, the Committee against Torture expressed deep concern: ‘at instances where electrical discharge weapons have been used on children, persons with disabilities and in recent policing operations where the serious threat of violence was questioned’. It called on the United Kingdom to ensure: ‘that electrical discharge weapons are used exclusively in extreme and limited situations – where there is a real and immediate threat to life or risk of serious injury – as a substitute for lethal weapons and by trained law enforcement personnel only. The State party should revise the regulations governing the use of such weapons with a view to establishing a high threshold for their use and expressly prohibiting their use on children and pregnant women’. The committee was of the view: ‘that the use of electrical discharge weapons should be subject to the principles of necessity and proportionality and should be inadmissible in the equipment of custodial staff in prisons or any other place of deprivation of liberty’. It urged the United Kingdom ‘to provide detailed instructions and adequate training to law enforcement personnel entitled to use electric discharge weapons, and to strictly monitor and supervise their use’.

In 2015, in its Concluding Observations on France, the Human Rights Committee expressed its concern about “allegations of ill-treatment, the excessive use of force and the disproportionate use of non-lethal weapons, especially during arrests, forced evictions and law enforcement operations.”

The Committee was “further concerned about continued racial profiling and allegations of police harassment, verbal abuse and abuse of power against migrants and asylum seekers in Calais”¹⁷.

In 2016, the Committee against Torture also expressed its concern about “the allegations of excessive use of force by the police and the gendarmerie, which has in some instances led to serious injuries or death”. It was also concerned by:

1. reports of problems faced by victims in filing complaints;
2. the lack of statistical data on complaints filed that would allow for comparisons with inquires launched and cases prosecuted;
3. the lack of detailed information on related convictions of police and gendarmerie officers and the sentences handed down; and
4. reports of high numbers of cases being dismissed or discontinued, light administrative sanctions being imposed that are not proportionate to the seriousness of the actions, and a very small number of court-ordered penalties being imposed upon police and gendarmerie officers¹⁸.

The Committee was further concerned “about the allegations of violence being used against asylum seekers and migrants, and about their situation in Calais and the surrounding area”.

In 2019, after urging France to halt the use of kinetic impact projectiles, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, invited the French authorities to show more respect for human rights during operations aimed at maintaining public order and to refrain from introducing excessive restrictions to freedom of peaceful assembly through the bill on strengthening and guaranteeing public order at demonstrations¹⁹.

In 2022, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) called on France to improve the recording of police identity checks²⁰.

In 2023, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, CERD, adopted a statement on the situation in France, expressing its concerns and making a number of recommendations to the State regarding racial profiling and excessive use of force by law enforcement officials²¹.

In 2023, the Monitoring Committee of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, which is responsible for verifying fulfilment of obligations assumed by member states of the Council of Europe, “considered many longstanding issues concerning the functioning of democratic institutions, the rule of law and human rights in France”. Among other statements, “the Assembly is particularly alarmed by the high number of people injured during demonstrations, especially the number of injuries with serious long-term consequences. In this connection, it regrets the fact that the official statistics do not provide a clear picture of the number of people injured or killed by law enforcement officers during demonstrations or the number of such officers sanctioned or having received criminal convictions for unlawful acts of violence committed during the demonstrations. Having such statistics would help dispel the feeling that unlawful violence by law enforcement officers goes unpunished. The Assembly therefore calls on the authorities to grant access to this information”²².

• Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions: report of the Special Rapporteur, Asma Jahangir, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/35
• Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Christof Heyns, submitted to the Human Rights Council pursuant to its Resolution 17/5. A/HRC/26/36
• Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, submitted to the Human Rights Council. A/HRC/14/24/ADD.6
• Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Mexico. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Committee. CCPR/C/MEX/CO/6
• Letter and preliminary observations on the decree “Ley de Seguridad Interior”, 2017. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

The Philippines has declared its adherence to key global human rights treaties relevant to the state’s use of force, particularly: the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights¹⁰ (ICCPR, ratified 23 October 1986); the ICCPR Optional Protocol¹¹ (ratified 20 November 2007); the 1984 Convention Against Torture^{12, 13} (CAT, ratified 18 June 1986) including its Optional Protocol 1¹⁴ (ratified 17 April 2012). The Philippines was originally a state party to the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, but announced its withdrawal under former President Rodrigo Duterte in March 2018¹⁵, which formally came into effect a year later. This was in response to the International Criminal Court’s February 2018 announcement that it would launch a preliminary investigation for possible crimes against humanity committed in the country, particularly in the context of its campaign against illegal drugs. On 14 May 2021 its Pre-Trial Chamber authorized the investigation for crimes against humanity in the implementation of the country’s drug war, covering the period 1 November 2011 to 16 March 2019, for which the ICC asserts its jurisdiction given that the alleged crimes happened while the Philippines was a State Party to the Rome Statute. The resumption of the investigation went back and forth due to the Philippine state’s efforts to block it. The Philippine government’s most recent appeal to the ICC, filed in February 2023, to block its investigation of possible crimes against humanity committed in the Philippines was rejected by the ICC in July 2023. The ICC deems the probe as continuing and in effect16.

In 2016, the former president Rodrigo Duterte launched an anti-illegal drug campaign “War on Drugs” or “Oplan Tokhang” as one of his government’s flagship programs, which in effect gives officers a license to kill. The ICC issued a statement of concern¹⁷ and has been monitoring human rights violations in relation to the program since 2016, despite threats by the president at that time to withdraw from the ICC. In 2017, a whistleblower of the Davao Death Squad prompted the filing of a petition for preliminary examination by the ICC. In 2018, the ICC initiated preliminary investigations¹⁸ on the “War on Drugs” and in the same year, the Philippines submitted a written notice of withdrawal from the Rome Statute¹⁹. From 2019 to 2022, the ICC has continued investigations against the Duterte government for Crimes Against Humanity, with limited progress. The investigation was resumed in 2022 at the beginning of President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr.’s term. In 2023, the ICC pre-trial chamber re-opened the investigation, and in response the Philippine government filed a motion to block investigations²⁰. In the most recent development in July 2023, the ICC rejected the appeal. However, the current administration refuses to cooperate with the ICC probes²¹.

In 2014, the UN Committee against Torture stated in its Concluding Observations that it was “highly concerned about allegations of excessive use of force, including lethal force, by police and security forces, especially when apprehending suspects and quelling demonstrations, and about the broad threshold for the use of lethal force in Section 16, Paragraph 2, of the Constitution”. It called on Sierra Leone to take “immediate and effective action to investigate promptly, effectively and impartially all allegations of excessive use of force, especially lethal force, by members of law enforcement agencies and to bring those responsible for such acts to justice and provide the victims with redress”. It also urged Sierra Leone to “make the necessary amendments in Section 16 of the Constitution and the police rules of procedure to ensure that lethal use of firearms by law enforcement officials can only be employed as a measure of last resort and if strictly unavoidable for the purpose of protecting life, in accordance with the Convention, the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990)”.

Organization of American States (OAS)

• On September 14, 2017, the Secretary General of the OAS appointed a Panel of Independent International Experts whose task was to analyze whether there is a reasonable basis to establish that the current Government of Venezuela has committed crimes against humanity, and to determine if there is a basis for referring the situation to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
• On May 29, 2018, the report —signed by the Secretary of the OAS together with the Panel of Independent International Experts— was published. It indicated that there were ‘sufficient grounds’ about the commission of crimes against humanity in Venezuela, which date back to at least February 12, 2014. The report recommends the following: the Secretary General of the OAS forward this Report and the evidence collected by the General Secretariat of the OAS to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC); the Secretary General invite the States Parties to the Rome Statute to refer the situation in Venezuela to the ICC Prosecutor’s Office; ask the Prosecutor to open an investigation into the crimes against humanity that are included in this Report, in accordance with the provisions of Article 14 of the Rome Statute. This first report includes, among others, the identification of 8,292 extrajudicial executions documented since 2015.
• On December 2, 2020, the General Secretariat of the OAS presented a second report that expanded on the previous report and reaffirmed the commission of crimes against humanity in Venezuela. It also questions the Prosecutor’s Office of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for inaction before these crimes. It notes that since the publication of the 2018 report, crimes against humanity in Venezuela have increased in scale, scope, and severity. Among the findings of the second report is the identification of 18,093 extrajudicial executions carried out by State security forces since 2014. It also identified 724 cases of forced disappearance between the years 2018 and 2019, and 653 documented cases of torture since 2014.

International Criminal Court

• On 26 September 2018, Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru referred the situation of Venezuela to the ICC, asking the Court to investigate crimes against humanity committed in Venezuela since February 12, 2014. This move marks the first state referral of another State Party’s situation in the history of the ICC. The Office of the Prosecutor has an ongoing preliminary examination of alleged crimes committed since at least April 2017 in Venezuela in the context of demonstrations and related political unrest.
• In 2020, the Office concluded that there was a reasonable basis to believe that crimes against humanity, particularly in the context of detention, have been committed in Venezuela since at least April 2017. Since then, the preliminary examination has also focused on the existence and genuineness of national proceedings as part of the admissibility assessment.
• On November 3, 2021, the ICC Prosecutor’s Office announced that the preliminary examination had concluded with the decision to continue investigations.
• On April 16, 2022, the ICC Prosecutor’s Office notified the Pre-Trial Chamber that it had received a request from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to defer the Prosecutor’s investigations in favor of actions carried out by the national authorities of Venezuela, in accordance with article 18 of the Rome Statute. In the same notification, the Prosecutor also informed the Pre-Trial Chamber of his intention to request, as soon as possible, authorization to resume the Office’s investigations — having examined the basis for the postponement request.
• On November 1, 2022, the Prosecutor submitted a request to the Pre-Trial Chamber requesting authorization to resume the investigation into the Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
• On June 27, 2023, Pre-Trial Chamber I authorized the ICC Prosecutor’s Office to resume its investigation into the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela I.
• Venezuela deposited its instrument of ratification of the Rome Statute on June 7, 2000. The ICC has been able to exercise jurisdiction over Rome Statute crimes committed in the territory of Venezuela or by its nationals since July 1, 2002.

OHCHR report

The UN Human Rights Office has a history of monitoring and reporting on the human rights situation in Venezuela. It has issued two public reports (2017 and 2018) based on the High Commissioner’s global mandate under General Assembly Resolution 48/141. Since September 2019, the High Commissioner has also provided oral updates and reports to the Human Rights Council pursuant to Resolutions 39/1 (2018), 42/4 (2019), 42/25 (2019), 45/2 (2020), and 45/20 (2020). The UN Human Rights Office continues its technical assistance, monitoring, and reporting work as provided for in Human Rights Council resolution A/HRC/51/29 (2022).

It is noteworthy that on July 4, 2019, the Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was presented — led by the former Chilean president Michelle Bachelet. It generated numerous debates about the situation of civil and political rights in Venezuela because of the presentation of official figures of homicides and deaths due to the intervention of the State security forces for the year 2018, which until that point had been unknown.

Said report questioned the actions of the Special Action Forces (FAES, Fuerza de Acciones Especiales), requesting its dissolution and investigation of the extrajudicial executions carried out by this division, expressing the following (p.16):

Thousands of people, mainly young men, have been killed in alleged clashes with state forces in recent years. There are reasonable grounds to believe that many of these deaths constitute extrajudicial executions carried out by security forces, particularly the FAES. OHCHR is concerned that the authorities may be using the FAES, and possibly other security forces, as part of a policy of social control. These violent deaths require an immediate investigation to ensure the accountability of the perpetrators and guarantees of non-repetition.

The report notes that proportion of alleged extrajudicial executions committed by security forces, particularly the FAES, in the context of police operations has been surprisingly high. The government informed the OHCHR that between January 1 and May 19, 2019, there were some 1,569 violent deaths due to ‘resistance to authority’ (p.11).

According to official figures provided to the OHCHR, in the case of 2018, 15,885 homicides were recorded, of which 5,287 deaths were due to ‘resistance to authority’. That is, 33% of the homicides that occurred in the country, were a consequence of the intervention of public forces.

The report also emphasizes that the majority of victims of human rights violations have not had real access to justice or adequate reparation. “According to those interviewed, few people file complaints, due to fear of reprisals or lack of confidence in the justice system” (p.12). Those who do, mostly women, face omnipresent obstacles and, in most cases, stalled investigations.

Prosecutors from the Attorney-General’s Office reproduce police logic of intimidation and mistreatment against the surviving victims or the relatives who promote the investigation of the cases, many show solidarity with the perpetrators and protect the officials involved: “often the judicial authorities have reversed the burden of proof by refusing to open investigations unless the victims identified those responsible” (p.10).

Subsequently, broadly speaking, the OHCHR reports and updates indicate that, in Venezuela, the security forces responded with excessive force and other repressive measures to protests in which various sectors of the population participated. Impunity persisted for the continued extrajudicial executions committed by security forces. Despite the approval of legal reforms related to the administration of justice, victims continued to have difficulties accessing the right to truth and reparation. By the end of 2022, more than 7.1 million Venezuelans had fled the country. There have been lengthy delays in investigating deaths during protests that took place in 2014, 2017 and 2019. Furthermore, of the 101 deaths that OHCHR has documented in the context of security operations, only eight have been brought to trial. Additionally, OHCHR reported that government authorities had dissolved the FAES of the Bolivarian National Police, which had participated in several hundred alleged extrajudicial executions. However, the government did not make any public statement on this issue and civil society organizations continued to denounce that the FAES remained active under other names.

Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela (MIIDHV, Misión Internacional Independiente de Determinación de los Hechos sobre Venezuela)

On September 27, 2019, the United Nations Human Rights Council established an Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela (hereafter La Misión), through Resolution 42/25 for a period of one year to evaluate alleged violations of human rights committed since 2014. The mandate of La Misión was extended by the Council through Resolutions 45/20 and 51/29, until September 2024.

On September 25, 2020, it published its first report, which focused on the patterns of behavior in which the four human rights violations provided for in the mandate occurred: extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and torture and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment. Within each pattern of behavior, the report discusses specific incidents in detail as illustrative examples of the patterns within which they occurred. It highlights:

The majority of people murdered in the cases investigated did not have criminal records or outstanding arrest warrants against them (…) There are reasonable grounds to believe that security forces committed extrajudicial executions, as well as arbitrary arrests and detentions (…) There is a clear pattern of the Government claiming that the deaths occurred as a result of clashes or that the victims were resisting authority at the time of their death. (…) In addition, the victims were fatally shot in vital areas, sometimes at point-blank range. The fatal shootings suggest that security forces did not attempt to employ non-lethal methods of control, deterrence, or containment before using deadly force. In the cases investigated, no deaths were reported by the security forces, so it seems unlikely that there was an armed confrontation. (p.12)

La Misión also conducted an extensive review of cases reported by the local press between January 2014 and December 2019 in order to corroborate patterns and changes over time. In total, La Misión examined 2,417 incidents in which 4,681 deaths occurred by security forces. (p.13)

The official version of events in many cases was that the victims were killed while resisting arrest, in a confrontation and/or during an exchange of gunfire. However, La Misión received direct evidence that contradicts the official version. Witnesses interviewed stated that the victims were last seen or heard from under the control of police officers, including on a bed, on the floor, with a hood over the victim’s head, or with their hands raised. Despite efforts to remove them from the scene, in some cases witnesses saw the officers fire the fatal shot. (p.14)

A source with internal knowledge of PNB/FAES operations told La Misión that, after the background check, the head of the operation in direct communication with superiors could request and receive “the green light to kill”. A former PNB/FAES officer interviewed by La Misión said that he and his colleagues refer to the murders as “squaring people up”. This interviewee said that there is a ‘triangle’ from the victim’s chest upwards “where people are allowed to shoot” (idem). Officials often fire shots to imitate a shooting “or take an illegal weapon they have […] and leave it there”. Another source told La Misión that the police used to plant a gun or a grenade (called in the jargon ‘agricultural missions’ to plant ‘seeds’) and then claim that there was an armed confrontation. (p.15)

La Misión has reasonable grounds to believe that the acts and conduct described in this report constitute “arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial executions, torture, and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment — including sexual and gender-based violence, forced disappearances (often short-term duration), and arbitrary detentions, in violation of national legislation and Venezuela’s international obligations”. (p.19)

Regarding the extrajudicial executions committed by the PNB/FAES and the CICPC, La Misión has reasonable grounds to believe that certain high-level authorities were aware of these crimes and contributed to their commission. Others, in their capacity as commanders and superiors, knew or should have known of their commission and, having effective command and control, did not adopt measures to prevent or repress them. The responsibility of the regional and state authorities of these forces corresponds to the areas in which they exercised authority and effective control. (p.19)

Also in the detailed conclusions of the same report it states (p.425):

Former FAES officers revealed to La Misión that the regional directors of the FAES requested statistics of deaths and detainees as a weekly or monthly procedure. Brigade leaders were responsible for collecting these statistics. A FAES officer indicated that FAES personnel were given instructions such as “today I want one dead […] each brigade has to have one dead”. Failure to comply could lead to reprimands. According to one FAES officer, compliance, particularly when a suspected criminal had been ‘eliminated’, helped officers achieve promotions. La Misión’s investigations revealed a common understanding within these forces regarding the ‘elimination’ of individuals during operations, regardless of whether the use of force was necessary and proportionate.

La Misión has also received direct information about explicit orders to commit extrajudicial executions where the respective Brigade Chiefs issued those orders (p.426).

In La Misión’s opinion, the attack was widespread and systematic. The perpetration of 54 acts of extrajudicial executions, 112 acts of illegal imprisonment and 95 acts of torture and other cruel or inhuman treatment that La Misión investigated were indicative of broader patterns of conduct, as demonstrated throughout this report. Furthermore, the conduct took place over a period of more than five years and throughout the territory of Venezuela. Therefore, the attack was widespread. Furthermore, the attack was organized, as opposed to an ‘accidental’ repetition of similar conduct. As noted, the crimes followed similar patterns; The same modus operandi was used to attack the victims. Therefore, the attack was systematic (p.435).

In a second report, presented in September 2021, La Misión focused its investigation on the justice system and its response to human rights violations and crimes it documented, since “the investigation of violations of the right to life must begin by trade. The fact that cases of death after the use of force are not properly investigated may in itself constitute a violation of the right to life” (2020, p, 8). Several of the officials among those investigated by La Misión continue to work for these organizations and in some cases have been promoted.

In a third report, presented in September 2022, it shows detailed conclusions on “Crimes against humanity committed through State intelligence services: structures and people involved in the implementation of a plan to repress opposition to the government”. In Point 5, the report states, “La Misión finds reasonable grounds to believe that during the period under review, arbitrary detentions were used to attack people because of their affiliation, political participation, their points of view, and their opinions and expressions” (pp.4–5). They also released another report on the situation in remote mining areas and highlighted the situation in the state of Bolívar, in the south of the country, where state and non-state actors have committed a series of violations and crimes against local populations in gold mining areas.

La Misión regrets that, despite repeated calls from the UN Human Rights Council, the Venezuelan authorities continue to prevent Mission personnel from carrying out investigations in Venezuelan territory, and they have not responded to the —at least— 23 letters sent from La Misión.

There are no relevant regional human rights treaties, and therefore no regional court judgements. However, Australia is a member of the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions.

The cases in which Brazil has been condemned by the Interamerican Court of Human Rights regarding Law Enforcement Operations include:

1. Nogueira Carvalho and other v Brazil
2. Escher and others v Brazil
3. Gomes Lund and others (Araguaia guerilla) v Brazil
4. Cosme Rosa Genoveva, Evandro de Oliveira and others (“Favela Nova Brasília”) v Brazil
5. Vladmir Herzog v Brazil

There are no judgements of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in this regard.

Report No. 458/21 of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on case 12. 880: Edmundo Alex Lemún Saavedra et al. v. Chile, of December 31, 2021

Urges the Chilean State to adopt measures of non-repetition that include legislative, administrative and any other measures with the purpose of: (i) preventing the excessive use of force by Carabineros in the context of the territorial claims of indigenous peoples, particularly the Mapuche people, including training, coordination and supervision measures, as well as the establishment of suitable mechanisms of accountability before the State and civil society; and (ii) ensuring that the military criminal justice system cannot, under any circumstances, hear cases of human rights violations.

The Colombian State has been found to have breached its human rights obligations on various occasions by the “Inter-American Court of Human Rights”²⁰ (Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos):

1. Case Caballero Delgado and Santana vs. Colombia. December 8^th, 1995, Isidro Caballero Delgado and María del Carmen Santana were detained by a military patrol belonging to the Colombian National Army. After their arrest these individuals were killed by civilians and the agents who conducted the detention. Subsequently their bodies disappeared.
2. Case Las Palmeras vs. Colombia. This case dates to events that took place on January 23^rd, 1991. The Commander of the Putumayo Departmental Police ordered an armed operation with support from the Colombian National Army, resulting in the execution of six civilians. Following the massacre, police officers and militaries dressed some of the victims in military uniforms, burned their clothes, and presented their bodies as deceased insurgents killed in combat.
3. Case Los Diecinueve Comerciantes vs. Colombia. Events occurred in the department of Santander on October 6^th, 1987, where 19 traders engaged in transportation and merchandise acquisition on the Colombia-Venezuela border disappeared. 17 of them were detained by a criminal group, taken to the property of a public force commander where they were murdered and dismembered, in accordance with a decision jointly made with members of the National Army operating in the area.
4. Case Gutiérrez Soler vs. Colombia. Wilson Gutiérrez Soler was arrested on August 24^th, 1994, in Bogotá D.C., by a former Colonel of the National Army and a Colonel of the National Police. Once deprived of freedom, he was transported to a basement where he was tortured until he was compelled to sign a statement acknowledging charges of extortion.
5. Case Escué Zapata vs. Colombia. The events occurred on February 1^st, 1988, when an indigenous informant of the Colombian National Army reported that there were guerrilla weapons hidden by the community. During the operation, Colombian National Army members entered the indigenous’ residence, assaulting him while searching for the alleged weapons. Subsequently, he was led to an area where he was killed by the military, who later reported that he had lost his life in a confrontation with the guerrilla.
6. Case Santo Domingo Massacre vs. Colombia. The events occurred on December 13^th, 1998, during a military operation against the FARC guerrilla. A crew of a Colombian Air Force helicopter released a device containing six cluster bombs, weaponry banned by International Humanitarian Law, causing the death of seventeen civilians, including six children. Additionally, twenty-seven individuals were wounded, and others were displaced to municipalities near the events, where they were targeted by machine gun fire from members of the Air Force.
7. Case Yarce and others vs. Colombia. This case concerned the killing of five women human rights defenders during operations by the state, including the police. The Court found that the government had failed in its obligation to guarantee the life and physical integrity of the community leader, Ana Teresa Yarce, and that it had violated the rights to freedom and physical integrity and free association of the other female leaders: Socorro Mosquera, Mery Naranjo, Luz Dary Ospina and Miriam Rua.
8. Case Bedoya Lima and others vs. Colombia. This case concerns the alleged abduction, rape, and torture of journalist and human rights defender Jineth Bedoya Lima in 2000 during a visit to “La Modelo” prison in Bogota. Colombia denounced the lack of objectivity of five judges in the oral proceedings before the Inter-American Court and withdrew (although later returned). The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) in 2019 had found that the abduction, rape, and torture of Ms Bedoya Lima had to be considered in a context of general violence against journalists and particularly sexual violence against women during the armed conflicts in Colombia. The Commission held that the State had failed to adopt appropriate and timely measures to protect Ms Bedoya Lima, despite knowing that the journalist was in a situation of risk due to her work. The Inter-American Court issued provisional measures to Colombia ordering the authorities to protect the life and bodily integrity of Ms Bedoya Lima.

El Salvador does not have any judgments from regional courts such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights or the United Nations treaty monitoring committees regarding cases of the use of lethal force.

As noted by the website PolicingLaw.Info¹², number of cases concerning alleged unlawful use of force in law enforcement by the UK police and security forces have come before the European Court of Human Rights. The most important are the Grand Chamber rulings in the McCann and da Silva cases.

MCCANN AND OTHERS v. UNITED KINGDOM (1995)

This judgment is one of the most important the European Court has ever made. It was the first ruling under Article 2 (the right to life) of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights in which the Court established that that right includes four dimensions: compatibility of national law with Article 2; the use of force itself; a “duty of precaution” or planning and control requirement; and a duty to investigate. In its judgment, the European Court found a violation of the right to life by the United Kingdom, not for the decision by British soldiers to shoot and kill three members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) who were on a bombing mission in Gibraltar, but for the failure to arrest them beforehand.

ARMANI DA SILVA v. UNITED KINGDOM (2016)

The da Silva case concerned the fatal police shooting of a Brazilian electrician, Jean-Charles de Menezes, in the London Underground in 2005 when he was mistaken for a wanted terrorist. The European Court found no breaches of the four dimensions of Article 2 and reaffirmed that an honest but mistaken belief on the part of the police did not amount to a violation of the right to life.

There has been one other European Court of Human Rights judgment on a police shooting in England:

BUBBINS v. UNITED KINGDOM (2005)

The deceased in this case had pointed a replica firearm from the window of his flat and was shot dead by a member of Bedfordshire Police. A Chamber of the Court held that there was no breach of any aspect of Article 2 and confirmed that a use of force based on an officer’s honest belief about the circumstances could be compatible with the provisions of Article 2(2).

There have been numerous rulings by the Court’s Chambers regarding failings in the duty to investigate under Article 2 involving the activities of UK law enforcement officials and security services in Northern Ireland (including notably Hugh Jordan v UK (2001), the combined rulings in McKerr v. UK, Kelly v UK and Shanaghan v UK (2001), McCaughey & Others v UK (2013) and Hemsworth v UK (2013)).

A number of cases concerning deaths following an alleged unlawful use of force in law enforcement operations in France have come before the European Court of Human Rights. Excluding deaths in custody involving restraint techniques, the following cases are known:

Taïs v France (2006): The intoxicated victim was arrested and placed in a drunk tank at the Arcachon police station. He was found dead in the early hours of the morning. The ECtHR held that given discrepancies in the medical report and autopsy, the authorities had failed to provide a plausible explanation for the cause of the victim’s injuries that led to his death and which could only have been caused while he was in custody. In addition, the police officers showed inertia in the face of the victim’s physical and moral distress. Both these failings breached Article 2.

Saoud v France (2007): The police received a telephone call asking them to intervene at the victim’s family home, where he was attacking his mother and two sisters. The victim refused to open the door to the flat when requested by the police and attacked one of his sisters. The police entered by the balcony and fired two kinetic impact projectiles [the report does not specify which sort of projectile]. The victim managed to seize one officer’s hand gun and fired four shots at floor level before he was disarmed. He was then handcuffed with his arms in front of his body, while the body weight of the officers was used to keep him pinned to the ground on his stomach. Held for thirty minutes in this position, he died of cardiorespiratory arrest due to “slow asphyxiation”. The ECtHR decided that the use of force at the initial moment of intervention and capture did not breach Article 2(2), but that the subsequent restraint technique did breach Article 2.

Guerdner and others v France (2014): While under arrest and being questioned in a gendarmerie headquarters, the victim jumped out of a window to try to escape. A gendarme fatally shot the victim as he ran away in darkness. The ECtHR held that the regulations covering the use of force were unclear but were compatible with Article 2 ECHR. It held that the use of lethal force was not absolutely necessary in the circumstances and so breached Article 2(2). Although the investigation into the use of lethal force by a gendarme was carried out by the gendarmerie, it was found not to breach the Article 2 requirements for an investigation.

Toubache v France (2018): The victim was a passenger in a car, the driver of which did not stop when ordered to do so by a gendarme. As the car was being driven away, the gendarme shot at the vehicle to try to stop it, but in so doing killed the victim. The ECtHR held that the use of force was not absolutely necessary in the circumstances and so breached Article 2(2).

Mendy v France (2018) (admissibility decision): The victim was suffering from a psychiatric illness and was chasing another person with a knife. He was shot dead by a police officer who formed the view that the victim represented an immediate danger to the life of another person. The ECtHR held that the use of lethal force in the circumstances was clearly within the scope of the requirements for absolute necessity under Article 2(2), so there was no case to answer.

Semache v France (2018): The victim died after being arrested by the police when the car in which he was travelling was stopped for erratic driving. The victim was forcefully restrained using a chest compression technique. The ECtHR held that although the force used was proportionate in the circumstances, the victim’s situation was handled negligently by the authorities, who failed to do what could reasonably be expected of them to prevent the risk of death to which he was exposed, and so breached Article 2.

Boukrourou and others v France (2018): The victim suffered from a psychiatric disorder and became annoyed and agitated in a pharmacy when he could not obtain his medication. The police intervened. Faced with his refusal to comply with their instructions and his physical resistance, the police officers punched him to subdue him. The victim died shortly afterwards. The ECtHR decided that a causal connection between the police use of force and the death could not be established, so there was no breach of Article 2. As medical assistance was called rapidly, that also meant Article 2 was not breached. However, the ECtHR held that the violent, repeated and ineffective actions of the police officers constituted an affront to human dignity and were thus contrary to Article 3.

Bouras v France (2022): During transfer, the victim tried to take a gendarme’s service weapon and escape. The driver then stopped and tried to subdue the detainee, before finally opening fire and killing him. The ECtHR held that this was a situation of self-defense and so within the scope of Article 2.

The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) is not the final Appellate Court for Jamaica. The JCF and its auxiliaries serve the entire island. The JCF has 19 police divisions and areas and these are led by senior officers ultimately answerable to the Commissioner of Police.

The following cases were heard at the Inter-American Court on Human Rights:

• Women Victims of Sexual Torture in Atenco v Mexico. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 28, 2018. Series C No. 371. On Abuse of force, sexual assault and torture by the Federal Police⁶.
• Fernández Ortega et al. v Mexico. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of August 30, 2010. Series C No. 215. On sexual assault committed by the military, the lack of due diligence in the investigation and punishment of the authors; “the failure to make adequate reparation to the [alleged] victim and her next of kin; […] the use of the military justice system to investigate and prosecute human rights violations, and […] the difficulties encountered by indigenous people, indigenous women in particular, to obtain access to justice”⁷.
• Rosendo Cantú et al. v Mexico. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of August 31, 2010. Series C No. 216. On sexual assault committed by the military and lack of due diligence in investigating and punishing perpetrators⁸.
• Alvarado Espinoza et al. v Mexico. Judgment of November 28, 2018. Disappearance of three members of a family during a military operative in Chihuahua. The court recognized the military’s responsibility in the disappearances, the state’s responsibility in the inadequate investigation and established criteria for the use of military in public security efforts, stating it must be extraordinary, subordinated to civil authorities and supplementary, regulated through legal mechanisms⁹.

The Philippines is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which promulgated its own ASEAN Human Rights Declaration in 2013 to affirm the association’s commitment to upholding human rights in the region. The declaration reaffirms adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Declaration of the Advancement of Women in the ASEAN Region, and the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in the ASEAN Region²².

The Declaration is non-binding, in most part due to the principle of non-interference in each of the member states’ internal affairs. There are therefore no regional human rights court judgements based on it.

Still, the declaration provides a human rights framework for ASEAN member states to follow. The implementation of the declaration is supported by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights which recently convened in March 2023 to discuss developments in the human rights situation in the ASEAN region²³.

There have been no cases decided by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights that relate to the use of force by law enforcement in Sierra Leone. Though Sierra Leone has signed the Protocol to create the African Court, it has not yet ratified it, and therefore cases against it cannot be pursued there (except, theoretically, by the Commission).

Hassan Kargbo and seven others have filed a default judgment notice at the ECOWAS Court against Sierra Leone for not responding to suit No. ECW/CCJ/APP/36/22 (a case relating to the use of force against protestors at Makeni in July 2020, first filed in 2022). At least four people were killed and a further ten injured when police and soldiers opened fire on protesters trying to block the relocation of a power-generator to another town. When protesters started throwing stones, officers started firing into the air, but while many of the protesters dispersed, some continued to throw stones and so officers started firing at the protesters. In a statement after the event the Government said it was aware of a “potential loss of life”, without providing details. It said that any attempt to undermine public peace would be met with “the fullest force of the law“².

A hearing was held in September 2023, to which Sierra Leone did not send counsel, but the court heard arguments from counsel for the plaintiffs. Referencing General Comment No.3 of the African Commission, their counsel Oludayo Fagbemi (IHRDA) argued that by using lethal force without aiming to protect life, the Sierra Leone Police had violated the right to life. Further, by failing to conduct a meaningful investigation into the incident, the State had further (and separately) violated the right to life. Judgment in this case was expected in January 2024³.

In February 2024, the ECOWAS Court found that Sierra Leone had violated the right to security of the person and the right be free from torture when police shot him in the abdomen during a peaceful student protest in Bo in March 2017, and then further violated his right to a remedy when the state failed effectively to investigate the incident or prosecute those responsible for the shooting⁴.

It should be noted that the same body has already found against Sierra Leone with respect to failure to investigate (in the case of Adama Vandi v Sierra Leone⁵. That case related to the police’s failure to investigate a rape, but as in another contemporary case against Nigeria, the Court concluded that its jurisprudence on effective investigations was in line with the Inter-American Court in Valásquez Rodríguez v Honduras.

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has treated the following cases:

• El Amparo vs. Venezuela (1996) refers to events that occurred after October 29, 1988. That day, sixteen fishermen from the town of El Amparo, Venezuela were heading to the La Colorada canal through the Arauca river, located in Apure State to participate in a ‘fishing trip’. At approximately 11:20am, when some fishermen were getting off the boat, military and police members of the José Antonio Páez Specific Command (CEJAP) opened fire on them, killing fourteen of the sixteen fishermen. On August 1, 1994, the Venezuelan State sent its response to the complaint and, by means of a note dated January 11, 1995, reaffirmed that Venezuela “did not contain the facts referred to in the complaint and that it accepted the international responsibility of the State”.2018 Court Resolution:
  

  … in the exercise of its powers to supervise compliance with its decisions, in accordance with Articles 33, 62.1, 62.3, 65, 67 and 68.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 24, 25 and 30 of the Statute, and 31.2 and 69 of its Regulations, RESOLVES: 1. To declare, in accordance with what is stated in Consideration 10 of this Resolution, that the State continues without complying with the measure of reparation related to continuing the investigations of the events referred to in this case and sanction those who are responsible (fourth operative paragraph of the Judgment on reparations and costs ). 2. Keep open the compliance supervision procedure with respect to the reparation measure ordered in the fourth operative paragraph of the Reparations Judgment, regarding continuing the investigations of the facts referred to in this case and sanctioning those who are responsible.

• El Caracazo vs. Venezuela (1999): On February 27, 1989, an undetermined number of people from the popular strata began a series of riots in the city of Guarenas, State of Miranda, as a consequence of the increase in urban transportation rates and the lack of recognition of preferential student passage by the Executive Branch. These riots later spread “to other areas of the Caracas Metropolitan Area (…), La Guaira, Maracay, Valencia, Barquisimeto, Guayana, Mérida, Maracaibo, and the areas adjacent to the transport terminal”. That day, a section of the Metropolitan Police was on strike, which is why it did not intervene in a timely manner to control the riots.According to statements by the then President of the Republic “there was no organization to prevent and confront, at the beginning, what was happening (…) after returning from the city of Barquisimeto, when he passed through an area of Caracas near the Presidential Palace called El Silence, [he saw] the destroyed display cases, upon arriving in Miraflores he called the Minister of Defense and ordered him to proceed with the mobilization of military personnel”. Control of the situation was entrusted to military forces, for which approximately nine thousand troops were brought from the interior of the country. These forces were made up of young people of 17 and 18 years old recruited in February 1989. From statements by senior army officers, former Ministers of State, and the Former President of the Republic, it is clear that the armed forces were not prepared to assume control of the public order. The young people who were sent, due to their youth and inexperience, constituted a danger to the lives and physical integrity of people. Likewise, it appears that these young people were equipped with assault weapons (FAL or Light Automatic Rifle, 7.62mm) and AMX-13 armored vehicles, to control the civilian population. The officers used high-powered 9mm caliber pistols. Most of the 44 deaths were caused by indiscriminate shooting by military agents while others were the result of extrajudicial executions. After nine years of the exhumations being carried out, the investigations remained in the summary stage of the process.2020.Court Resolution:
  

  1. The State has committed a serious breach of its duty to report on the execution of the five reparations that are pending compliance ordered in the Judgment of the Caracazo case (…) 2. The State has not complied with the five reparations ordered in the Reparations Judgment of the present case…

• Barrios Family vs. Venezuela (2011): The events of this case occurred in the town of Guanayén, Aragua State. On August 28, 1998, police officers detained, attacked, and murdered Benito Barrios. On December 11, 2003, Narciso Barrios was also murdered by police officers. On March 3, 2004, Jorge and Rigoberto Barrios were detained, attacked, and threatened by police officers. Additionally, on June 19, 2004, six other members of the Barrios family —including two children— were detained and attacked by police officers. Likewise, the residences of some members of the Barrios family were raided by police agents, who stole and destroyed their property. Several members of the Barrios family had to leave Guanayén to live in other regions. Despite a series of appeals having been filed, no further investigations have been carried out, nor have those responsible for the events been punished.Court Decision:
  

  1. The State is responsible for the violation of the right to life established in article 4.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights, in relation to article 1.1 of said instrument (…) it is responsible for the violation of the right to personal integrity, established in article 5 of the Convention (…) is responsible for the violation of the right to personal liberty, established in article 7 of the Convention (…)

• Uzcátegui and others vs. Venezuela (2012): The case refers to the alleged extrajudicial execution of Néstor José Uzcátegui on January 1, 2001 by members of the Falcón State police; to the alleged persecution of Luis Enrique Uzcátegui by members of the same police force as a reaction to the search for justice in relation to the death of his brother Néstor José; to the also-alleged illegal and arbitrary detention and raids carried out, for the same motivations, against the personal integrity of the relatives of the Uzcáteguis; to the threats against the life and personal integrity of Luis Enrique Uzcátegui, who has also had to face a process for the crime of defamation against him and move from his place of residence; and, finally, to the alleged lack of judicial protection and enforcement of due judicial guarantees.Néstor José Uzcátegui, then 21 years old, lived with members of his family in a home located in the urban Velita II, in the city of Coro and state of Falcón. On the morning of January 1, 2001, officials from the Police Investigation Directorate and an elite group of the Armed Police Forces of the state of Falcón raided the home of the Uzcátegui family without a court order and with violence while the family was celebrating the new year. During the police operation, the police officers used firearms against Néstor José Uzcátegui, shooting him at least twice — without legitimacy and, where appropriate, necessity and proportionality of the use of firearms having been demonstrated for lethal force. Néstor José Uzcátegui died as a result of the shots received. These events were framed in a context in which extrajudicial executions and other abuses occurred by police forces, particularly by state and municipal police. At that time, “the disproportionate, indiscriminate and discretionary use […] of force, negligence and inexperience in the use of firearms, threats and harassment, simulation of executions, arbitrary detentions, illegal searches, delays in transfers of injured people to health centers after having injured them, shots in the air, adulteration of cartridges, [and] carrying of illegal weapons,” among other situations.Court Decision :
  

  The State is responsible for the violation of the right to life, recognized in Article 4.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights, in relation to Article 1.1 of said instrument (…) it is responsible for the violation of the right to personal liberty, recognized in Articles 7.1, 7.2 and 7.4 of the Convention (…) is responsible for the violation of the right to personal integrity, recognized in Article 5.1 of the Convention (…)

• Landaeta Mejías Brothers and others vs. Venezuela (2014): On November 17, 1996, Igmar Alexander Landaeta Mejías died from two gunshot wounds after an alleged confrontation with police intelligence agents. After said events, the agents transferred his body to the Type III Ambulatory Center of Turmero and then left without identifying themselves. Regarding Eduardo José Landaeta Mejías, 17 years old, the Court confirmed that on December 29, 1996, a month and a half after the death of his brother, he was detained by agents of the Security and Public Order Corps of Aragua State (CSOPEA, Cuerpo de Seguridad y Orden Público del Estado Aragua), and taken to the San Carlos Neighborhood Barracks. This was in relation to an alleged investigation that was being investigated before the Mariño Section. Later he was transferred to the Central Barracks. He died in the custody of CSOPEA police during the transfer from the Central Police Command to the Mariño Section, after having been detained for a period of more than 38 hours. The autopsy protocol identified the existence of more injuries, in addition to those caused by the projectile impacts.The Court ruled that the Venezuelan State is internationally responsible for the violation of the obligation to respect and guarantee the right to life of Igmar Alexander Landaeta Mejías, in relation to the duty to adopt provisions of domestic law. Likewise, the Court established that the State is responsible for the violation of the right to personal freedom and the obligation to respect and guarantee the rights to life and personal integrity, in relation to the rights of the child, to the detriment of Eduardo José Landaeta Mejías, who was 17 years old at the time of the events. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the Venezuelan State is responsible for the violation of the rights to judicial guarantees, judicial protection, and personal integrity of the relatives of the Landaeta Mejías brothers. The Court found that at the time of the occurrence of the events there was a serious problem of police abuses in various states of Venezuela, including Aragua State, and that the brothers Igmar Alexander and Eduardo José —both with surnames Landaeta Mejías and aged 18 and 17 years of age respectively— after threats and harassment lost their lives due to actions by officials of the CSOPEA.
• Díaz Loreto and others vs. Venezuela (2019): On November 19, 2019, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued a ruling against Venezuela for the violation of the right to life (Article 4 of the American Convention) to the detriment of Robert Ignacio Díaz Loreto, David Octavio Díaz Loreto, and Octavio Ignacio Díaz Álvarez for the events that led to their deaths at the hands of police officials from Aragua State. The State was also found responsible for having violated the right to personal integrity and personal freedom to the detriment of Robert Ignacio Díaz Loreto for the events that occurred after he was injured in a police vehicle. Likewise, it was indicated that the State had violated the guarantee of due process (Article 8.1 of the Convention) and the personal integrity of the next of kin of Robert Ignacio Díaz Loreto, David Octavio Díaz Loreto, and Octavio Ignacio Díaz Álvarez for not having fulfilled their duty to investigate, as well as for the suffering that their deaths caused them and for the acts of threats and intimidation of which they were victims as a result of these events. The Court recalled that at the time of the facts of the case there existed in Venezuela —and particularly in Aragua State— a context of extrajudicial executions by police officials. This context was recognized by public institutions, both internally and at an international level. The events of the case took place on January 6, 2003, in the Segundera sector of the city of Cagua, Aragua State. Mr. Robert Ignacio Díaz Loreto was shot by officials of the Security and Public Order Corps of Aragua State (CSOPEA) and was later transferred to the Seguro Social de la Cornisa health center, in the city of Cagua, where he was dead on arrival. In a second event, David Octavio Díaz Loreto, and Octavio Ignacio Díaz Álvarez were shot by police officers. They were later transferred and left lifeless at the José María Vargas Hospital, also in the city of Cagua. Based on these events, the authorities undertook investigation and prosecution proceedings against those allegedly responsible for the deaths of Robert Ignacio Díaz Loreto, David Octavio Díaz Loreto, and Octavio Ignacio Díaz Álvarez, after which they were acquitted by a final sentence on September 4, 2014. On the other hand, the Court verified that in the present case, several relatives of the three victims were subjected to threats and intimidation during the development of the investigation and the process.
• Guerrero, Molina, and others vs. Venezuela (2021): The facts of the case refer to the extrajudicial execution of Jimmy Guerrero, 26 years old at the time of his death, and his relative Ramón Molina on March 30, 2003, by police personnel in Falcón State. They include previous acts of harassment, illegal, and arbitrary detentions and torture committed against Jimmy Guerrero by police forces, as well as the lack of adequate investigation of the deaths and the other events referred. The Court considered it proven that the events referred to were related to an increase in homicides and police violence in Venezuela, as well as in Falcón State in particular, which affected young men in poverty to a greater extent. At the same time, there was a high degree of impunity regarding said violence.Court Decision :
  

  4. The State is responsible for the violation of the right to personal liberty, contained in Article 7 of the American Convention on Human Rights, in its Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, in relation to the obligation to respect the rights without discrimination, which arises from Article 1.1 of the same treaty (…) for the violation of the right to personal integrity, established in Article 5 of the American Convention on Human Rights, in its Paragraphs 1 and 2 (…) for the violation of the right to life, recognized in Article 4.1 of the Convention (…)

There are two other sentences for violation of the right to life by State security forces against prisoners:

• Montero Aranguren and others (Retén de Catia) (2006) for the alleged extrajudicial execution of 37 inmates at the Catia Detention Center —located in the city of Caracas, Venezuela— in the early hours of November 27, 1992;
• Olivares Muñoz and others vs. Venezuela (2020) for the violation of the right to life of seven deceased people, as well as the deprivation of liberty and the right to personal integrity of another 27 who were injured on November 10, 2003 at the Ciudad Bolívar Judicial Confinement Center, known as the prison of Vista Hermosa.

In all cases these are final sentences, either due to convictions or because the State has assumed responsibility (Amparo and El Caracazo cases). However, despite the condemnations, Venezuela has not complied with any of the sentences.

The 2019 death of Kumanjayi Walker at Yuendumu, near Alice Springs, Northern Territory, brings attention to the over-representation of Indigenous Peoples fatally shot during officer involved shootings in Australia. Walker was shot three times by Northern Territory police officer Constable Zachary Rolfe resulting in an unsuccessful criminal prosecution attempt. The subsequent coronial inquest and failed criminal prosecution of Constable Rolfe signals the gulf between expectations of “Indigenous people that ‘white’ law does not do justice to Aboriginal people, especially when police are involved”⁷ and the finicalities of common-law conceptions of necessity, proportionality, and reasonableness of police use of force. For the community, the death of Walker was a continuation of oppression and trauma associated with the history of Indigenous deaths in custody.

Constable Rolfe was charged with murder, manslaughter, and engaging in a violent act after an investigation centred on the legality of the second and third shots fired. Rolfe’s first shot, after Walker stabbed Rolfe and his partner during an attempted arrest, was not questioned. The prosecution alleged that the second and third shots (fired less than three seconds after the first) resulting in Walker’s death amounted to criminal conduct. Judicial proceedings were sought to establish the legality of the second and third shots. At issue was the peculiarity of the Northern Territory’s Police Administration Act which provides police officers with criminal immunity. Section 148B of the Act states that

A person is not civilly or criminally liable for an act done or omitted to be done by the person in good faith in the exercise of a power or performance of a function under this Act.

The prosecution argued that that first shot was lawful as it related to the arrest of Walker (a prescribed function under the Police Administration Act), but the subsequent two shots were not related to arrest. Unlike other Australian jurisdictions, Northern Territory law does not enable officers to claim a defence under the doctrine of self-defence (cf. Section 322K of the Victorian Crimes Act 1958). Constable Rolfe was later acquitted.

The Federal Supreme Court (STF) ordered a suspension of police operations in Rio de Janeiro communities during COVID, except in “absolutely exceptional cases”. Deaths fell significantly until October 2020, as police operations intensified despite the Supreme Court’s decision. In the same case, the plenary of the STF ordered the submission of a plan to reduce police lethality and to control human rights violations by the security forces, to create a judicial observatory on citizen policing within the National Council of Justice (CNJ), and to install GPS equipment and audio and video recording systems in police vehicles and uniforms².

In July 2013, the construction worker Amarildo Dias de Souza, a habitant of the Rocinha favela, was taken by the Rio de Janeiro Military Police to a UPP unit (Unit of Pacifying Police) for questioning. He was never seen again. His family pressed for action and after three months of investigation the Rio de Janeiro´s Public Prosecution Service initiated a prosecution against 25 military policemen for the homicide of Amarildo. Twelve of the twenty-five police officers charged were convicted of torture followed by death and of hiding his body.

When the São Paulo Military Police intervened in a 1992 dispute between detainees, they killed 111 inmates in what is now known as the “Carandiru Massacre”. Some of the police officers involved were convicted at trial, but on appeal all convictions have been annulled the convictions. This is not the final outcome, as the Supreme Court may reinstate the convictions, or new trials may be held.

RIT 305-2019, Fourth Oral Criminal Court of Santiago, case against Francisco Javier Arzola Ruiz and another, sentence of September 14th, 2019

FACTS: Three civilians (street merchants) were on separate occasions brutally beaten and threatened with death by someone who called himself the ‘Paco Nazi’. SENTENCE: The then senior non-commissioned officer of the Carabineros, Francisco Arzola Ruiz, was sentenced to 17 years’ imprisonment for the crime of torment or unlawful coercion (Article 150A of the Penal Code) and of the consummated and reiterated crime of torture (Article 150A of the Penal Code), and the then First Corporal, Rodrigo Muñoz Cid, was also sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment for the crime of torture.

Rol 788-2022, Court of Appeals of Antofagasta, case against José Andrés Cuevas Meliñir, judgment of September 28th, 2022

FACTS: Eight civilians were detained by military officials and taken to an undetermined sector of the desert, where they were assaulted and threatened with death if they didn’t immediately get out of sight. Then, the agents left, leaving the civilians abandoned in the middle of the desert at night. JUDGMENT: The appeal against the judgment of the lower court sentencing Chilean Army officer Jose Cuevas Melinir to four years’ imprisonment for the crime of torture (Article 150A of the Penal Code) was rejected.

Rol 80-2019, Oral Criminal Court of Angol, Camilo Catrillanca Marín case, judgment of January 28, 2021

FACTS: Camilo Catrillanca and his 15-year-old friend with the initials M.A.P.C. were traveling on a tractor on a road in the Mapuche community of Temucuicui. Minutes before, in a nearby sector, a crime occurred that prompted an operation by the Special Police Operations Group (GOPE) of Carabineros. During the operation, Camilo Catrillanca was shot, which caused his instant death, and the minor M.A.P.C. was detained, suffering unlawful coercion. SENTENCE: The former Carabineros sergeant Carlos Alarcón Molina, was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment for the homicide of Camilo Catrillanca, and 5 years and one day for the attempted homicide of M.A.P.C. The former sergeant Raúl Ávila Morales, was sentenced to 3 years and one day in prison for the unlawful coercion of M.A.P.C.

RIT 60-2022, Oral Criminal Court of San Bernardo, Fabiola Campillai Rojas case, sentence of October 11, 2022

FACTS: While walking to work (and while demonstrations were taking place due to the social crisis) in San Bernardo, southern Santiago, Fabiola Campillai was struck in the face by a tear gas grenade fired by the former Carabineros officer Patricio Maturana Ojeda. This impact caused the victim to lose her sight, taste and sense of smell. SENTENCE: Patricio Maturana Ojeda was sentenced to 12 years and 183 days’ imprisonment for the crime of unlawful coercion resulting in very serious injuries (Articles 150 D and E of the Criminal Code).

In 2016, General Miguel Maza Marquez was sentenced to 30 years in prison by the Supreme Court of Justice for the murder of the political leader and then, presidential candidate, Luis Carlos Galán. The conviction also encompassed the assassination of Julio César Peñaloza Sánchez and bodyguard Santiago Cuervo Jiménez, as well as the injuries caused to bodyguard Pedro Nel Angulo Bonilla, who testified in the case. These events occurred on August 18^th, 1989 while Galán was conducting a political rally amid his presidential campaign. According to the Supreme Court of Justice, the former director of the DAS was part of “the plan to murder the political leader, undermining his security”²¹.

The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) recently established within the framework of the peace agreement between the Colombian State and the former FARC guerrillas, has made significant progress in investigating the involvement of the National Police and the Army in civilian deaths. Many of these hearings have been public, allowing for the testimonies of victims, their families, and perpetrators to be heard. Charges and sentences —which fall under a specific legal agreement for cases investigated and adjudicated by this jurisdiction within the truth, justice, reparation, and non-repetition framework established by the agreement— are expected to start being published by the end of 2023 and will continue for the next years until JEP finishes its mandate in 2037. In addition to JEP, the Truth Commission published its report in 2022, compiling testimonies and narratives that also address instances of abuse by law enforcement against civilians.

El Salvador does not have any specific national court judgments on the use of lethal force, as the offense is not codified. However, criminal investigations have been conducted against police officers and soldiers.

According to data from the Attorney General’s Office, from 2015 to 2020, a total of 5,052 public security agents were processed, and their cases have been brought to court. Of these, 4,279 were police officers and 773 were soldiers. The most prevalent crimes were: Simple homicide (1,087), illegal possession or carrying of firearms (495), injuries (388), aggravated homicide (271), and threats (230). Out of the total, only 12.51% faced the process with pretrial detention.

From 2015 to 2020, 1,365 public security agents were prosecuted for violent deaths, and the number of convictions was 25.¹⁷

In 2023, in the so-called W80 case R (on the application of Officer W80) v Director General of the Independent Office for Police Conduct and others), the Supreme Court found that: ‘the test to be applied in disciplinary proceedings in relation to the use of force by a police officer in self-defence is the civil law test… (which looks to whether an honest but mistaken belief is reasonable) as opposed to the criminal law test of self-defence (which looks to whether the belief is honestly held)’¹³.

In 2021, in R v Benjamin Monk¹⁴, concerning the death of Dalian Atkinson, the court found one of the officers involved guilty of manslaughter. While this case was not, perhaps, as concerned with substantive or procedural issues as other cases, it is nevertheless noteworthy as it is believed to be the first time since 1986 that a police officer has been successfully prosecuted for manslaughter¹⁵. A second officer was acquitted of charges of assault following a retrial.

Additionally, many cases, investigations, and reports have sought to address unlawful police use of force in the United Kingdom. The following are a number of key examples (as taken / reproduced from the website PolicingLaw.Info). In 1999, a judge-led inquiry into the Metropolitan Police Force’s investigation of the death of a Black youth, Stephen Lawrence, concluded that the Met was guilty of “institutional racism”. Fifteen years later, in 2014, Janet Hills, the chair of the Met’s association for black police officers, called on the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, to admit that the force was still institutionally racist¹⁶.

In 2011, the Independent Police Complaints Commission concluded that a police officer had used “excessive force” in dragging a protester in a wheelchair across a road and that the Metropolitan Police Service was wrong not to recommend criminal charges against him¹⁷. The IPCC criticised the internal inquiry into the incident and called on the Met to apologise to the disabled student, Mr. Jody McIntyre. Criminal charges could not be brought against the officer as a six-month legal deadline had already expired. The IPCC recommended that the officer become subject to ‘management action’.

In 2012, the IPCC urged the Metropolitan Police to reduce the use of excessive force following complaints against specialist riot officers¹⁸.

In 2015, it was reported that 3,000 police officers were under investigation for alleged assault in England and Wales.

In 2016, a police officer and a police community support officer were convicted of misconduct in a public office and sent to prison for their failure to protect a disabled Iranian refugee, Bijan Ebrahimi¹⁹. The 44-year-old was punched and kicked to death outside his Bristol home and his body set on fire by neighbour Lee James, who wrongly suspected he was a paedophile. In 2017, the IPCC suggested that Avon and Somerset police officers may have been biased against Bijan Ebrahimi because of his race²⁰.

In 2020, an inquest was held into the death of Marc Cole²¹. On 23 May 2017, Mr Cole, who had been acting in a paranoid and psychotic manner, ingested a substantial amount of cocaine before jumping from a first floor window of a friend’s home. He was in possession of a large knife with which he stabbed a woman in her garden before walking in the roadway and slashing with the knife at his own throat and neck. The police arrived and, following a confrontation with Mr Cole, Tasered him on three occasions. He suffered a cardiac arrest at the scene and was rushed by ambulance to a local hospital where he was pronounced dead by medical staff. The jury, in dealing with the cause of death found specifically “excessive (amount) of cocaine taken resulting in paranoid and erratic behaviour with the use of Taser having more than a trivial impact on Mr Cole’s cardiac arrest”. The Coroner held that:

Two forensic pathologists gave evidence and confirmed their joint opinion that the Taser caused (together with other things) Mr Cole’s death in that it played a more than minimal, trivial or negligible part. Although I found as a fact that the training given to the police officers was appropriate I did so ONLY upon the basis that it was given based upon the limited knowledge presently available. I am concerned, based upon the evidence that was led before the jury, that there is insufficient independent data as to the lethality of Taser use and that, therefore the advice and training provided to police officers may be deficient or incomplete.

The Coroner suggested “a wholesale review of the effects of multiple Taser activations and the effects of sustained activations (whether in isolation or in combination) so that fuller and more comprehensive advice, guidance and training can be given to those officers who are authorised to carry Taser”.

Yassin Aibeche (2016): A fight had broken out in 2013 in a Marseille grocery store between the police officer, who was intoxicated outside working hours, and Yassin Aibeche, a high school student. The policer officer used his service firearm and killed the victim. In 2016, he was sentenced by the Bouches-du-Rhône Assize Court to twelve years’ imprisonment.

Amine Bentounsi (2017): The victim, an unarmed fugitive trying to escape from the police, was shot in the back in Noisy-le-Sec in 2012. The police officer who fired the shot pleaded self-defence, but received a 5-year suspended prison sentence.

Mustapha Ziani (2017): During an intervention in 2010, a Marseille police officer shot a man in the chest with a KIP launcher. He received a 6-month suspended prison sentence in 2017.

Dieng v France (2020): The victim died in a police bus after being immobilized and pressed to the ground while resisting arrest. In 2017, the victim’s family lodged an application with the ECtHR. In 2020, the French State reached an out-of-court settlement by virtue of which the claimants agreed to renounce all further claims against France in relation to the facts at the origin of this claim, while the government undertook to pay them the sum of 145,000 euros.

Najim A. (2021): In 2018, a driver fleeing a traffic stop at the Gallargues toll booth was shot dead by a gendarme. In 2021, the gendarme was found guilty by the Judicial Court of Nimes for involuntary manslaughter and sentenced to a 1-year suspended prison sentence and a 5-year ban on carrying a weapon.

Yannick Locatteli (2021): Responding to a suspected burglary in 2018 in Guadeloupe, a gendarme fired seven bullets into the victim’s vehicle as it was reversing, fatally wounding him. In 2021, the gendarme was sentenced by the Judicial Court of Basse-Terre to 5 years’ imprisonment, 3 of which were suspended, for involuntary manslaughter.

Amadou Koumé (2022): In March 2015, the police were called by a waiter in a Paris bar, who reported an agitated man. Three police officers intervened to arrest the victim. Investigations established, largely thanks to CCTV footage, that the victim had been strangled, first standing up for around ten seconds, then lying on the ground for a longer period. The victim was also held down by a police officer, who applied pressure with his knee to the victim’s lumbar vertebrae. Once handcuffed and restrained by a plastic collar placed around his legs, the victim was left to lie face down on the floor on his stomach. In 2022, the three police officers received a 15-month suspended prison sentence from the Judicial Court of Paris for involuntary manslaughter.

Cyril Cozic (2022): In January 2014, the victim, who was intoxicated with alcohol, was taken into custody following a hit-and-run road accident. The victim was placed in a drunk tank and was found dead the next day. During the night, the temperature had dropped to 8°C. In 2022, the Judicial Court of Versailles gave the gendarme a six-month suspended prison sentence for involuntary manslaughter.

Jamaicans for Justice (Appellant) v Police Service Commission and another (Respondents) (Jamaica) 25 March 2019¹⁹. This case involved a challenge brought by the non-governmental organization Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ) to the decision by the Police Services Commission (PSC) to agree with the recommendation of the Commissioner of Police to promote Delroy Hewitt to Superintendent of Police. The case rested on what steps the PSC “as the entity tasked with deciding on the promotion of police officers, should take to inform itself about the officers recommended for promotion” (JFJ 2019). The challenge was raised by JFJ because of what it says is “a systemic problem of promoting officers against whom there were/are allegations of misconduct, to senior ranks within the Jamaica Constabulary Force, which undermines police reform and taints the promotion process within the police force”. In 2015, Jamaica’s Court of Appeal agreed with JFJ about the “seriousness of allegations” but declined to reverse the decision of the PSC “on the basis that its decisions were not deemed to be so unreasonable that it produced an absurdity — which the Court decided was the requirement in law for Judicial Review of the Police Service Commission’s decision”. These courts had rejected the assertion by JFJ that the Police Services Commission had a legal “duty to conduct, or to instruct another entity to conduct, independent, impartial and effective investigations into an officer’s misconduct when they are being considered for a promotion” (JFJ 2019). In 2017 JFJ appealed to the Privy Council and in March 2019 the Privy Council handed down a decision overruling the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal.

Supreme Court of Justice, Amparo Directo 15/2012. The court reinforced civil courts’ jurisdiction, over civilians. Stating that military tribunals cannot extend their jurisdiction over nonmilitary persons. Also, on cases where a military member commits a crime against civilians, civil and not military courts have jurisdiction. (Amparo is a Mexican legal concept most closely translated as ‘due process’¹⁰.)

Supreme Court of Justice, Action of Unconstitutionality 25/2016, 27/2016 and 28/2016: The Court determined the unconstitutionality of certain articles of the Law that regulates the Use of Public Force in the State of Mexico. The Court stated thar use of force must comply with the principle of legality, absolute necessity, proportionality and accountability. The Court also stated that in violates these principles by allowing the discretionary use of arms as a first option. However, the law was upheld in several portions that had been deemed in violation of human rights by the plaintiffs.

National Supreme Court of Justice, Action of Unconstitutionality 46/2016: The case was brought forth by the National Human Rights Commission against reforms to the Military Code and the Military criminal procedure code. The Supreme Court again reinforces a clear constitutional prohibition for military authorities to enforce jurisdiction over civilians. It also states the need for military laws to comply with basic rights such as personal freedom, due process, etc.

National Supreme Court of Justice, Action of Unconstitutionality 64/2019: Presented by the National Human Rights Commission regarding the unconstitutionality of the National Law on the Use of Lethal Force. The Court stated that the use of law must be subjected to the principles of rationality and opportunity. Congress should establish the purpose in the use of force.

In 2023, the Philippine National Police Internal Affairs Service (PNP IAS) ordered the relief of six police officers and that criminal complaints were filed against them for reckless imprudence involving homicide after shooting a minor, Jemboy Baltazar, who was mistaken for another suspect. The officers also failed to comply with regulations on wearing body cameras during operations. There are no publicly available records on the proceedings of the prosecution against the six LEOs. Relief from a post or an office is a temporary disciplinary measure in the police force. As provided for by RA 8551, “a PNP uniformed personnel who has been relieved for just cause and has not been given an assignment within two (2) years after such relief shall be retired or separated”.

In 2021, the Department of Justice dismissed murder complaints against 17 police who were involved in the killing of nine activists in the incident called “Bloody Sunday”, due to “lack of merit”.

In 2018, Caloocan Regional Trial Court Branch 125 held three policemen guilty of homicide against a minor, Kian Delos Santos, who was killed in the “War on Drugs” for allegedly being involved in the drug trade and fighting the police during official operations. Evidence, however, shows that he was killed unarmed and was pleading for his life²⁴.

Constitutional and Statutory provisions make it difficult if not impossible to bring a case against law enforcement officials in a situation where use of force is employed. Section 16(2) of the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone has often been understood as providing permission for the deprivation of life using force. The Sierra Leone Correctional Services Act permits officers to use such force against inmates “as is reasonably necessary in order to make the inmate obey lawful orders”⁶. There is no evidence of any national judgment on the use of force.

Absent decided cases, however, there have been a number of investigations by the Commission of Human Rights, and by ad hoc Commissions of Inquiry into incidents involving the use of force, which have produced recommendations, and which are discussed below.

The Judgment of the Criminal Cassation Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 1026 of July 25, 2000, acquitted police officers who shot at the driver of a vehicle since this driver did not comply with the police commission’s warning. The sentence justifies that anyone who does not heed the call to stop may be shot by the police so that they will comply with said stop order. Furthermore, the ruling indicates that the police officer who kills a person who does not respond to the call to stop should not be punished, and that said officer is acting under a justification cause (fulfillment of a position or office) of Article 65 of the Venezuelan Penal Code. Said sentence contains a saved vote in which the excess committed by this decision is pointed out by serving as a guarantee for police officers to shoot indiscriminately against those who do not heed the call to stop.

The Ruling of the Political-Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 840 of July 27, 2016 rejected a challenge to the legality of the order that allowed the armed forces to use firearms to control demonstrations. The Supreme Court argued that the references to the right to life in Resolution No. 008610 of the Standards of Action of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces in functions of control of public order, social peace and citizen coexistence in public meetings and demonstrations (published in Official Gazette No. 40,589, of January 27, 2015), meant that it was not intrinsically illegal.

For the Chamber, the Resolution being challenged would be regulating the use of force authorized therein in order to set parameters of action for officials of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces. Although Article 68 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (CRBV) expressly prohibits the use of firearms in public demonstrations, the contested resolution expressly allows it in any type of demonstration, whether peaceful or violent.

Therefore, the decision was to allow the Appeal for Annulment, but the requested precautionary protection was declared inadmissible, since “it is reiterated that what is prohibited by the constitutional text is the use of firearms and toxic substances in the control of peaceful demonstrations… not so in those that are violent or that become violent”.

Police oversight in Australia is arranged parallel to police agency establishment. While each jurisdiction has an independent oversight agency and/or ombudsman oversight⁸, the investigation of officer-involved fatal shootings is the responsibility of the jurisdiction’s respective coroner’s court.⁹ Non-fatal shootings, however, are investigated by the relevant police agency, with IBAC (Victoria) having the power to independently investigate cases relating to excessive use of force and LECC (New South Wales) having oversight of excessive uses of force.

The four layers of oversight involve:

1. Internal police agency commands. Police agencies have established commands that review and investigate matters and complaints about police officers that relate to professional standards, officer misconduct or serious misconduct. Investigations include events such as poor service, failure to act, excessive use of force by police officers, and non-fatal and fatal police shootings.
2. External integrity agencies. Independent agencies that have a general responsibility to prevent and/or investigate cases of corruption within their jurisdiction. Each agency has responsibilities to monitor internal police agency investigations. For instance, the New South Wales agency (LECC) has the power to monitor serious misconduct investigations at a case level (such as assaults by police officers). The Victorian agency (IBAC) has additional powers to conduct separate investigations of complaints of serious police misconduct.
3. Independent ombudsman. These agencies generally have powers to review decisions made by police agencies.
4. Coroners courts. These agencies have the primary function of investigating ‘deaths in custody’ which include fatal police officer involved shootings.

The external integrity agencies mentioned above can be summarized as follows:

Military courts have jurisdiction over actions by the Military Police, which is in charge of public order.

In São Paulo state, a Special Action Group for Public Security and External Control of Police Activity (GAESP) was created in 2022 within the Public Prosecutor’s Office as an external control of police activity (including municipal guards), with a broad remit and aiming at the collective protection of public security through administrative and judicial measures.

In Rio de Janeiro state, the Public Prosecutor’s Office created the General Coordination of Public Security of the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the State of Rio (CGSP) in 2021, which has amongst it tasks to control the regularity, suitability, and efficiency of police activity.

The first Brazilian Police Ombudsman was created in São Paulo 1995 through an initiative of the São Paulo State Council of Human Rights. As of 2005, 14 of the 27 Federative Units (or states) had implemented Police Ombudsmen via State Laws and Decrees. The list of states with Police Ombudsmen and their creation year is as follows:

1. São Paulo, created by the São Paulo State Decree number 39,900, Jan. 1^st, 1995;
2. Pará, created by the Pará State Law number 5,944, Feb. 6th, 1996;
3. Minas Gerais, created by the Minas Gerais State Law number 12,622, Sep. 25th, 1997;
4. Espírito Santo, created by the Espírito Santo Complimentary Law number 297, Jul., 27th, 2007;
5. Rio de Janeiro, created by the Rio de Janeiro State Law number 3,168, Jan. 12th, 1999;
6. Rio Grande do Sul, created by the Rio Grande do Sul State Decree number 39,668 Aug. 17th, 1999;
7. Mato Grosso, created by the Mato Grosso State Law number 7,286, May 23rd, 2000;
8. Paraná, created by the Paraná State Decree number 2,026, May 9th, 2000;
9. Pernambuco, created by the Pernambuco State Decree number 22,149, Mar. 2000;
10. Rio Grande do Norte, created by the Rio Grande do Norte State Law number 7,851, Jun. 28th, 2000;
11. Goiás, created by the Goiás State Law number 14,383, Dec. 31st, 2002 ;
12. Santa Catarina, created by the Santa Catarina State Complimentary Law number 243, Jan. 30th, 2003;
13. Bahia, created by the Bahia State Decree number 7,623, Jun., 25th 1999;
14. Ceará, created by the Ceará State Law number 13,093 Jan. 8th, 2001.

National Institute of Human Rights

Established on June 15, 2005 by Law 20.405, its mission is to promote and protect the human rights of all persons living in Chile, established in constitutional and legal norms; in the international treaties signed and ratified by Chile and that are in force, as well as those arising from the general principles of law, recognized by the international community. In this mission, the law endows it with the prerogative to initiate legal actions before the ordinary courts of justice to clarify the criminal responsibility of public officials in cases where these rights have been violated.

Committee for the Prevention of Torture

Established on April 25, 2019 by Law 21.154, it is mandated to prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, through an operational system of visits, advice, training and advocacy. In this mission, the law endows it with the prerogative of supervising all places of deprivation of liberty in the country, to ensure respect for the human rights of the persons held there.

MAPP/OEA: political and technical Mission that has been accompanying the peace efforts of the State since 2004, operating in the areas most affected by internal armed conflict and criminality. The Mission is permanently deployed through 18 regional offices, primarily in the rural and most isolated areas of the country. The Mission is recognized as a reference in peace matters in Colombia. Its contributions are focused on closing the gap between communities and institutions, providing balanced analyses and specific recommendations to the Colombian state for decision-making at the local, regional, and national levels²².

The United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia is a special political mission established in 2016 by the UN Security Council to verify the Final Peace Agreement’s implementation and assist Colombia in its commitment to ending the conflict and building peace. The Mission verifies the implementation of five points of the 2016 Final Peace Agreement between the Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP.

Currently the UN Mission is also verifying the implementation of the ceasefire between the Government and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional-ELN, also mandated by the Security Council²³.

In El Salvador, the actions of the police are supervised and regulated internally and externally through the following two mechanisms

Police Disciplinary Law, Legislative Decree 518, 2007

This law establishes the disciplinary regime applicable to the personnel of the National Civil Police (PNC). It defines the types and classifications of sanctions, procedures, and authorities and bodies with investigative and sanctioning powers.

• Article 17 establishes national disciplinary tribunals that handle cases involving senior and executive-level personnel. Regional tribunals are also established to resolve cases originating within their territorial jurisdictions and involving basic, administrative, technical, and service-level police personnel.
• Article 26 establishes appellate tribunals that have jurisdiction to hear appeals of decisions by the disciplinary tribunals.
• Article 32 establishes the General Inspectorate, which is responsible for verifying compliance with the disciplinary regime. It initiates the respective procedures, acts as a controller, submits reports to the Director-General, and can appeal, if necessary, the final decision of the disciplinary tribunal.

Organic Law of the General Inspectorate of Public Security, Legislative Decree 815, 2014

Published in the Official Gazette No. 202, Volume No. 405 on October 30, 2014, it states the following:

• Article 1: The General Inspectorate of Public Security is a supervisory and oversight body for Public Security Institutions. It operates under the authority of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, in accordance with the law.
• Article 3: The General Inspectorate’s competence includes the control and oversight of the actions of the operational and management services of the National Civil Police (PNC) and the National Academy of Public Security (ANSP), with special emphasis on respect for human rights.
• Article 5: The General Inspectorate has the following powers:
  1. Ensuring strict compliance with the law by members of the Police Corporation and the ANSP, in accordance with the governing regulations.
  2. Monitoring and controlling the functioning of all agencies, departments, units, and operational and management services of the PNC and the ANSP.
  3. Supervising compliance with human rights in the actions of PNC members and the ANSP.
  4. Ensuring adherence to the Police Code of Conduct and Ethics required for the exercise of functions by the PNC.
  5. Supervising the conduct of public servants of the ANSP and students in accordance with ethical principles governing public service and approved curricula by the ANSP Academic Council, as stipulated in its Organic Law.
  6. Evaluating and supervising police plans, programs, instruments, and procedures to ensure compliance with national and international laws.
  7. Verifying the proper management of personnel and institutional resources in the PNC and the ANSP;
  8. Supervising compliance with the disciplinary regimes of the ANSP and the PNC, in accordance with the regulations governing both institutions.
  9. Receiving, investigating, and processing complaints from citizens regarding the actions of PNC members and the ANSP.
  10. Initiating disciplinary proceedings for serious and very serious offenses committed by members of the Police Institution and the ANSP.
  11. Exercising functional direction over internal disciplinary investigations of the PNC and the ANSP.
  12. Requesting reports from the heads of the PNC and the ANSP regarding investigations related to this law.
  13. Referring cases that constitute crimes or offenses committed by personnel of the Police Institution and the ANSP to the competent authorities.

In England and Wales, oversight bodies in cases involving death following police use of force include:

1. Coroner’s Courts: Coroners investigate certain deaths that are unnatural, violent, or where the cause is unknown²². This includes, but is not limited to, deaths following police use of force. Indeed Section 7 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 ‘places a requirement upon the Coroner to summon a jury to hear an inquest case (when)… the death occurred in prison or similar place of detention; the death occurred whilst the deceased was in police custody, or resulted from an injury caused by a police officer(s) in the purported execution of his/her duty’²³. In exceptionally high-profile cases or for other legal reasons a judge may be appointed to hold an inquest into a death²⁴.
2. The Independent Office for Police Conduct (the IOPC) The 2017 Policing and Crime Act established the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) (the successor to the Independent Police Complaints Commission). The IOPC declares that it: ‘oversees the police complaints system in England and Wales. We investigate the most serious matters, including deaths following police contact and set the standards by which the police should handle complaints. We are independent, which means that our decisions are made entirely independently of the police and government’²⁵.

The National Police are overseen by the IGPN. The IGPN is the result of the 1986 merger of the previous Inspection Générale de la Police Nationale (IGPN), created in 1884, and the General Services Inspectorate (Inspection Générale des Services or IGS), created in 1854. The IGS’s jurisdiction was limited to the Paris police prefecture (i.e. Paris intra muros and the departements (administrative areas) of the Petite Couronne, including the Paris airports of Orly and Roissy).

This body carries out general inspections and audits of the police and investigates the conduct of police personnel — its activities are outlined on the Interior Ministry website. It publishes annual reports on its activities, including data on the use of force.

From 2013 onwards, the annual reports were expanded and presented at a press conference. In 2017, the IGPN announced the creation of official statistical figures in order to track deaths and injuries. The 2020 report introduced more information on fatalities, including a brief description of the incident, date and location.

The National Gendarmerie are overseen by the IGGN. Previously, the Inspectorate of the National Gendarmerie (Inspection de la Gendarmerie nationale or IGN), created in 2002, was under the supervision of the Defence Ministry. In 2011, the IGN was replaced by the IGGN when the Gendarmerie was attached to the Interior Ministry.

The IGGN carries out general inspections and audits of the gendarmerie and investigates the conduct of gendarmerie personnel — its activities are set out on the Interior Ministry website. It publishes annual reports on its activities since 2019, including data on the use of force since 2020.

The Police Services Commission (PSC) is external to the JCF and is one of four commissions that fall under the Office of the Services Commission. Its functions include providing recommendations to the Governor General regarding appointments and/or promotions of JCF members above the rank of Inspector, appeals all ranks and selection of officers and members for training courses and study leave. Section 129(1) of the Jamaica Constitution establishes the PSC.

The Police Civilian Oversight Authority (PCOA) is external to the JCF and was established in 2006 to ensure accountability and adherence to policy guidelines and policing standards. The PCOA’s functions relating to the JCF and its auxiliaries include monitoring the implementation of policy, conducting inspections and monitoring the management and use of financial and other resources.

The Independent Commission of Investigations (INDECOM) is external to the JCF. According to information on its website, the commission was established by the INDECOM Act which was passed on April 15 2010 and it began operations on August 16 2010²⁰. The INDECOM Act repealed the Police Public Complaints Act which established the Police Public Complaints Authority (PPCA). INDECOM investigates, produces reports and makes recommendations to offices such as the Director of Public Prosecutions regarding offences committed by members of the security forces. These offences may include causing death and injury to a person or persons and instances of abuse. INDECOM investigates 25 different categories of abuse. Among these categories include shooting incidents, detention issues, and abuse and property incidents. Shooting incidents include fatal shooting, shooting injury, discharge of a firearm, and accidental discharge.

The Republic Act No. 6770, or “The Ombudsman Act of 1989”, gave the Ombudsman and his/her deputies the mandate that they “shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people”. Republic Act No. 6770 assigns the Office of the Deputy for the Armed Forces, now the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (OMB-MOLEO), to prosecute cases involving law enforcement agents and other uniformed personnel.

When the Department of the Interior and Local Government was established in 1990 by virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, the same law provided that a National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) shall “exercise administrative control over the Philippine National Police”. It was empowered to “affirm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed upon members of the Philippine National Police by the Chief of the Philippine National Police”.

Republic Act No. 8551 or the “Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998” created the Internal Affairs Service (IAS) of the PNP. Among its enumerated functions, the IAS, on its own accord, “shall also conduct … automatic investigation of the following cases: a) incidents where a police personnel discharges a firearm; b) incidents where death, serious physical injury, or any violation of human rights occurred in the conduct of a police operation; c) incidents where evidence was compromised, tampered with, obliterated, or lost while in the custody of police personnel; d) incidents where a suspect in the custody of the police was seriously injured; and e) incidents where the established rules of engagement have been violated”.

The IAS may recommend “the imposition of disciplinary measures against an erring PNP personnel”. The IAS’s recommendation “cannot be revised, set-aside, or unduly delayed by any disciplining authority without just cause”. The IAS can file a case against a member of the PNP in the appropriate court and it can “provide assistance to the Office of the Ombudsman in cases involving the personnel of the PNP”. What IAS does not have is the power to prosecute and try cases that it has been tasked to investigate. It is also perceived to be tainted by the corruption that engulfs the PNP²⁵. And in September 2022, a sexual harassment case was filed against the head of the IAS before the Office of the Ombudsman²⁶. The IAS inspector general was convicted of the charge²⁷.

In 2009, NAPOLCOM established the Philippine National Police Human Rights Desk to monitor and consolidate reports on human rights violations allegedly committed by state and non-state actors. Based on the Philippine National Police Human Rights Desk Operations Manual, the PNP HRD is required to submit monthly reports of human rights violations to the PNP Human Rights Affairs Office. The Desk, however, does not have investigative functions²⁸.

Besides NAPOLCOM and the PNP’s IAS, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and the Department of Justice are oversight bodies that investigate police misconduct. The CHR was established by the 1987 Philippine Constitution through Executive Order No. 163. The Commission is mandated to ensure the protection and promotion of human rights in the country. To do this, the Commission is mandated to conduct investigations, on its own or in response to complaints, on incidents that involve “all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights”. The CHR has the court’s power to cite for contempt those who unduly challenge or defy its investigations and it has “visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detentions facilities”. Yet, as with the IAS, it can only recommend prosecution to other executive and constitutional offices like the Department of Justice or the Ombudsman.

The Philippines, it seems, has various institutions for redress for victims of violence by law enforcement agents and uniformed personnel. The question is whether they work as intended or whether they were intended not to work at all.

The Independent Police Complaints Board (IPCB) was established in 2013 and became operational in 2015. The Board is mandated to investigate any death in police custody, any shooting incident where a police officer discharged a firearm, and any fatal road traffic accident involving a police vehicle, among others⁷.

Within the Police, a Complaint Discipline and Internal Investigations Department (CDIID) is responsible for most internal investigations of police conduct. A Memorandum of Understanding was agreed in 2019 between the IPCB and the CDIID, with a view to ensuring the referral of any relevant case (i.e., those falling within the mandate of the independent body) within 14 days⁸.

Policy decisions about police reforms can be made by the Police Council, a body first established under the 1964 Police Act but which had fallen into disuse and was re-established under the 1991 Constitution as part of the recommendations of the Advisory Council for transitioning back toward civilian rule. It is headed by the Vice President and the Minister of Internal Affairs, and includes other members, such as a representative of the Sierra Leone Bar Association⁹. However this body does not seem to be routinely apprised of questions relating to the use of force.

Within the police, there is a Professional Standards Directorate, which investigates complaints and allegations of misconduct against a member of the Force, and deals with issues around service delivery.

The Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone also has a mandate to investigate any allegation of human rights violation (whether on its own motion or in response to a complaint)¹⁰. It has produced occasional ad hoc reports into police shootings, as well as annual reports, but the annual reports do not systematically track incidents of lethal use of force. There is a strong relationship between the Human Rights Commission and broader civil society, including in the preparation of annual reports.

Ombudsman’s Office

It is one of the entities of the Citizen Power formed together with the Attorney-General’s Office and the Comptroller General of the Republic, as part of the system of checks and balances of the national Public Power. It has its origin in the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (CRBV) of 1999, which recognizes, for the first time, an autonomous power to guarantee the morality and transparency of the State: ‘Citizen Power’. By a constitutional mandate, the Ombudsman’s Office has the purpose of promoting, monitoring, and defending human rights in the country. It is directed by the Ombudsman who is responsible for promoting, defending, and supervising the rights guaranteed in the Constitution and in the human rights treaties to which Venezuela is a party. However, this regulatory mandate is not fulfilled in reality, and the Citizen Power is currently co-opted by the Executive Power.

Attorney-General’s Office (MP, Ministerio Público)

Beyond its historical genesis that dates back to the Constitution of Gran Colombia of 1830, its history and most recent form begins with the CRBV of 1999. It is part of the Citizen Power, which is currently exercised by body of the Republican Moral Council, made up of the Attorney General of the Republic, the Ombudsman, and the Comptroller General of the Republic. The Attorney-General’s Office is formally autonomous and independent (Articles 284 and 285 CRBV). Among its functions is to carry out the actions that may be necessary to enforce the responsibility incurred by public officials, including cases of homicides committed by police and military officials. However, this regulatory mandate is not fulfilled in reality, and the Citizen Power is currently co-opted by the Executive Power.

On the other hand, the Organic Law of the Police Service and the Bolivarian National Police Corps (LOSPCPNB, Ley Orgánica del Servicio de Policía y Cuerpo de Policía Nacional Bolivariana) of 2009 generally contemplates two types of controls: internal control (inspectors or internal affairs offices) as an exclusive instance of accountability on deviant conduct of officials, considered individually; and external controls, such as citizen committees, which were established in Articles 79, 80 and 81.