Colombia

• Introduction and background
• Part 1: Legal frameworks
• Part 2: Policies and procedures
• Part 3: Comparative indicators
• Summary and recommendations
• References and data sources

Introduction

Abstract

An effective supervision and civilian control over the use of force by LE agents is still a pending task in Colombia, where there are high levels of impunity. More and improved mechanisms of information are necessary to understand use of force. These mechanisms must possess the necessary transparency to instill confidence in the information and analyses they produce. While the country has available, centralized and controlled official information, there is still a need for improvement. Oversight and control remain a pending task for the authorities. The concerted exercise of authority by institutions such as the Office of the Inspector-General and the effective investigation by the Attorney General’s Office are necessary to achieve the rational use of force by police and the military forces. As long as such measures are not effectively developed, it will be impossible to properly recognize the issues associated with the use of force and advance in its control. Criminal justice authorities offer an insufficient response to investigative and judicial needs arising from acts of violence by law enforcement.

Background

An indication of the prevalence of deaths to civilians and law enforcement (LE) agents is given in this summary chart (Source: Data from National Police 2022; Calculation and analysis: FIP 2022):

Indicator	Total	Male	Female
Number of civilians killed by LE agents on duty by gunshot	238	234	4
Total number of civilians killed by law enforcement agents, regardless of means and whether on or off-duty (CKt)	251	246	5
Civilians killed per 100,000 inhabitants	0.47	0.46	0.008
Number of LE agents killed on duty by firearm (homicides only, excluding suicides and accidents)	134	132	2
Total number of LE agents killed, regardless of means and whether on or off-duty	163	161	2
Percentage homicides due to state intervention	2%	1.9%	0.03%

The Colombian Constitution defines law enforcement agencies as those exclusively composed of the Military Forces and the National Police¹. The former is constituted by the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Their objective is the defense of national sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and constitutional order. The National Police is a permanent civil body whose mission is to preserve the necessary conditions for the exercise of rights and public freedoms, while also ensuring the peaceful coexistence of the inhabitants of the national territory².

The President, as the Head of State and Government, is the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. The President collaborates with municipal mayors and departmental governors in the responsibility they exercise as the primary law enforcement authorities in their territories, which translates into the subordination of the institutions operating in their jurisdictions³. The Police must obey the territorial government authorities promptly and diligently, as must the Military Forces when carrying out functions to preserve or restore public order.

The two-pronged institutional structure that exists alongside the hierarchical dependence exercised by the President and local authorities over law enforcement, particularly the National Police, has led to clashes in decision making when disturbances of public order arise, especially when those in power belong to opposing political parties. This further highlights the significant challenges these authorities face in effectively controlling the constitutional order and the capacities to enforce it, especially in circumstances requiring intervention and the use of force.

Although the police and the military are responsible for the use of force under the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, and differentiation when authorized by civilian authorities, they have significant differences in mission, structure, and organization that have led to the development of a different professional performance and disciplinary system for each of them. Nonetheless, there are certain general regulations that govern the authority to resort to the use of force in both cases⁴.

The history of violence and conflict in Colombia has led to a situation in which the civilian leadership established by the constitution over the military and police forces has been confronted with a political and social narrative of internal war that has overshadowed leadership by the executive. This narrative has advanced under a logic of military and armed confrontation as the framework to address the various dynamics and manifestations of violence or disruption of order that occur in the country. At times, this military approach fails to distinguish between incidents linked to armed groups or drug trafficking which challenge state security, those affecting citizen security and coexistence, and sometimes legitimate expressions of discontent and protest.

One of the law enforcement units that has been most embroiled in controversy due to its interactions with citizens in recent decades within the context of political, ideological, and social polarization is the recently renamed Unit for Dialogue and Maintenance of Order (UNDMO), known until June 2023 as the Mobile Anti-Disturbances Squadron (ESMAD). This law enforcement unit was established in 1999 with the objective of “supporting departments and metropolitan police forces in crowd and public event control”⁵. It initially consisted of around 200 police officers. By 2016, it had grown to over 3,600 members with a budget of 327 billion Colombian pesos⁶, approximately 81 million dollars.

In 2015, the Ministry of Defense issued the Manual for the Control of Demonstrations and Disturbances for the National Police. In this document, ESMAD was defined as the “specialized anti-disturbances operational group, responsible for crowd control, road unblocking, and evacuations in public or private spaces, whether in urban or rural areas within the national territory, aimed at restoring the exercise of public rights and freedoms”⁷. The manual also specified that police officers involved in public order control activities were not allowed to carry firearms but could engage in “dissuasion and prevention” actions using “non-lethal elements, devices, ammunition, and weapons,” such as chemical cartridges and grenades, smoke grenades, and stun guns. In addition to these items, the regulations for the use of force and the deployment of non-lethal elements, devices, ammunition, and weapons by the National Police include another list of 24 instruments that could be used in anti-riot actions, such as gas launcher rifles, chemical agent launchers, electric shock devices, trained animals, and flares, among others⁸.

Although this weaponry is considered “non-lethal or less lethal,” there have been fatalities because of its use, along with cases of lost eyesight, hearing, and physical injuries sustained by protesters. The complete extent of these incidents is difficult to ascertain due to the lack of publicly available figures⁹.

Some civil society organizations have compiled statistics on the subject. According to the Center for Research and Popular Education (CINEP), in events occurring between 2002 and 2014, ESMAD allegedly caused 13 deaths during operations aimed at dispersing protests and maintaining public order. This includes the death of an indigenous minor during the eviction from a private property in the Cauca department¹⁰. Additionally, there were 448 cases of aggression resulting in around 3,950 victims, in which ESMAD’s involvement is suspected¹¹.

On a different note, the Foundation for Press Freedom (FLIP) revealed in 2016 that between 2004 and that year, ESMAD had committed 52 aggressions against journalists while they were covering protest events¹². The civilian population has not been the only victim as part of the activities during the intervention of ESMAD. By 2016, there had been five deaths of officers in service and over 850 police officers injured during this type of operations¹³.

In the case of the protests and mobilizations that took place between 2019 and 2021, known in Colombia as the “social outbreak”, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights documented 46 verified deaths, including 44 civilians and two police officers. The number of injuries resulting from clashes between law enforcement and protesters reached several thousand¹⁴. Furthermore, the System of Information on Aggressions against Social Protest (SIAP)¹⁵ reported that between 2018 and 2019, 51% of the complaints registered against law enforcement included allegations of misuse of weaponry, use of firearms, arbitrary detentions, torture, and use of unconventional weaponry during protests¹⁶.

Due to the controversies arising from the actions of this law enforcement unit, there has been a widespread call for the transformation of ESMAD within certain political, academic, and societal sectors. Some groups have even demanded its elimination. In addition, there was a broad public debate regarding the necessity of removing the entire law enforcement unit from the Ministry of Defense, to completely disassociate its operations from the military structure, regain leadership, and enhance civilian control and supervision autonomy over it. The debate continues without a specific proposal from the new administration of Gustavo Petro.

In 2021, complaints against ESMAD led the government of President Ivan Duqu to issue a resolution called the “Statute of Reaction, Use, and Verification of Legitimate State Force and Protection of the Right to Peaceful Protest.” This resolution “establishes guidelines for the actions of law enforcement authorities in their functions of guaranteeing fundamental rights, maintaining citizen coexistence, and public order in the context of public and peaceful demonstrations.” The statute included a “protocol for the coordination of actions to respect and guarantee peaceful protest as a legitimate exercise of the rights of assembly, public and peaceful demonstration, freedom of association, free movement, freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, opposition, and participation,” even for those who did not participate in the protests.

It established the creation of a committee to monitor respect and guarantee the exercise of peaceful protest. The statute also emphasized the primacy of dialogue and mediation in protests, led by the executive branch authorities at the national and territorial levels, who would have the responsibility to prioritize dialogue and mediation during public demonstrations. It also prescribed dialogue, engagement, and mediation as the first step in addressing mobilizations¹⁷. The statute generated controversies due to the ambiguity and lack of clarity of some concepts and its failure to bring about a structural transformation that would address the grievances regarding ESMAD’s actions.

In June 2023, in fulfillment of campaign promises by the newly elected administration, the government ordered a transformation of ESMAD under the leadership of the new police director. It included:

• Changing the unit’s name from Mobile Anti-Disturbances Squadron to Unit for Dialogue and Accompaniment to Public Demonstrations.
• Changes in the members’ uniform, notably the use of white helmets as part of what was termed a new Basic Accompaniment Device (DBA).
• Aesthetic changes to the riot control vehicles and the repurposing of some of these vehicles as ambulances and relief units.
• An emphasis on dialogue before any intervention, implying that the deployment of the unit would be a last resort¹⁸.

These changes have been criticized for being cosmetic rather than substantive. Many of the proposed changes were already included in the resolution of the previous government, such as the principle of using force as a last resort, the elimination of certain “less-lethal” weapons, and the revision of protocols for their use.

The new government broadly outlines its approach to establishing a human security focus in the country in its Development Plan¹⁹. It mentions aspects like strengthening the civilian nature of the police, generating violence prevention mechanisms, monitoring law enforcement actions, digitalizing public information, improving investigation and prosecution processes of military criminal justice, but it does not provide specific proposals for addressing the numerous causes of homicide, improving the publication of use-of-force statistics, strategies for preventing police abuse, or anything concrete related to these issues.

Part 1: Legal Frameworks

Global treaties

1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)		State party
ICCPR Optional Protocol 1		State party
1984 Convention Against Torture (CAT)		State party
CAT committee competent to receive individual complaints?		Yes
CAT Optional Protocol 1		Not party

Regional treaties

1948 Charter of the Organization of American States		State party
1969 Inter-American Convention on Human Rights		State party
Competence of Inter-American Court on Human Rights		Yes

National legal provisions

Relevant constitutional provisions or general laws

Article 12 of the National Constitution 1991 “Nadie será sometido a desaparición forzada, a torturas ni a tratos o penas crueles, inhumanos o degradantes”.

Law 599 2000, “Por la cual se expide el Código penal”

Law 1407 2010, “Por la cual se expide el Código Penal Militar”.

Law 1698 2013 “Por la cual se crea el Sistema de Defensa Técnica y Especializada de los miembros de la Fuerza Pública, y se dictan otras disposiciones”.

Decree 124/2014 regulatory of Law 1698/2013 “En donde se establece la integración de los tratados internacionales ratificados por Colombia, la legislación nacional y la jurisprudencia en materia de derechos humanos y derecho internacional humanitario al planeamiento, ejecución y seguimiento de las operaciones, operativos y procedimientos de la Fuerza Pública”.

Decree 003 2021 “Por el cual se expide el Protocolo de acciones preventivas, concomitantes y posteriores, denominado Estatuto de reacción, uso y verificación de la fuerza legítima del Estado y protección del derecho a la protesta pacífica ciudadana.

Resolution 1091, March 31 2023: “Por el cual se expide el Manual para la Atención a la Reunión y Manifestación Pública y Pacífica y Control de Disturbios de la Policía Nacional de Colombia”.

Relevant specific national legislation

Decree 2535 1993 “Por el cual se expiden normas sobre armas, municiones y explosivos”.

Resolution 02903 June 2017 “Por la cual se expide el Reglamento para el uso de la fuerza y el empleo de armas, municiones, elementos y dispositivos menos letales, por la Policía Nacional”.

Resolution 00448 2015 “Reglamento para el uso de la fuerza y empleo de elementos, dispositivos, municiones y armas no letales en la Policía Nacional”.

Law 1801 July 2016 “Código Nacional de Policía y convivencia”.

Relevant national regulations

National Police and the Army have incorporated guidelines and rules of the International Humanitarian Law in their own action and operational manuals, such as the “Manual de Derecho Operacional para las Fuerzas Militares 2015: en donde se regula la conducción de hostilidades y otras misiones militares en tiempos de guerra, transición, estabilización o paz, en cuanto al uso de la fuerza, es decir en donde se establecen los elementos de legalidad para adelantar las operaciones militares y policía”.

Legal interpretation and application

UN or other international body decisions or advisory opinions

OHCHR has been present in Colombia since 1997 giving technical assistance as well as strengthening capacity in relation to the promotion and protection of human rights with both the State and civil society. It currently operates from the capital city, Bogotá, and nine sub-offices across the country.

Within the context of the judgments issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights against the Colombian State, recommendations have been made regarding the use of force and the responsibilities of the Colombian State in providing victims with mechanisms for the provision of justice and compensation.

Regional court judgments

The Colombian State has been found to have breached its human rights obligations on various occasions by the “Inter-American Court of Human Rights”²⁰ (Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos):

1. Case Caballero Delgado and Santana vs. Colombia. December 8^th, 1995, Isidro Caballero Delgado and María del Carmen Santana were detained by a military patrol belonging to the Colombian National Army. After their arrest these individuals were killed by civilians and the agents who conducted the detention. Subsequently their bodies disappeared.
2. Case Las Palmeras vs. Colombia. This case dates to events that took place on January 23^rd, 1991. The Commander of the Putumayo Departmental Police ordered an armed operation with support from the Colombian National Army, resulting in the execution of six civilians. Following the massacre, police officers and militaries dressed some of the victims in military uniforms, burned their clothes, and presented their bodies as deceased insurgents killed in combat.
3. Case Los Diecinueve Comerciantes vs. Colombia. Events occurred in the department of Santander on October 6^th, 1987, where 19 traders engaged in transportation and merchandise acquisition on the Colombia-Venezuela border disappeared. 17 of them were detained by a criminal group, taken to the property of a public force commander where they were murdered and dismembered, in accordance with a decision jointly made with members of the National Army operating in the area.
4. Case Gutiérrez Soler vs. Colombia. Wilson Gutiérrez Soler was arrested on August 24^th, 1994, in Bogotá D.C., by a former Colonel of the National Army and a Colonel of the National Police. Once deprived of freedom, he was transported to a basement where he was tortured until he was compelled to sign a statement acknowledging charges of extortion.
5. Case Escué Zapata vs. Colombia. The events occurred on February 1^st, 1988, when an indigenous informant of the Colombian National Army reported that there were guerrilla weapons hidden by the community. During the operation, Colombian National Army members entered the indigenous’ residence, assaulting him while searching for the alleged weapons. Subsequently, he was led to an area where he was killed by the military, who later reported that he had lost his life in a confrontation with the guerrilla.
6. Case Santo Domingo Massacre vs. Colombia. The events occurred on December 13^th, 1998, during a military operation against the FARC guerrilla. A crew of a Colombian Air Force helicopter released a device containing six cluster bombs, weaponry banned by International Humanitarian Law, causing the death of seventeen civilians, including six children. Additionally, twenty-seven individuals were wounded, and others were displaced to municipalities near the events, where they were targeted by machine gun fire from members of the Air Force.
7. Case Yarce and others vs. Colombia. This case concerned the killing of five women human rights defenders during operations by the state, including the police. The Court found that the government had failed in its obligation to guarantee the life and physical integrity of the community leader, Ana Teresa Yarce, and that it had violated the rights to freedom and physical integrity and free association of the other female leaders: Socorro Mosquera, Mery Naranjo, Luz Dary Ospina and Miriam Rua.
8. Case Bedoya Lima and others vs. Colombia. This case concerns the alleged abduction, rape, and torture of journalist and human rights defender Jineth Bedoya Lima in 2000 during a visit to “La Modelo” prison in Bogota. Colombia denounced the lack of objectivity of five judges in the oral proceedings before the Inter-American Court and withdrew (although later returned). The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) in 2019 had found that the abduction, rape, and torture of Ms Bedoya Lima had to be considered in a context of general violence against journalists and particularly sexual violence against women during the armed conflicts in Colombia. The Commission held that the State had failed to adopt appropriate and timely measures to protect Ms Bedoya Lima, despite knowing that the journalist was in a situation of risk due to her work. The Inter-American Court issued provisional measures to Colombia ordering the authorities to protect the life and bodily integrity of Ms Bedoya Lima.

National court judgments

In 2016, General Miguel Maza Marquez was sentenced to 30 years in prison by the Supreme Court of Justice for the murder of the political leader and then, presidential candidate, Luis Carlos Galán. The conviction also encompassed the assassination of Julio César Peñaloza Sánchez and bodyguard Santiago Cuervo Jiménez, as well as the injuries caused to bodyguard Pedro Nel Angulo Bonilla, who testified in the case. These events occurred on August 18^th, 1989 while Galán was conducting a political rally amid his presidential campaign. According to the Supreme Court of Justice, the former director of the DAS was part of “the plan to murder the political leader, undermining his security”²¹.

The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) recently established within the framework of the peace agreement between the Colombian State and the former FARC guerrillas, has made significant progress in investigating the involvement of the National Police and the Army in civilian deaths. Many of these hearings have been public, allowing for the testimonies of victims, their families, and perpetrators to be heard. Charges and sentences —which fall under a specific legal agreement for cases investigated and adjudicated by this jurisdiction within the truth, justice, reparation, and non-repetition framework established by the agreement— are expected to start being published by the end of 2023 and will continue for the next years until JEP finishes its mandate in 2037. In addition to JEP, the Truth Commission published its report in 2022, compiling testimonies and narratives that also address instances of abuse by law enforcement against civilians.

Oversight bodies

MAPP/OEA: political and technical Mission that has been accompanying the peace efforts of the State since 2004, operating in the areas most affected by internal armed conflict and criminality. The Mission is permanently deployed through 18 regional offices, primarily in the rural and most isolated areas of the country. The Mission is recognized as a reference in peace matters in Colombia. Its contributions are focused on closing the gap between communities and institutions, providing balanced analyses and specific recommendations to the Colombian state for decision-making at the local, regional, and national levels²².

The United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia is a special political mission established in 2016 by the UN Security Council to verify the Final Peace Agreement’s implementation and assist Colombia in its commitment to ending the conflict and building peace. The Mission verifies the implementation of five points of the 2016 Final Peace Agreement between the Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP.

Currently the UN Mission is also verifying the implementation of the ceasefire between the Government and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional-ELN, also mandated by the Security Council²³.

Part 2: Policies and Procedures

Data collection and publication by official agencies

1. Are the number of deaths following any police use of force
	Collected?	Partial, Medium
	Accessible through existing publicly available information?	Partial, Medium
	Is this a legal requirement?	Good, Robust
	Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available?	Good, Robust
	If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released?	Partial, Medium
2. If published, to what extent can the number of deaths be readily determined from official statistics?		Limited, Poor
3. Is it possible to identify specific individuals killed in official records?		No Provisions
4. Is demographic and other information for the deceased
	Collected?	Good, Robust
	Accessible through existing publicly available information?	Partial, Medium
	Is this a legal requirement?	No Provisions
	Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available?	Good, Robust
	If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released?	Good, Robust
5. Is demographic and other information on officers in use of force incidents
	Collected?	Limited, Poor
	Accessible through existing publicly available information?	Limited, Poor
	Is this a legal requirement?	No Provisions
	Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available?	Good, Robust
	If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released?	Limited, Poor
6. Is information on the circumstances
	Collected?	Limited, Poor
	Publicly available?	Limited, Poor
	Is this a legal requirement?	No Provisions
	Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available?	Good, Robust
	If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released?	Limited, Poor
7. Is information about the type(s) of force used
	Collected?	Limited, Poor
	Accessible through existing publicly available information?	Limited, Poor
	Is this a legal requirement?	No Provisions
	Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available?	Good, Robust
	If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released?	Limited, Poor

Data quality of official sources

8. How reliable are the sources used to produce official statistics about deaths?		Good, Robust
9. Are there mechanisms for internal quality assurance / verification conducted		Partial, Medium
10. Is the methodology for data collection publicised?		Good, Robust
11. How reliable are the overall figures produced?		Good, Robust

Data analysis and lessons learnt

12. Do state or police agencies analyse data on the use of lethal force, to prevent future deaths?		Partial, Medium
13. Is there evidence that state/ police agencies act on the results of their analysis, including applying lessons learnt?		Partial, Medium
14. Are external bodies are able to reuse data for their own analyses?		Partial, Medium
15. Do external, non-governmental agencies collect and publish their own statistics on deaths following police use of force?		Partial, Medium

Investigations by official agencies

16. Is there a legal requirement for deaths to be independently investigated?		Good, Robust
17. If so, which organisation(s) conduct these investigations?		Military Criminal Justice System, Office of the Inspector-General of the Nation, and Office of the Ombudsman
19. Are close relatives of the victims involved in the investigations?		Limited, Poor
20. Investigation reports into deaths
	Are publicly available?	Partial, Medium
	Give reasons for the conclusions they have reached?	Limited, Poor
	Is this a legal requirement?	Good, Robust
	Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available?	Good, Robust
	If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released?	Good, Robust
21. Is there information available on legal proceedings against agents / officials, pursuant to deaths?		No Provisions
22. Is there information available on legal proceedings against state agencies, pursuant to deaths?		No Provisions
23. Is there information available on disciplinary proceedings against agents/ officials, pursuant to deaths?		Partial, Medium
24. Number of prosecutions against agents / officials involved in the last ten years?		Unable to be determined
25. Number of convictions against agents / officials involved in the last ten years?		Unable to be determined
26. Number of prosecutions against agencies involved in the last ten years?		Unable to be determined
27. Number of convictions against agencies involved in the last ten years?		Agencies are not subject to investigations or accusations, only public officers allegedly responsible for the events.

Detailed elaboration

Data collection and publication by official agencies

In Colombia, any case of externally caused fatal injury (death) anywhere in the country requires a technical expert report provided by the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences, regardless of whether or not it is the result of an authority’s actions in upholding the law. These reports include descriptive sociodemographic, circumstantial, spatiotemporal, and other variables that help determine if a death was violent²⁴. Since forensic investigation does not involve criminal liability judgments, the Office of the Attorney General and the Police conduct parallel investigations into the incidents. If the investigation suggests the involvement of any public official, the Office of the Inspector-General of the Nation initiates another inquiry as part of its oversight role over the conduct of any public servant. Additionally, the Office of the Ombudsman, another entity responsible for overseeing public functions, can submit reports or draw the attention of the entities to events that violate citizens’ human rights.

On its website, the National Institute of Legal Medicine publishes monthly statistical bulletins on forensic data related to externally caused injuries it has a record of. These reports include clinical and pathological information with victim variables such as sex, causes of death, date of death, age group, city or municipality where the incident occurred, and context. These figures are presented as presumptions, since only through subsequent investigations carried out by relevant authorities can this information be definitively established. Additionally, every year it publishes a general report on these incidents that includes some descriptive statistical analyses.

The National Police and administrative authorities are the entities with the most wide-ranging presence across the national territory. Police stations and substations cover both rural and urban areas in each of Colombia’s 1,123 municipalities²⁵. Due to this territorial scope, the National Police is often the first authority to become aware of most cases of externally caused injuries. The police are required to record all incidents in its information system through their SIEDCO system (Statistical, Criminal, and Operational Information System- according to its acronym in Spanish), regardless of whether a member of law enforcement is potentially involved, or the incident occurred during law enforcement activities by any authority. Studies conducted by Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP) in 2020 revealed that the police’s public databases omitted cases of violent civilian deaths in operations carried out by law enforcement in defense of the population and the state²⁶. This situation may have changed as, in the last two years, both the police and the Ministry of Defense now include these cases in their published databases. The National Police also publishes cumulative total crime statistics reports on its website each month, including information such as type of weapon, location, date, sex, age group, and number of victims.

The Attorney General’s Office creates a criminal report for each case it investigates and that enters the regular justice system. The progress of these criminal reports can be observed in the Oral Accusatory Criminal Justice System (SPOA) throughout its various procedural stages. However, this information is not published by the entity in any digital or physical mechanism.

The Office of the Inspector-General of the Nation and the Office of the Ombudsman do not have publicly available databases on their platforms either. Nevertheless, they may periodically release bulletins, reports, or documents with information.

The Military and Police Criminal Justice Systems also keep data on cases where there is suspected involvement of members of law enforcement on active duty. However, these data are difficult to access and analyze, as the information management system is ineffective and vulnerable to errors and manipulation by officials²⁷. These data are also not available on the platforms of these entities.

For several years the country has had a digital state platform called Datos Abiertos Colombia where a variety of statistics, including crime data, can be found and downloaded in various formats. This platform can have some outdated figures and may lack certain variables that could be accessed through other more direct request mechanisms.

The requirement to document the number of deaths resulting from the use of force by law enforcement agencies is a legal mandate as it constitutes part of the crime investigation conducted by the authorities. However, this does not necessarily entail that the information must be publicly disclosed.

When agencies do not provide public access to their data and statistics, or in cases where more detailed information is required, it is possible to request such data through mechanisms such as the ‘right of petition,’ which is a formal written request for information, and the Petitions, Complaints, Claims, and Suggestions System (PQRS). These requests may encompass victim information such as ethnic background, age, gender, type of weapon, nationality, marital status, occupation, level of education, and other relevant factors. It is also possible to seek information about alleged aggressors including sex, occupation, age, nationality, and other pertinent details. These actions are supported by Article 23 of the Colombian Constitution, which stipulates that everyone has the right to respectfully submit enquiries to the authorities for either general or personal interests. The relevant institutions or agencies are required to provide a formal written response within ten days of the request. It is advisable that when requesting information about cases involving deaths or injuries related to the use of force by law enforcement agencies, including those arising from operational activities, the petition should explicitly specify the type of information sought.

Through these mechanisms it is highly probable that the authorities may share general statistical figures that do not encompass information protected by Habeas Data, such as names, addresses, or any other specifics that could be used to identify individuals. Data related to classified judicial information or that is part of ongoing investigations cannot be disclosed. Delays may occur when entities provide information in formats that hinder data analysis, such as PDF. Additionally, the excuse of classified information may be invoked to withhold certain data. In cases where data is withheld, it is possible to challenge these decisions by submitting further requests or notifying another agency. However, resolving these issues may take time. The response time may also be delayed when a request is forwarded to different departments within the same agency, as none of them may assume responsibility for providing a response.

To identify the number of deaths based on official statistics, supplementary manual work is required. This entails subjecting the shared databases to a cleansing process to eliminate duplications and typographical errors (for example, a case with one death mistakenly listed as 100 deaths). It may not be directly feasible to compare the databases between agencies. Manual efforts may be undertaken to ascertain total deaths and select characteristics for potential comparison. Notably, in 2017 the National Police’s information system SIEDCO underwent two significant changes in the consolidation of its crime figures. The first involved integrating administrative records of complaints from the Attorney General’s Office criminal system. The second entailed the introduction of a ‘report a crime’ application that enables citizens to file complaints via a webpage. These changes yielded substantial variations in the data measuring any recorded criminal activity in the country, thus impeding comparability of crime statistics before and after integration²⁸. Today organizations requesting criminal information still seek data separately from both the Police and the General Attorney as a means of ensuring data quality.

Demographic information is collected by the authorities as it facilitates the characterization of the deceased. This data may be employed by other public agencies to create documents, recommendations, and public policies. However, it is not a legal mandate to collect such information.

As previously mentioned, any death or externally caused injury identified by the authorities or reported by individuals must be documented and investigated in Colombia, irrespective of whether the alleged aggressor was a member of a law enforcement authority. All cases should undergo the same investigative process until it is determined whether they should follow ordinary justice procedures or military court jurisdiction. Regardless of the path, the case must be recorded in the system, at least in the databases of the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences, the Office of the Attorney General, and the National Police. Consequently, information regarding incidents involving the use of force, including demographic, circumstantial, and type of force details, should be accessible just as in any other case. Nevertheless, this does not always happen. Instances may arise, such as when individuals fail to initiate claims in the Police or Attorney General’s Office systems, or during military operations involving air and ground bombings, which may render it impossible to determine the total number of deaths. Furthermore, when the police or the military themselves directly assume control of a case and place it under Military Justice jurisdiction, it will not enter the ordinary justice system.

Data quality of official sources

The institutions responsible for producing official statistics about deaths in Colombia are deemed reliable, given the country’s history of violence and conflict, which has prompted these entities to construct and continually enhance sufficient, dependable, and effective mechanisms for responding to information requests. Furthermore, state agencies tasked with overseeing public officials, such as the Office of the Inspector General, have been developing more effective mechanisms supported by increased budgets to ensure efficient preventive and punitive efforts.

The existence of multiple institutions producing data enables cross-referencing of information. Additionally, private media enjoy broad access to direct sources, and numerous civil society organizations engage in oversight and supervision activities of various phenomena, including instances of the use of force involving members of law enforcement agencies. However, within the criminal investigation and prosecution chain, the judicial branch faces the most significant and complex challenges in terms of data collection, organization, and publication. As a result, information on general criminal cases, including instances of the use of force, tends to have relatively acceptable-quality data until the penalization stage, which remains a major concern in the country.

The methodology for data collection is publicly available. In the case of the National Police, the Criminal Investigation Unit operates 51 decentralized offices throughout the country for data collection. This approach allows for the gathering of a substantial volume of statistics on potential criminal activity. The information is consolidated from citizen complaints submitted either in-person at the offices or through a web-based format, as well as from cases addressed daily by the police. The data is manually entered into the system, encompassing both criminal behavior and police services such as seizures and recovered merchandise²⁹. Subsequently, the data is registered in SIEDCO and subjected to daily analysis by an automated software that generates statistics. It then undergoes a verification process.

Collaborative efforts are being undertaken with the Attorney General’s Office to unify crime figures in their databases. Initially, each unit conducting the initial data collection validates the information before entering it into SIEDCO, ensuring no duplications and confirming adherence to the principles of reality, accuracy, and legal motives. The data quality team at the Attorney General’s Office then monitors the inputted data to identify gaps and errors. Following these steps, the National Police’s statistical reporting team processes and extracts information from SIEDCO to generate reports and documents. While methodological issues in the collection of criminal figures may exist, it is possible to assert that there is a moderate level of reliability in the numbers collected by the authorities.

The SPOA employed by the Attorney General’s Office is also manually entered with information derived from citizen complaints, events attended by officials from the agency, and data transferred by other entities initiating investigations or complaints for the office to pursue.

Despite this general level of reliability, there is still scope for improvement in enhancing methodologies, transparency and access to information. This includes improved inter-institutional coordination mechanisms, the incorporation of technology to streamline and enhance data upload processes, and the reduction of data classified as sensitive or related to security matters unless genuinely warranted.

Data analysis and lessons learned

While state police agencies have established data collection and analysis processes to generate regular monthly and annual reports, these reports often focus on general data descriptions. Unfortunately, there is limited evidence of public recommendations or lessons learned aimed at preventing future deaths. This is a consistent criticism that organizations from civil society have directed at state institutions over the years. These agencies do analyze the data internally and convene committees to discuss problems and situations. However, these discussions tend to remain internal and become public only when policy, protocol, or structural changes are under consideration.

Public service oversight entities like the Office of the Inspector General and the Office of the Ombudsman include alerts in some of their reports, highlighting situations that jeopardize human rights compliance. Nevertheless, specific public policy recommendations addressing the prevention of homicides, including those related to instances of force, have been notably absent.

Institutional reports documenting lessons learned and actions taken by state police agencies in response to use of force have also been lacking, despite being a recurring point of criticism.

Investigations by official agencies

Within the Colombian legal framework, victims of police violence can file complaints before disciplinary and criminal instances. The Office of the Inspector-General of the Nation and the National Police are obliged to process these complaints, and the Office of the Local Ombudsman must investigate the reported incidents to determine whether they are related to the performance of duty or if they constitute intentional misconduct. According to Article 221 of the Constitution, if the Attorney General’s Office determines that the incidents are related to duty, their judicial proceedings are conducted under the provisions of the Military Criminal Code, before military courts or tribunals. However, if the incidents are deemed to involve intentional misconduct not related to duty, or if they are linked to acts of genocide, enforced disappearance, or any violation of international humanitarian law, they must be handled by the ordinary judiciary. It is common for investigations to transition from one jurisdiction to the other amidst discussions about whether the incidents occurred while on duty.

In addition to these two legal pathways the Office of the Inspector-General of the Nation and the Office of the Ombudsman can initiate additional investigations. The Office of the Inspector-General has judicial police powers, which enable it to remove officials from their posts and disqualify them from public service for several years.

One obstacle that may hinder the effective prosecution of crimes committed by members of law enforcement is that the Attorney General’s Office may not be aware of cases that warrant investigation for criminal activity. This can occur either because victims do not report incidents, or because the law enforcement agencies themselves assume jurisdiction and process the cases within the Military and Police Justice System, without transmitting this information to any other authority. This situation may arise in cases of individuals killed in operations or confrontations between the public forces and criminal groups, or in regions where the Office of the Attorney General or the Police face challenges in maintaining a continuous presence due to armed groups that impede their activities³⁰.

Evidence of these shortcomings in the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed by members of the police force is reflected in the following data. Between 2017 and 2019, the Institute of Legal Medicine registered the National Police as allegedly responsible for the homicides of 289 individuals, while the Attorney General’s Office opened a total of 127 investigations during the same period for these incidents. This implies that in 44% of cases documented by the Institute of Legal Medicine, the Attorney General’s Office initiated formal investigations. Of these 127 investigations, two led to convictions and four were archived, signifying that 0.69% of homicides allegedly committed by the National Police between 2017 and 2019 resulted in convictions³¹.

In Colombia, it is not common for the families of victims to engage with the investigative process. This may be a consequence of the fear of reprisals, as raising awareness about such incidents could lead to scandals or tarnish the reputation of the law enforcement institution. In this regard, the media and certain civil society organizations have served as platforms to highlight cases. However, this has not guaranteed swift and effective legal proceedings.

Typically, there is confidentiality of proceedings regarding ongoing investigations and certain stages of legal proceedings. This makes it challenging to access publicly available information during the trial phase. More information may be available before charges are filed, or after sentences are issued. In cases overseen by the Military and Police Justice System, access to such data is even more difficult. Nevertheless, it is always possible to utilize information request mechanisms, and it is common for institutions to provide general data on ongoing cases. This is mainly the victim-related information. Regarding data and figures about members of law enforcement, the information is nearly impossible to find. Moreover, institutions often justify withholding such information on the grounds that, prior to a verdict, they cannot disclose evidence that is still under examination.

The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) recently established within the framework of the peace agreement between the Colombian State and the former FARC guerrillas, has made significant progress in investigating the involvement of the National Police and the Armed Forces in civilian deaths. Many of these hearings have been public, allowing for the testimonies of victims, their families, and perpetrators to be heard. Charges and sentences —which fall under a specific legal agreement for cases investigated and adjudicated by this jurisdiction within the truth, justice, reparation, and non-repetition framework established by the agreement— are expected to start being published by the end of 2023 and will continue for the next years until JEP finishes its mandate which is maximum in 2037. In addition to JEP, the Truth Commission published its report a year ago, compiling testimonies and narratives that also address instances of abuse by law enforcement against civilians. The document includes recommendations aimed at ensuring non-repetition of human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law that Colombia experienced in the last century.

Non-official sources

• Fundación Ideas para la Paz: This is an independent think tank aimed at generating objective knowledge and initiatives that contribute to peacebuilding. For several years, it has produced reports on the use of lethal force by law enforcement agencies and documents making recommendations for the effective prosecution of crimes committed by them, as well as supervision and control of the Police, among other topics. Website: https://ideaspaz.org
• Temblores NGO: This civil society organization, primarily composed of young individuals, seeks to “mobilize community processes of social transformation.” It has produced reports on incidents of police violence in recent years, utilizing secondary information from entities responsible for investigating these cases. Website: https://www.temblores.org
• Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa: A non-governmental organization dedicated to “defending freedom of expression and promoting an optimal environment for journalistic activities”. It has released reports on incidents in which journalists have been targeted by members of law enforcement during their news coverage.
• De Justicia: A center for studies on law, justice, and society. They have undertaken projects involving primary data collection, conducted research, and produced documents with recommendations on this subject. Website: https://www.dejusticia.org
• Various private entities, civil society organizations and international cooperation groups have repeatedly sought information from authorities to conduct extensive public analyses, create reports, and monitor the activities and institutional development of law enforcement entities using their own resources. These documents commonly contain recommendations and insights gained from experience to propose new approaches to criminal and violent phenomena, promote internal structural enhancements, and suggest actions to prevent and address homicides, including those resulting from the use of force.
• Organizations like Temblores, Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa, Cerac, and Fundación Paz y Reconciliación have independently collected and compiled information to create their own datasets on deaths resulting from police use of force. Although some of these reports have contributed to public policy discussions, influenced the drafting of bills in Congress, and prompted reflection among leaders and public officials heading key institutions, it is worth noting that some of this data may lack rigorous methodological standards.

Part 3: Comparative indicators

I-1a. CK: Number of civilians killed by law enforcement agents on duty, by gunshot	238
I-1b. CKt: Number of civilians killed by law enforcement agents, regardless of means and whether or not on duty	251
I-1c. CW: Number of civilians wounded by law enforcement agents on duty, by gunshot	94
I-1d. CWt: Number of civilians wounded by law enforcement agents, whether or not on duty and regardless of means	3.839
I-2. CK per 100000 inhabitants	0.47
I-3. CK per 1000 law enforcement agents	0.53
I-4. CK per 1000 arrests	1.4
I-5. CK per 1000 weapons seized	13.9
I-6. AK: Number of law enforcement officers unlawfully killed on duty by firearm	134
I-6b. AKt: Number of law enforcement officers unlawfully killed, whether or not on duty and regardless of means	163
I-7. AK per 1000 agents	0.3
A1. Percentage of homicides due to state intervention	2
A2. Ratio between CK and AK	1.8
A3. Civilian lethality index: Ratio between CK and CW	0.18
A4. Lethality ratio: Ratio between Civilian lethality index and law enforcement agents lethality index	0.19
A5. Average number of civilians killed by intentional gunshot, per incident	0.15

The following information corresponds to the year 2020. Further information on methodology and characterization on the data can be found in Monitor of Use of Lethal Force in Latin America and the Caribbean — Colombia 2022³²:

The indicators were calculated based on the databases provided by the National Police and the Attorney General’s Office. Other public entities were consulted but the information received could not be used for this analysis.

The databases contain figures for violent deaths and injuries allegedly perpetrated by law enforcement agents using firearms and against them as victims. The term ‘allegedly’ is used here since these figures come from complaints recorded by the police or criminal investigations that have not yet led to judicial decisions. The nature of the information means that it cannot be determined whether or not the deaths and injuries of LEA or those allegedly caused by them occurred while they were on duty.

The proxy used to obtain the number of civilians allegedly killed by LEA, sourced from the National Police database, were individuals allegedly killed by the use of firearms and classified as “member of a criminal group or criminal offender”.

During 2020, 12,320 homicides, of which 9371 were perpetrated with firearms, were recorded by the National Police in Colombia.

The database from the National Police and the one from the Attorney General’s Office presented numerical discrepancies, especially in the count of civilian victims. These differentials relate partially to their geographical deployment. For instance, the National Police is the entity with the largest amount of personnel and work stations available to respond to any situation throughout the territory, which means that it frequently receives and records the initial information about any incident, as it usually receives the highest number of reports. Therefore, it is likely to have the highest number of records, serving as the first link in the investigative and prosecutorial chain during a crime investigation. On the other hand, as the Attorney General’s Office operates through 35 regional branches that handle reported crimes occurring in the whole country, its territorial scope contributes to its figures being lower than those recorded by the police.

Although the data does not provide insights into why the reports registered in the police database do not necessarily lead to criminal charges and investigations, the differences between the two databases give an indication of the number of reports that do not progress to the judicial investigation or trial stage. In other words, the numerical gap points to the cases that have been dismissed, filed, or closed.

The National Police database served as the source for all calculations, except for the information regarding injuries from firearms, therefore the civilian lethality index, lethality ratio, and average of civilians killed by intentional gunshot per incident were calculated using the data from the Attorney General’s Office (I-1.c, I-1.d, A3, A4, A5). This happened because the police’s information about injuries did not include the variable of alleged perpetrator or any other proxy, while the Prosecutor’s Office data includes information describing the characteristics of person that is suspect of committing a crime included a variable of the crime suspect. It is very important to take this point into consideration before seeking to draw general conclusions from the information.

Even though the two databases were used to complete the indicators, the information was not mixed for the calculations.

Another important aspect that drew attention during the calculation of the indicators had to do with the two databases obtained from the National Police source. One was available on National Police’s Crime Observatory webpage, which is publicly accessible³³. The other was requested through a right of petition³⁴ specifying a requirement for all cases involving deaths or injuries of either LEA or civilians allegedly caused by their actions, including those resulting from operational activities. Upon comparing the information from both databases, it was found that in the case of civilians allegedly killed due to the actions of LEA, there were approximately 70% more records in the database obtained through the right of petition compared to the public one. In cases where the victims were LEA there were almost no differences between these sources of information.

The differentials between the two databases suggest, as highlighted by FIP since 2018 in previous reports, that the behavior of the police in manipulating figures to achieve favorable operational outcomes continued. Police were removing violent civilian deaths from the public record that should be included, even if they were part of operations carried out with legitimate use of force in defense of the population and the State. Given that the police is typically the first entity to receive data about such incidents, any violent death they have information about should have been recorded in their database.

Below is a comparative chart of both databases:

	Public database	Right to petitition database
Number of civilians presumed killed by law enforcement agents 2018	92	275
Number of civilians presumed killed by law enforcement agents 2019	62	240
Number of civilians presumed killed by law enforcement agents 2020	74	251
Number of civilians presumed killed by law enforcement agents by firearms 2018	80	239
Number of civilians presumed killed by law enforcement agents by firearms 2019	59	220
Number of civilians presumed killed by law enforcement agents by firearms 2020	63	238
Number of unlawfully killed law enforcement agents 2018 Unlawfully: Homicides only, excluding suicides and accidents	182	183
Number of unlawfully killed law enforcement agents 2019	181	181
Number of unlawfully killed law enforcement agents 2020	162	163
Number of unlawfully killed law enforcement agents by firearms 2018	132	133
Number of unlawfully killed law enforcement agents by firearms 2019	121	121
Number of unlawfully killed law enforcement agents by firearms 2020	133	134

Summary and recommendations

A prevailing logic of conflict has affected the way the Colombian State has addressed criminal and social issues in the country over the past century, resulting in excessive use of force that sometimes appears to be legitimized by a portion of society. This leads to confusion between the concepts of citizen security and state security, in which the friend-enemy logic places citizens at risk and makes them vulnerable to police abuse. This serves as an indicator of the government’s and local authorities’ incapacity to effectively address social demands. However, this does not seem to be a uniquely Colombian situation, but rather one that is related to the regional and global context.

The use of armed forces, particularly the army, is not an exceptional occurrence in the country. Figures such as military assistance to ensure urban security are constant and generate risks in terms of the use of force and potential human rights violations. This phenomenon, which has been more prevalent in rural areas, now exhibits urban characteristics that must be considered.

One of the negative impacts of the armed conflict and the phenomenon of drug trafficking in Colombia has been the neglect of the preventive function by the police, which has instead prioritized reactive tasks in response to activities carried out by various groups. This emphasis has overshadowed the attention to social coexistence and citizen security, which corresponds to its fundamental mission.

The history of violence in Colombia has had an impact on the National Police, leading to its militarization in terms of command structure and training³⁵. Regarding the Armed Forces, it can be said that they have dedicated almost all their efforts to combating armed groups operating outside the law or any other activity deemed related to them. During this struggle, the Armed Forces ended up assuming policing tasks unrelated to purely military operations and for which they are not always suited, such as urban surveillance, contraband control, road patrolling, prevention or control of rural marches, and civic strikes. Therefore, the role of civilians in decision-making regarding the use of force and the guidance of these agencies in different contexts is crucial. In this sense, there are responsibilities that have not been thoroughly analyzed or have remained purely political. Mayors, governors, ministers, and other civil authorities involved in operational and policy decisions have responsibilities when events that require the use of force take place, since the law enforcement agencies obey their directions and these agencies’ high commands are most of the time coupled with them. So, a decision that can result in an abuse of force by police and the military is not only a responsibility of the officer that committed it, but it also has a political responsibility since the civil authorities are the head commanders of these forces, therefore that must be explored³⁶.

A broad discussion on lethal weapons policy is needed in the country. The regulation and use of these by law enforcement must go beyond manual guidelines and engage in complex discussions that consider the entire production, distribution, and end-user chain³⁷.

Oversight and control remain a pending task for the authorities. The concerted exercise of authority by institutions such as the Office of the Inspector-General and the effective investigation by the Attorney General’s Office are necessary to achieve the rational use of force by police and the military forces. As long as such measures are not effectively developed, it will be impossible to properly recognize the issues associated with the use of force and advance in its control³⁸.

More and improved mechanisms of information are necessary to understand use of force. These mechanisms must possess the necessary transparency to instill confidence in the information and analyses they produce. While the country has available, centralized and controlled official information, there is still a need for improvement³⁹.

Criminal justice authorities offer an insufficient response to investigative and judicial needs arising from acts of violence by law enforcement. There is inadequate attribution of individual criminal responsibility. Thus, it would be important to establish or strengthen human rights units in certain regional branches of the General Attorney’s Office, with independent capabilities to address cases against members of law enforcement⁴⁰.

Modifying Article 221 of the Constitution is important, so that military courts only handle offenses strictly related to military interests and allow ordinary justice to investigate and judge all acts of violence or corruption, whether associated with military service, police service or another kind⁴¹.

It is essential that there be full access to specific data on the use of force and that institutions publish regular reports. Colombia would benefit from a new National Law on the Use of Force that establishes the obligation to annually release reports containing the number of individuals who died due to the use of force. However, such reports should also provide information about cases of the use of force by law enforcement agencies (legitimate or illegitimate), the location of the incident, and the follow-up of the case. The records should be supervised, audited for quality, and open for use in external investigations. Moreover, the records should include all institutions employing lethal force, extending beyond the National Police.

References, data sources and downloads

1 Constitución Política de Colombia, título VII, capítulo 7, art. 216 (1991).

2 Artículo 218 de la Constitución Política de Colombia (Asamblea Constituyente de 1991: 53).

3 D. J. Vásquez Hincapié y L. M. Gil-García, “Modelo constitucional de la fuerza pública en Colombia”, Prolegómenos 20(39), (2017): 139-162. Available at: https://doi.org/10.18359/prole.2728 (consulted on 15-Sep-2023).

4 Vásquez Hincapié et al., “Modelo constitucional” (2017), op. cit.

5 Directiva Transitoria No. 0205 (febrero de 1999), Policía Nacional

6 VICE World, “¿Qué tan paila es el ESMAD de otros países?”, Vice. Disponible en: https://www.vice.com/es_co/article/xw8wwn/vice-esmad-antidisturbios-mundo-policia; Revista Semana, “Denuncian impunidad del ESMAD en homicidios de estudiantes”, Semana (8 de abril de 2016). Available from: https://www.semana.com/educacion/articulo/impunidad-del-esmad-por-asesinato-de-estudiantes/484578

7 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Resolución 05228 “Por la cual se expide el manual de control de manifestaciones y disturbios para la Policía Nacional”, (27 de noviembre de 2015). Available from: https://www.policia.edu.co/documentos/normatividad_2016/manuales/Manual%20de%20control%20 de%20manifestaciones%20y%20disturbios%20para%20la%20Polic%C3%ADa%20Nacional.pdf

8 As a result of its ruling issued on September 22, 2020, regarding repeated violent conduct by the ESMAD and the Public Force in the context of protests and peaceful demonstrations, the Supreme Court of Colombia ordered the ESMAD (as well as any institution performing police functions) to suspend the use of 12-gauge shotguns, previously authorized under the Manual for Controlling Demonstrations and Disturbances (Supreme Court of Justice, 2020)..

9 Resolución 00448 (2015), op. cit.

10 Agence France Press, “Cauca, un indígena muerto en acción del ESMAD”, El Nuevo Siglo (9 de mayo de 2017). Disponible en: https://www.elnuevosiglo.com.co/articulos/05-2017-cauca-un-indigena-muertoen-accion-del-esmad.

11 A. Vanegas, Responsabilidad del ESMAD por abuso de autoridad en los paros agrarios (Colombia: Universidad Santo Tomás, 2017). Disponible en: https://repository.usta.edu.co/handle/11634/2038; Revista Semana, “Denuncian impunidad del ESMAD” (2016), op. cit.

12 Revista Semana, “Tropel sangriento: ¿Qué hacer con el ESMAD?”, Semana (23 de julio 23 de 2016). Disponible en: https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/esmad-cuestionado-por-abuso-de-autoridad/482972

13 Ibid.

14 https://razonpublica.com/paso-la-reforma-del-esmad/

15 System developed in the “Defend Freedom: A Matter for All” Campaign of CSPP, and it carries out a process of systematizing complaints based on press releases, social organizations’ bulletins, media reports, and reports from civil society verification and intervention commissions (CSPP, 2019).

16 Ibid.

17 Resolución 1190 (2018). Disponible en: https://www.mininterior.gov.co/la-institucion/normatividad/resolucion-1190-del-3-de-agosto-de-2018

18 https://www.canalinstitucional.tv/noticias/director-policia-cambios-esmad-protocolos-intervencion; https://razonpublica.com/paso-la-reforma-del-esmad

19 https://www.dnp.gov.co/plan-nacional-desarrollo/Paginas/default.aspx.

20 Cuastumal Madrid, J. (2013) Casos colombianos fallados por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Estudio a través de la teoría del derecho procesal. Estudios de Derecho, 70(155). https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.esde.20015

21 https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/cortes/condenan-a-miguel-maza-marquez-por-crimen-de-luis-carlos-galan-50810

22 https://www.mapp-oea.org/mappoea/acerca-de-la-mappoea/

23 https://colombia.unmissions.org/en/mandate

24 Forensis 2021. https://www.medicinalegal.gov.co/documents/20143/878249/Forensis_2021.pdf

25 https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/poblacion/proyepobla06_20/ProyeccionMunicipios2005_2020.xls

26 J. Castillo, M. E. Lleras, M. Suarez, Sin política pública contra los homicidios no es posible proteger el derecho a la vida en Colombia (Bogotá: Fundación Ideas para la Paz, 2018). Disponible en: https://ideaspaz.org/media/website/FIP_NE_Homicidios_Diciembre.pdf

27 Persecución penal de delitos cometidos por miembros de la fuerza pública: problemas críticos y algunos elementos para su solución. FIP 2021

28 Cambios Metodológicos en las estadísticas de Seguridad Ciudadana. Oficina de análisis de información y estudios estratégicos. Secretaría se seguridad, convivencia y justicia. Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá. Septiembre 2018. https://scj.gov.co/sites/default/files/documentos_oaiee/Final%20estadisticas-sector-seguridad.pdf

29 Ficha metodológica, Sistema Estadístico Nacional de Colombia, https://www.policia.gov.co/sites/default/files/ficha_metodologica_operacion_estadistica.pdf

30 Persecución penal de delitos cometidos por miembros de la fuerza pública. Problemas críticos y algunos elementos para su solución. Fundación Ideas para la paz, diciembre 2021.

31 Bolillo, Dios y Patria. Temblores, 2020: 65-66. https://www.temblores.org/bolillo-dios-y-patria.

32 Monitor of Lethal Force in Latin America and the Caribbean, Colombia 2022. Fundación Ideas para la Paz. https://www.monitorfuerzaletal.com/docs/MonitorFuerzaLetal_2022_Colombia.pdf

33 https://www.policia.gov.co/grupo-informacion-criminalidad/estadistica-delictiva

34 This mechanism will be explain in detail in another section of this document.

35 Monitor of Lethal Force in Latin America and the Caribbean, Colombia 2022. Fundación Ideas para la Paz. https://www.monitorfuerzaletal.com/docs/MonitorFuerzaLetal_2022_Colombia.pdf

36 Monitor del uso de la fuerza letal en América Latina: Un estudio comparativo de Brasil, Colombia, El Salvador, México y Venezuela 2019. Capítulo de Colombia, Fundación Ideas para la Paz. https://www.monitorfuerzaletal.com/docs/MonitorFuerzaLetal_2019.pdf

37 Monitor of Lethal Force in Latin America and the Caribbean, Colombia 2022. Fundación Ideas para la Paz. https://www.monitorfuerzaletal.com/docs/MonitorFuerzaLetal_2022_Colombia.pdf

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Persecución penal de delitos cometidos por miembros de la fuerza pública: problemas críticos y algunos elementos para su solución. FIP 2021. https://www.storage.ideaspaz.org/documents/FIP_Fescol_FinalV1.pdf

41 Ibid.

Other sources

Persecución penal de delitos cometidos por miembros de la fuerza pública: problemas críticos y algunos elementos para su solución. Fundación Ideas para la Paz 2021.

Monitor of Lethal Force in Latin America and the Caribbean, Colombia 2022. Fundación Ideas para la Paz.

Monitor del uso de la fuerza letal en América Latina: Un estudio comparativo de Brasil, Colombia, El Salvador, México y Venezuela 2019. Capítulo de Colombia, Fundación Ideas para la Paz.

Siete recomendaciones para desbloquear el direccionamiento, supervisión y control civil de la fuerza pública. Fundación Ideas para la Paz 2022.

Agence France Press. “Cauca, un indígena muerto en acción del ESMAD”. El Nuevo Siglo, 2017. Disponible en: https://www.elnuevosiglo.com.co/articulos/05-2017-cauca-un-indigena-muerto-en-accion-del-esmad

Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas. Código de conducta para funcionarios encargados de hacer cumplir la ley adoptado por la Asamblea General en su resolución 34/169, 1979. Disponible en: https://www.ohchr.org/SP/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/LawEnforcementOfficials.aspx Barómetro de las Américas.

Castillo J., Lleras M. E., Suarez, M. Sin política pública contra los homicidios no es posible proteger el derecho a la vida en Colombia. Bogotá: Fundación Ideas para la Paz, 2018. Disponible en: https://ideaspaz.org/media/website/FIP_NE_Homicidios_Diciembre.pdf

Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE). Proyección población 2017, 2017. Disponible en: https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/demografia-y-poblacion/proyecciones-de-poblacion

Escuela Militar de Cadetes General José María Córdova (ESMIC). Manuales de derecho operacional, 2018. Disponible en: https://www.esmic.edu.co/index.php?idcategoria=2849

Fierro, H. El derecho operacional en el conflicto armado: como fundamento de los juicios penales y de responsabilidad del estado. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Ibáñez, 2015.

Informe Anual del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos en Colombia, sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en Colombia, 2018. Disponible en: http://www.hchr.org.co/index.php/informes-y-documentos/informes-anuales/8887-informe-del-alto-comisionado-de-las-naciones-unidas-para-los-derechos-humanos-sobre-la-situacion-de-derechos-humanos-en-colombia-durante-el-ano-2017

“¿Quién se le mide a formar parte del ESMAD, la fuerza más odiada de Colombia?”. Las2Orillas (22 de mayo de 2017). Disponible en: https://www.las2orillas.co/quienes-se-le-miden-formar-parte-del-esmad-la-fuerza-mas-odiada-colombia/

Leal Buitrago, F. “Eficacia de la Fuerza Pública y adecuación de estrategias: ¿hacia una paz sostenible?” (Segunda parte), Razón Pública (5 de febrero de 2012). Disponible en: https://www.razonpublica.com/index.php/econom-y-sociedad-temas-29/2701-francisco-leal.html

Ley 1698 de 2013. Disponible en: https://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Normativa/Leyes/Documents/2013/LEY%201698%20DEL%2026%20DE%20DICIEMBRE%20DE%202013.pdf Ministerio de Defensa Nacional.

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